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Abstract 
Societies around the world are faced with flood risk, prompting authorities and decision 
makers to manage risk to protect population and assets. With climate change, 
urbanisation and population growth, flood risk changes constantly, requiring flood risk 
management strategies that are flexible and robust. Traditional risk management 
solutions, e.g. dike construction, are not particularly flexible, as they are difficult to 
adapt to changing risk. Conversely, the recent concept of integrated flood risk 
management, entailing a combination of several structural and non-structural risk 
management measures, allows identifying flexible and robust flood risk management 
strategies. Based on it, this thesis investigates hierarchical flood protection systems, 
which encompass two, or more, hierarchically integrated flood protection structures on 
different spatial scales (e.g. dikes, local flood barriers and dry-proofed buildings), which 
jointly reduce risk. Hierarchical flood protection systems offer several advantages 
compared to single-structure flood protection systems, since they can be precision-
tailored to fit risk reduction requirements and allow for flexible adaption of the 
protection system to changing flood risk.  
In the presence of flood protection structures, flood development depends on the 
state of all protection structures in the system. As such, hazard is a function not only of 
rainfall and river discharge, but also of protection structures’ fragility. A methodology 
for flood risk analysis and decision analysis for hierarchical flood protection systems is 
proposed, which allows for joint consideration of hazard models and fragility models of 
protection structures. 
 In the implementation of the flood risk analysis methodology several challenges are 
identified, two of which are addressed in the present thesis. First, design and 
optimisation of a hierarchical flood protection system generally entails decisions about 
structures at different spatial scales, which, in turn, may require risk assessment at 
different spatial resolutions and levels of detail. Consistent risk modelling at different 
spatial scales may therefore require up- and downscaling of data and models under due 
consideration of uncertainties and dependencies. In this thesis, a methodology is 
vii 
proposed for spatially disaggregating an aggregated building portfolio considering 
disaggregation uncertainty and spatial correlation. The methodology is applied to the 
disaggregation of portfolios of buildings in two communes in Switzerland. The 
relevance of disaggregation uncertainty to natural hazard risk assessment is illustrated 
with a simple flood risk assessment example.  
A second challenge - fragility and vulnerability modelling of all protection 
structures in the hierarchical flood protection system - is identified. To optimise the 
design of protection structures, fragility and vulnerability models must allow for 
consideration of decision alternatives. While such vulnerability models are available for 
large protection structures (e.g. dikes), engineering vulnerability models that allow 
considering the impact of flood proofing measures on residential building vulnerability 
seem to be lacking. Thus, a flood vulnerability modelling approach for residential 
buildings is proposed, which allows for detailed building and hazard characterisation 
and models damages though explicit consideration of damage processes. The modelling 
approach allows for describing the impact of flood proofing measures on building 
vulnerability and can be utilised as a basis for decision analysis. 
The concept and usefulness of hierarchical flood protection systems, as well as the 
implementation of the flood risk analysis methodology and the vulnerability modelling 
approach are illustrated with an example application.  
In summary, the present thesis provides a characterisation of hierarchical flood 
protection systems as well as several methodologies to model such systems. It aims at 
increasing understanding of hierarchical flood protection systems and provides 
modelling approaches to facilitate further research and the implementation of 
hierarchical flood protection systems in practice. 
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Resumé 
Samfund verden over er konfronteret med risikoen for oversvømmelse, hvilket tvinger 
myndigheder og andre beslutningstagere til at håndtere konsekvenserne af 
oversvømmelser gennem risikostyring for at beskytte befolkningen og deres aktiver. 
Klimaændringer, urbaniseringen samt befolkningstilvæksten medfører at risikoen for 
oversvømmelse ændres konstant, hvilket kræver at strategierne for risikostyringen er 
fleksible og robuste. Traditionelle løsninger indenfor risikostyring såsom diger er ikke 
særlige fleksible, da de ikke umiddelbart kan tilpasses ændrede risiko niveauer. 
Omvendt er fleksible og robuste strategier for risikostyring nyligt blevet identificeret 
gennem konceptet om integreret risikostyring for oversvømmelser, hvilket indeholder 
en kombination af flere strukturelle og ikke-strukturelle metoder. Denne afhandling 
undersøger hierarkiske beskyttelsessystemer mod oversvømmelser, der indeholder to 
eller flere integreret hierarkiske strukturer til beskyttelse mod oversvømmelser. Disse er 
implementeret på forskellige niveauer f.eks. diger, lokale barrierer, bygninger designet 
til at kunne håndtere oversvømmelser og tilsammen vil disse reducere risikoen.  Der er 
adskillige fordele ved hierarkiske beskyttelsessystemer sammenlignet med 
beskyttelsessystemer udelukkende bestående af en enkelt struktur. Herunder kan 
nævnes deres mulighed for at være præcist skræddersyet til den krævede risikoreduktion 
samt at de tillader tilpasning af de fleksible beskyttelsessystemer for skiftende risiko for 
oversvømmelse.  
Ved tilstedeværelse af strukturelle barrierer mod oversvømmelser afhænger 
oversvømmelsens udvikling og konsekvenser af tilstanden af barriererne i systemet. 
Risikoen er ikke udelukkende funktion af nedbørsmængden og udledningsmængden fra 
floder, men også af skrøbeligheden af barriererne. En ny metode, til at analysere 
risikoen for oversvømmelser og beslutninger i forbindelse med hierarkiske 
beskyttelsessystemer og som giver mulighed for samlede overvejelser vedrørende 
risikomodeller og modelleringen af barrierernes skrøbelighed, er beskrevet   
I implementereingen af metoden for risikoanalysen er der identificeret flere 
udfordringer, hvoraf to er behandlet i nærværende afhandling.  
ix 
Først, design og optimering af et hierarkisk beskyttelsessystem for oversvømmelser 
indebærer generelt beslutninger om strukturer på forskellige rumlige skalaer. Disse kan 
til gengæld kræve risikovurdering niveauer. Konsekvent risiko modellering på 
forskellige rumlige skalaer kan kræve op- og nedskalering af data og modeller under 
hensyntagen til usikkerheder og afhængigheder. I denne afhandling er foreslået en 
metode for rumligt opdeling af en samlet portefølje af bygninger, under hensyntagen til 
usikkerheden ved opdelingen og den rumlige korrelation. Metoden anvendes på 
opdelingen af porteføljer for bygninger i to kommuner i Schweiz. Relevansen af at 
modellere usikkerheden ved opdelingen i risikovurderingen af naturkatastrofer er 
illustreret med et simpelt eksempel for vurderingen af risikoen for oversvømmelse. 
Den anden identificerede udfordring er modelleringen af skrøbeligheden og 
sårbarheden af barriererne i det hierarkiske beskyttelsessystem mod oversvømmelser. 
For at optimere udformningen af barriererne, er det nødvendigt at modelleringen af 
disses skrøbelighed og sårbarhed giver mulighed for at betragte alternativer design. 
Modeller for modelleringen af sårbarheden for større beskyttelsessystemer (f.eks diger) 
er tilgængelige, hvorimod modeller for det medtager sårbarheden af lokale barrierer for 
beboelsesbygninger synes at mangle. I den nærværende afhandling foreslås en metode 
til modellering af beboelsesbygninger, der medtager detaljeret karakteristika og 
risikoniveau for bygningen samt eksplicit modellerer skadeudviklingen. Metoden 
tillader at barrierernes påvirkning på sårbarheden mod oversvømmelse af bygningen 
medtages og derved kan benyttes som grundlag i en beslutningsanalyse.    
Konceptet og mulighederne med hierarkiske beskyttelsessystemer samt 
implementeringen af risikoanalysen for oversvømmelser og metoden for at modellere 
sårbarheden af barriererne er illustreret med et eksempel. 
Kortfattet, tilvejebringer nærværende afhandling en karakteristik af hierarkiske 
beskyttelsessystemer mod oversvømmelser samt flere metoder til at modellere sådanne 
systemer. Dens målsætning er at øge forståelsen af hierarkiske beskyttelsessystemer og 
leverer modelleringsmetoder der kan bruges til fremme yderligere forskning og 
implementeringen af hierarkiske beskyttelsessystemer i praksis. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter provides relevant background information, 
highlighting the relevance of flood risk management and framing 
several inherent challenges. Further, the hierarchical flood 
protection system concept is introduced, along with objectives and 
scope of this thesis.  
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1.1 Background 
Floods are caused by heavy rainfalls, the overflow of water bodies, or the overflow of 
water streams, which may have negative impacts on society, causing fatalities and 
economic damage. Flood risk is a measure to jointly characterise the probability of 
occurrence and the consequences of floods1; its understanding requires thorough 
knowledge of its two components.  
According to EM-DAT (2014), over the last 30 years, floods have caused an 
average of 6'000 fatalities yearly and approximately 20 billion USD in economic 
damage yearly. According to Jha et al. (2012) flood is globally the most frequent 
natural hazard. EM-DAT (2014) and DFO (2014) indicate that flood events are 
registered on every continent and most countries, with a few exceptions for deserts and 
polar regions. Furthermore, according to EM-DAT (2014) the number of flood events 
meeting their reporting criteria2 has significantly increased from the 1980s, as illustrated 
in Figure 1.1. Notwithstanding that event reporting may have improved, it is generally 
accepted that flood risk increased over the last decades and a further increase is 
expected in the future (Jha et al. 2012). The expected increase can be mainly attributed 
to three factors: climate change, population growth and urban development.  
 
Figure 1.1 - Global flood events per year (Data source: EM-DAT 2014) 
The effects of climate change are diverse and must be differentiated by geographical 
region. Nevertheless, the research community generally agrees that climate change will 
                                                 
1 A formal definition of flood risk is provided in Section 3.2. 
2 The EM-DAT (2014) reporting criteria is the following: "…at least one of the following 
criteria must be fulfilled: 10 or more people reported killed, 100 or more people reported 
affected, declaration of a state of emergency or call for international assistance." 
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lead to more frequent and severe extreme meteorological events (IPCC 2014a). Thus, 
frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall events, as well as peak river discharge 
following heavy rainfall, are expected to increase in many parts of the world, leading to 
higher frequency of flooding. Climate change is also expected to cause a rise in sea 
levels, increasing the probability of flooding in low-lying coastal areas (Field et al. 
2012).  
Population growth and urban development both contribute to an increased societal 
loss potential. Population growth leads to more people and assets potentially exposed to 
floods; urban development leads to a concentration of population and assets in relatively 
small urbanised areas. According to Bouwer (2010), these two factors are responsible 
for greater future flood risk increase than climate change. Bouwer (2010) and Evans et 
al. (2006) indicate how serious the potential future increase in flood risk might be. The 
former calculates that flood risk in The Netherlands might increase between 96% and 
716% from 2000 to 2040, whereas the latter calculates up to twentyfold increase in 
economic risk for some regions in the United Kingdom by the 2080s, if current 
spending for flood risk management is not increased. These projections are alarming, 
however they are subject to substantial uncertainties, see Hall and Solomatine (2008) 
and Bouwer (2010).  
Given the substantial threat to population and societal assets, decision makers in 
supranational, national and regional organisations, as well as decision makers in 
commercial entities and private persons are asked to manage flood risk. Flood risk 
management entails the assessment of flood risk and, if necessary, the implementation 
of flood risk management measures to appropriately handle risk.  
The importance of managing flood risk can be illustrated anecdotally by comparing 
the number of fatalities from flood events in developed and developing countries. On 
average, a flood event in developing countries causes almost ten times as many fatalities 
as an event in developed countries (EM-DAT 2014). There are many reasons for this 
difference, e.g. higher population density in several developing countries. However, the 
difference in flood risk management plays a significant role. Developed countries have 
been managing flood risk for over a century, while developing countries lack resources 
and, often, knowledge to appropriately manage risk; more fatalities are the consequence 
(Hallegate 2012). 
Decision makers can often choose between a plethora of structural and non-
structural flood risk management measures, with a range of spatial scales and 
investment costs (Jha et al. 2012). Structural measures include dams protecting a whole 
Introduction 
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valley, dikes protecting a flood plain, local flood barriers protecting a village and flood 
proofing measures protecting an individual building. Non-structural measures include 
early warning systems, population education to raise risk awareness, disaster 
management plans, risk transfer instruments and spatial planning.  
Historically, flood risk management has been dominated by the construction of large 
flood protection structures, e.g. dikes. Their design was generally based on a design 
event (e.g. 100 year event) from which the structure ought to offer protection (Merz, 
Hall et al. 2010). Potential flood event consequences were not explicitly considered in 
the design process. Once the structure was built, in a false sense of security, little 
consideration was given to residual risk and the possibility that the protection structure 
might fail (Tobin 1995). In recent years, a more thorough approach has become the 
norm, considering all possible flood events and their consequences. With this shift, 
flood risk assessment has become the basis for identifying optimal flood risk 
management strategies3 through risk-based decision analysis. In Europe and elsewhere, 
this shift in perspective has been accelerated by regulations requiring authorities to 
develop flood management plans on the basis of flood risk assessments (Bubeck 2013). 
Identification of an appropriate flood risk management strategy should consider its 
economic costs and benefits, as well as performance of the strategy under a number of 
future flood risk scenarios (Field et al. 2012). The necessary compromise between cost 
efficiency and future sustainability of a solution is well captured by Revkin (2011): 
“The basic issue is finding ways to build into near-term investments and choices an 
appropriate consideration of long-term trends and worst-case scenarios.”. This balance 
is particularly difficult when designing large protection structures, as they entail 
substantial investments and long planning and construction periods. Once built, with a 
certain protection height, they offer little flexibility to adapt to changing flood risk. The 
recognition that large protection structures alone cannot adequately assure safety of 
population and assets has led to the development of the integrated flood risk 
management concept. Integrated flood risk management entails the combination of 
several flood risk management measures which jointly manage risk; for example, large 
protection structures are complemented by local flood barriers and early warning system 
measures. An extensive description of integrated flood risk management is found in Jha 
et al. (2012) and elsewhere in literature. For instance, Dawson et al. (2004b) 
                                                 
3 A flood risk management strategy is here understood as a comprehensive set of measures to 
understand and treat flood risk in a specific region. 
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recommend complementing large protection structure with non-structural measures 
such as spatial planning policies and risk transfer instruments. Bubeck (2013) and 
Joseph (2014) emphasise the importance of implementing risk reducing measures in 
private buildings to complement large scale protection structures.  
The large variety of possible integrated flood risk management strategies makes the 
identification of the optimal flood risk management strategy challenging. 
Comprehensive science-based decision support for integrated flood risk management, 
with sustainable solutions as a goal and appropriate consideration of risk and 
uncertainties, is essential. This thesis contributes to this goal by characterising and 
modelling hierarchical flood protection systems, as introduced in the next section. 
1.2 Hierarchical flood protection system 
A hierarchical flood protection system entails two or more sequentially integrated 
structural risk management measures along the route of flood water from its source to 
affected persons and assets (see Figure 1.2 for a schematic illustration). In accordance 
with the principles of integrated flood risk management, in a hierarchical flood 
protection system flood risk is jointly managed by several risk management measures. 
While the bulk of risk reduction is still assured by large protection structures, such as 
dikes and dams, these are complemented by smaller structures, e.g. secondary dikes, 
local flood barriers or flood proofing measures applied to buildings to protect their 
interiors. Hierarchical flood protection systems have several advantages, some of which 
are outlined in the following. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 - Schematic representation of a hierarchical flood protection system with three hierarchy 
levels 
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When flood protection is assured by a single large protection structure, flooding 
probability is homogenously reduced for a whole flood plain, including villages, cities, 
agricultural areas and forests. Dike height is often dictated by the required safety level 
of urban areas; however, agricultural areas and forests on the flood plain profit from the 
same flood protection, which may not be economically justifiable and can thus be seen 
as a waste of societal resources. In contrast, a hierarchical flood protection system can 
be tailored to reduce flood risk in a more specific way: areas with high asset value 
density can be protected on a higher safety level than agricultural areas and forests, see 
Figure 1.3 for illustration. As a result, expected costs (including costs of constructing 
and maintaining a flood protection system, as well as expected flood consequences) 
entailed by a hierarchical flood protection system are generally lower than for a single-
structure flood protection system.  
 
Figure 1.3 - Illustration of the effect of a hierarchical flood protection system on the probability of 
flooding 
 
A further advantage of hierarchical flood protection systems emerges with the 
challenge faced by decision makers when planning large flood protection structures. 
Given the many uncertainties about future flood risk, such structures can easily be over-
designed, resulting in wasted resources, or under-designed, resulting in insufficient 
protection. In such a situations, it is advantageous to identify flood risk management 
strategies that are flexible (adaptable for the future, if necessary) and robust (i.e. good 
performance in multiple future flood risk scenarios). The consideration of a hierarchical 
flood protection system allows for flexible adaption of the flood protection system, 
through upgrading the protection structures on a hierarchy level or adding a hierarchy 
level if, and when, required. 
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Given these considerations, hierarchical flood protection systems seem useful. 
Whereas hierarchical flood protection systems may naturally arise in practice, they are 
rarely actively considered when planning flood protection systems. Specifically, when 
planning large flood protection structures, the possibility of adding smaller 
complementary structures is often ignored. As a result, the flood protection system 
might be suboptimal and disregarding the aforementioned advantages. A possible 
reason for the little consideration of hierarchical flood protection systems in practice 
might be the challenges encountered in modelling such systems. In the following, three 
challenges are identified. 
Hierarchical flood protection systems entail protection structures of different sizes 
and with different reach of protection. The consideration of such different flood 
protection structures may require flood risk to be assessed at different spatial scales, i.e. 
with different resolutions and levels of detail. Therefore, the first challenge pertains to 
consistent modelling of risk at different spatial scales, which can require data and 
models to be scaled up or down to consistently represent risk at each scale. 
A second challenge is faced with the computation of flood scenarios with 
consideration of the state of all flood protection structures. When assessing flood risk 
for areas protected by protection structures, the possibility of protection structure 
breaches should be considered. Given that each protection structure can be breached at 
different locations, multiple different breaching scenarios must be modelled to 
appropriately assess flood risk. When breaches on several hierarchy levels are 
considered, the total number of breaching scenarios to be modelled grows exponentially 
with the number of hierarchy levels, and with it, computational costs increase rapidly. 
Several approaches are available to model flood with consideration of breaching 
scenarios of individual flood protection structures (e.g. Dawson and Hall 2006; 
Vorogushyn et al. 2010); however, these approaches must be extended to allow 
considering breaches on more than one hierarchy level, in a computationally efficient 
manner. 
A third challenge pertains to the modelling of the vulnerability and fragility of all 
considered protection structures. Optimisation of a hierarchical flood protection system 
requires the joint optimisation of several individual protection structures, for each of 
which, decision alternatives need to be compared. Therefore, for every considered 
protection structure, a fragility or vulnerability model is required, which allows for 
consideration of decision alternatives. Fragility models are available for dikes, which 
are based on structural reliability theory and allow for structure optimisation for flood 
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risk management (see e.g. Voortman 2003). Little research is available on fragility of 
smaller protection structures, like local flood barriers. Vulnerability models for 
residential buildings are available, which allow considering the effect of flood proofing 
measures. However, no model providing sufficient modelling details for its practical 
application is available. 
These challenges indicate that research work is necessary to facilitate the modelling 
of hierarchical flood protection systems. 
1.3 Objective  
This thesis aims to contribute to the characterisation and modelling of hierarchical flood 
protection systems, as well as enabling decision optimisation within a hierarchical flood 
protection system. In particular, the following objectives are identified: 
‐ Define and characterise hierarchical flood protection systems. 
‐ Propose a modelling approach for flood risk analysis within hierarchical flood 
protection systems. Further, define a model for decision analysis and decision 
optimisation for hierarchical flood protection systems.  
‐ Apply the concept of hierarchical flood protection systems to an example study 
area. 
‐ Develop a flood vulnerability model for residential buildings that can be utilised 
as part of a decision analysis, i.e. a vulnerability model sensitive and detailed 
enough to represent vulnerability changes introduced by flood proofing 
measures. 
‐ Make a contribution to the consistent modelling of flood risk at different spatial 
scales, particularly to the spatial disaggregation of portfolio data under 
consideration of uncertainties and dependencies. 
1.3.1 Scope of the thesis 
Flood risk assessment and management are broad and complex study fields, 
encompassing a number of disciplines, including meteorology, hydrology, geography 
and civil engineering. It is not possible to cover all relevant aspects in either a general or 
detailed manner within this thesis. Therefore, the scope of the thesis is limited as 
follows:  
‐ Only river floods of low land rivers are considered.  
‐ Flood consequence modelling is limited to direct tangible consequences (as 
introduced later) to residential buildings.  
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters. Chapter 1 (the present introduction) provides 
an overview of the topic, as well as objectives and scope of the thesis. Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 introduce the fundamental background knowledge by providing a relevant 
literature overview. Chapter 2 introduces the topics of engineering risk assessment, risk 
management and risk-based decision analysis. Chapter 3 examines the concepts 
introduced in Chapter 2, with a focus on floods. Chapter 4 defines and characterises 
hierarchical flood protection systems; their advantages are described and a modelling 
methodology is proposed for flood risk analysis, as well as a decision analysis, in the 
presence of hierarchical flood protection systems. Chapter 5 describes the developed 
probabilistic disaggregation model, which allows for disaggregating spatially 
aggregated portfolios of assets. This chapter is a paper submitted to the journal Georisk 
on March 12th, 2015. Chapter 6 describes the developed vulnerability model for 
residential buildings in floods; this chapter consists of a paper accepted for publication 
by the journal Natural Hazards. Chapter 7 describes an application of a hierarchical 
flood protection system to a study area in Switzerland. In the example application, a 
flood protection system with three hierarchy levels is proposed and optimised. The 
example also illustrates the application of the vulnerability model presented in Chapter 
6. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by highlighting and discussing its key findings and 
limitations and provides an outline of further research. 

  
 
2 Engineering risk assessment and 
decision analysis  
This chapter introduces concepts inherent to engineering risk 
assessment, risk management and risk-based decision analysis. The 
concepts are introduced in general manner, but with a societal 
prospective, since flood risk management is generally a societal 
issue. Illustrative examples are taken from natural hazard risk 
assessment and management.  
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2.1 Introduction 
From a societal point of view, the role of a civil engineer is to support society in 
constructing, maintaining and decommissioning its infrastructure in a sustainable 
manner. The sustainability aspect is of great importance, as society has long recognised 
that natural and financial resources are limited (Faber 2007a). To maintain, and possibly 
increase, quality of life for future generations, society must make optimal use of its 
resources, since whatever resource is allocated in suboptimal manner today will be 
missing in the future. 
Societal resource allocation can be divided into two tasks. The first task is the 
allocation of resources to different societal activities: power production, sewage 
treatment, transportation (while this task is often a prerogative of politicians, there are 
good arguments for basing such decisions on scientific knowledge). The second task is 
the prerogative of engineers: it requires optimally utilising resources allocated to a 
societal activity for the design, construction, inspection, maintenance and decommission 
of infrastructure and engineered systems necessary to the societal activity. In this 
context, optimality generally means identifying the system configuration promising the 
best cost-benefit ratio, while, at the same time, conforming to societal safety 
requirements of individuals and environment. This is a challenging task, generally 
entailing several decision problems, from general performance definitions to the design 
of small structural details. The task is further complicated by significant uncertainties 
embedded in each decision, stemming from inherent variability in, and incomplete 
knowledge of, the world. To facilitate identifying optimal system configurations, 
engineers develop mathematical models of reality to help consider and predict the 
behaviour of engineered systems in the present and future. These models allow 
comparison of benefits and costs entailed in each considered system configuration and 
ultimately allow identifying the optimal system configuration. For such analysis to be 
meaningful, it must consider the whole lifetime of a system and all events that might 
impact the system during its lifetime, as well as their potential consequences. As 
discussed in the following sections, this is the scope of engineering risk assessment, and 
decision analyses based on it are risk-based decision analyses.  
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2.2 Risk 
Risk has many definition across research fields, see e.g. Vlek (1996). In an engineering 
context, risk has a predominantly negative connotation and the definition of UNISDR 
(2009) seems appropriate: “The combination of the probability of an event and its 
negative consequences”. This definition is formalised by Ciurean and Schröter (2013) 
as: 
RISK = HAZARD X VULNERABILITY, 
where hazard is a potential event with negative consequences and vulnerability is the 
susceptibility of a system exposed to the event. In a further formalisation, JCSS (2008) 
defines the risk HZr  associated with a hazard event HZ  as the product between the 
probability HZp  that the hazard event occurs
4, and the consequences HZc  associated 
with the event: 
 HZ HZ HZr p c   (2.1) 
The total risk r   for a system is determined by considering all hazard events 
, 1,2,...,mHZ m M  that can potentially affect the system: 
 
1
m m
M
HZ HZ HZ
m
r p c

   (2.2) 
2.3 Risk management  
Society and individuals try to maintain, and possibly improve, present and future quality 
of life. Hazard events can be detrimental to quality of life; thus, society engages in risk 
management to minimise the probability of occurrence and consequences of hazard 
events.  
Coherent risk management within, and across, application fields is challenging. The 
variety of engineered systems and hazard events to be considered is remarkable, as is 
the uncertainty in the behaviour of engineered systems. As such, risk management 
should be based on a generic framework allowing dependable representation of relevant 
                                                 
4 The probability of occurrence of a hazard event always relates to a time frame, which is 
generally chosen as 1 year in natural hazard risk assessment.  
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system characteristics, hazard events and consequences, under due consideration of 
uncertainties (JCSS 2008).  
A general framework for risk management is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Risk 
management includes several activities, which, at the lowest level of analysis, can be 
seen as a continuous cyclical process of context and criteria definition, risk assessment, 
risk treatment and monitoring activities.  
 
Figure 2.1 - Risk management framework, adapted from Faber and Stewart (2003) and Jonkman (2007) 
Context and criteria definition provide the boundary conditions of risk management. 
For risk management to be meaningful, political, legal, social and financial boundaries 
of the analysed system need to be understood. Risk acceptance criteria of the society for 
persons and the environment also must be taken into account (Stewart and Melchers 
1997). Failure to grasp boundary conditions may lead to insufficient, impractical or 
unworkable solutions, defying the very purpose of risk management.  
The scope of risk assessment includes system identification and representation, 
identification of all potential hazard events and assessment of occurrence probability 
and consequences of each, i.e. actual quantification of risk. The steps entailed in risk 
assessment are illustrated in Figure 2.1 and thoroughly detailed in the next section. 
Risk evaluation entails comparison of risk analysis results with the previously 
identified risk acceptance criteria, as well as evaluation of possible risk treatment 
measures to select an appropriate risk treatment strategy (thus, risk evaluation entails 
risk-based decision analysis, detailed in Section 2.5). 
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Risk treatment measures include all activities that impact risk or risk ownership; 
they may be classified as (see e.g. UNISDR 2009): 
‐ risk avoidance measures, 
‐ risk reduction measures and 
‐ risk transfer measures.  
Risk avoidance implies complete elimination of the possibility that certain hazard 
events occur. In Equation (2.2), risk avoidance corresponds to a reduction of number 
M  of possible hazard events.  
Risk reduction can be achieved in two ways: reducing the occurrence probability of 
hazard events and/or reducing their consequences, i.e. reducing either (or both) the 
multiplicands in Equation (2.2). Risk-reducing measures in natural hazard risk 
management can be divided into structural and non-structural measures. Structural 
measures entail physical modifications of the system: construction of a dike to reduce 
flood risk, construction of dampers in high rise buildings to reduce seismic risk, or 
implementation of roof ties to reduce strong-wind risk. Non-structural measures include 
measures aimed at a better functioning of a system before, during and after a hazard 
event. They include, amongst others, early warning systems, population education and 
risk-aware spatial planning. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in modern risk management, 
risk may be managed with a portfolio of integrated structural and non-structural 
measures (Jha et al. 2012). 
Risk transfer does not change risk for the system; instead, financial implications of 
risk are transferred between two entities (persons or companies). An example of a risk 
transfer transaction is an insurance contract, where a person or company subject to risk, 
i.e. the insured, transfers the financial implication of a risk to an insurance company in 
exchange for a premium.  
The last activity in the risk management cycle is continuous control and risk 
monitoring of the system. A system subject to risk is a system subject to change, and it 
is crucial to quickly identify system changes that may indicate a change in risk. As risk 
is abstract and often unapparent, monitoring focuses on the observation and 
measurement of risk indicators, defined by JCSS (2008) as “…any observable or 
measurable characteristic of the system … containing information about the risk”. The 
results of risk monitoring and control activities may be utilised for a more accurate risk 
assessment and to measure the effectiveness of implemented risk treatment measures. 
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Several sources, e.g. Bayraktarli et al. (2004), distinguish three phases of risk 
management relative to the occurrence of a hazard event. These are: 
‐ Pre-event – Before a hazard event occurs, risk management activities focus on 
the reduction of risk with optimal allocation of resources. 
‐ Event management – During a hazard event, risk management activities are 
aimed at reducing and controlling consequences by providing help and rescue. 
‐ Post-event – After a hazard event occurs, risk management activities include 
rebuilding and strengthening of affected systems, rehabilitation of infrastructure 
functionality and collection of information to improve future risk assessment. 
These distinctions are important, since in each phase boundary conditions, available 
resources and risk treatment measures are different (Faber 2007b). However, in each 
phase, the framework illustrated in Figure 2.1 remains valid and should be applied.  
2.4 Risk assessment 
Risk assessment provides the quantitative basis for risk management. Several 
frameworks for engineering risk assessment are available in literature, e.g. Stewart and 
Melchers (1997) and JCSS (2008); the present section is primarily based on the latter. 
The considered framework for risk assessment is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
The first fundamental risk assessment step is the definition of the considered 
system; spatial and temporal scope of analysis is defined (system identification) and an 
appropriate representation of system characteristics, components and functionalities is 
ascertained (system representation). The next step is the identification of hazard events 
that could potentially affect the system. Given a list of all possible hazard events, a 
quantitative risk analysis is performed. Figure 2.2 illustrates a framework for risk 
analysis adapted from JCSS (2008), including three distinct modelling steps: hazard 
assessment, vulnerability assessment and robustness assessment. Hazard assessment 
entails the characterisation of each considered hazard event in terms of probability of 
occurrence and intensity. Vulnerability assessment is the characterisation of direct 
consequences (i.e. consequences for the system) from a hazard event. Robustness 
assessment is a characterisation of indirect consequences (i.e. consequences for 
everything outside the system due to system functionality loss) from the hazard event 
and/or direct consequences. 
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Figure 2.2 - Framework for quantitative risk analysis (adapted from JCSS 2008) 
In the following sections, each step of the outlined risk assessment framework is 
detailed and the treatment of uncertainty in risk assessment is addressed, as it is of 
fundamental importance. 
2.4.1 System definition 
Systems considered in an engineering risk assessment can range from a small 
component in an engineered structure to something as broad as the infrastructure 
network of a whole country. Temporal scope can also vary greatly; it is, however, 
common to consider the whole lifetime of a system, which may extend over several 
generations. With such an extensive range of possible spatial and temporal scopes, it is 
important to carefully define and delimit what is considered in a risk assessment. 
System identification involves the definition of a spatial and temporal scope of the 
system. It is as much about exclusion as it is about identification: all aspects not 
relevant to risk assessment must be excluded. Once the system is identified, it has to be 
appropriately represented. System representation concerns the translation of the actual 
system into an abstracted logical and/or mathematical model. Generally, many different 
system representations are possible, each with different level of detail and 
sophistication. In the choice of an appropriate system representation, compromise is 
often necessary between level of detail in the system representation and computational 
demands that follow from the chosen representation. In general, a system representation 
should be detailed enough to capture relevant system characteristics, hazard processes 
and consequences, while still allowing for reasonable computational times. In practice, 
the level of detail of system representation may also be dictated by the amount of 
available information. Small and simple systems, e.g. one engineered structure, can 
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generally be quite precisely understood, allowing for a detailed system representation. 
Conversely, when analysing large and complex systems, such as an infrastructure 
network or a portfolio of structures, available knowledge is often less detailed, and the 
system representation more coarse. 
Complex systems may be represented as a collection of system components and 
functional interrelations between components. While the overall system complexity can 
be prohibitive to model, behaviour of individual components is often reasonably well 
understood and thus easier to model. In this context, it is important to notice that every 
component can be a system in itself. For instance, as illustrated in JCSS (2008), a 
system could be a road network, and a bridge in the network a system component; in 
turn, a bridge could be the considered system with the bridge deck, columns and cables 
its components.  
Whichever system representation and level of detail is chosen, it has to represent 
available knowledge in a consistent manner, and should be easy to update when new 
knowledge becomes available. It is also important to consider and represent uncertainty: 
engineers have limited and incomplete understanding of reality, which has to be 
reflected in the system representation. 
2.4.2 Uncertainty  
Systems and processes considered in a risk assessment are inherently uncertain. For 
instance, time of occurrence and intensity of a natural hazard event, or development of a 
fatigue crack can generally not be known with precision. Furthermore, when dealing 
with complex systems and time horizons stretching over decades, knowledge about the 
future state of the system is always imperfect and therefore subject to uncertainty. For a 
meaningful risk assessment it is important to capture and represent uncertainty in an 
appropriate manner, in the words of Faber (2005): “ … only when the origin and the 
nature of the prevailing uncertainties are fully understood, can a consistent 
probabilistic modelling be established, allowing for rational decision making regarding 
risk reduction”.  
Although uncertainties can be classified in several ways, in engineering risk 
assessment it is common to differentiate uncertainties according to their type and origin, 
as natural variability in the system, model uncertainties and statistical uncertainties (see 
e.g. Faber 2005). Natural variability is often referred to as aleatory uncertainty; model 
and statistical uncertainties as epistemic uncertainties. Aleatory uncertainty is 
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considered inherent to nature and cannot be reduced with mere data collection 
(Ditlevsen and Madsen 2007). Conversely, epistemic uncertainty can be reduced when 
new data on the system becomes available. In practice, the distinction between aleatory 
and epistemic uncertainties is often not trivial: it depends on the chosen system 
representation (Kiureghian and Ditlevsen 2009) and might change with time (Faber 
2005). Nevertheless, the proposed distinction is useful to frame the sources of 
uncertainty and distinguish their treatment in risk assessment.  
According to Paté-Cornell (1996), uncertainty may generally be considered in three 
different ways in natural hazard risk assessment:  
‐ Assessment of aleatory uncertainties only – In this approach, best estimates of 
parameters and models are utilised and epistemic uncertainty is disregarded. 
‐ Integrated treatment of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties – Here, 
epistemic uncertainty is integrated with aleatory uncertainty. Through the 
integration, the impact of epistemic uncertainty on risk is not explicit in the 
result. 
‐ Separated assessment of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties – Here too, 
epistemic uncertainty is considered, but in an explicit manner. In a general 
approach, risk assessment may be carried out conditionally on epistemic 
uncertainty parameters. In the result, epistemic uncertainty is explicit and risk 
may be illustrated with (epistemic) uncertainty bounds.  
Integrated treatment of uncertainties can be approached within the Bayesian probability 
framework, which allows for coherently integrating knowledge from different sources 
and updating probabilities when further knowledge becomes available (i.e. reducing 
epistemic uncertainty). Several authors recommend (Paté-Cornell 1996, Faber 2007b) or 
apply (Bayraktarli et al. 2005, Straub 2005, Nishijima and Faber 2007) the Bayesian 
probability framework for engineering risk assessment. 
Hall and Solomatine (2008) acknowledge the value of integrated uncertainty 
treatment with the Bayesian probability framework. However, they highlight a 
communication problem its usage may entail; the public may be surprised by a 
reduction in risk estimate due to mere data collection, which may, in turn, lead to a loss 
of trust in the risk assessment and authorities. The same paper highlights an advantage 
of separated uncertainty treatment: it allows for calculating the probability that an 
apparently optimal decision alternative may turn out to be sub-optimal.  
Choosing a system representation and modelling approach often involves a choice 
between simple models with few explanatory variables, but large aleatory and epistemic 
(model) uncertainty, and more complex models, with many explanatory variables, and 
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consequently large epistemic (statistical) uncertainty. Both approaches can be valid, but 
in models dominated by statistical uncertainties, potential for future uncertainty 
reduction through data is larger, and thus such a model is generally preferable (Faber 
2005).  
2.4.3 Hazard assessment 
Prior to hazard assessment, relevant hazard processes must be identified, that is, 
anthropogenic, physical, chemical and biological processes, which may be the source of 
hazard events, are identified. Hazard processes may include exogenous hazard 
processes (i.e. caused by a process or agent external to the system: for example, a 
natural hazard event) and endogenous hazard process (i.e. caused by a failure within the 
system without a focused impact from outside: for example, a fatigue failure), see e.g. 
Stewart and Melchers (1997). With relevant hazard processes identified, the hazard 
assessment comprises two parts: first, the characterisation of hazard processes to 
determine the probability and magnitude of hazard events arising from it and second, 
characterisation of the hazard action (in terms of energy, acceleration, pressure, etc.) 
impacting the system, given a hazard event of a certain magnitude. The two parts are 
described in more detail in the following, using examples from natural hazard 
modelling.  
The first part characterises the probability of hazard event occurrence with a specific 
magnitude in time and space. It entails hazard source characterisation based on 
historical data, risk indicators and/or expert knowledge. For instance, the hazard source 
of earthquakes is generally a tectonic fault and, for a given fault, probability of 
occurrence and magnitude of the earthquake are related by a functional relationship first 
described by Gutenberg and Richter (1942); this relationship can be parameterised from 
historical data. For river floods, the hazard source is generally a hydro-meteorological 
process leading to extreme rainfall in the river catchment. While it is possible to model 
the meteorological process and the extreme rainfall event, it is just as common to avoid 
modelling these complex processes and directly model flooding from the river discharge 
process. To characterise river discharge probability distribution, long series of historical 
discharge data are often available in developed countries; these allow characterising the 
probability of occurrence of extreme discharge events through extreme value theory. 
Modelling of hazard source process from historical data requires particular attention, as 
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stationarity, or the presence of trends, needs to be assessed. Given climate change, the 
stationarity of hydro-meteorological processes is doubtful. 
The second part of a hazard assessment is the characterisation of a hazard event 
development, in terms of energy transfers from the hazard source to all locations in the 
considered system, in order to characterising hazard actions throughout the system. 
Hazard actions are generally described with hazard indices, i.e. physically observable, 
or easily derivable, quantities that characterise the energy impacting the system in 
consequence of a hazard event. The physical process that transfers energy from the 
hazard source to a system location is obviously a function of the type of hazard in 
question, as exemplified in the following.  
For earthquakes, seismic waves spread from the earthquake hypocentre through 
rocks and terrain to the earth surface, where they may be felt as a ground motion; the 
ground motion intensity is generally a function of distance to the hypocentre and 
geological characteristics. Intensity of the ground motion for a given hazard event, can 
be characterised with different hazard indices like peak ground acceleration or spectral 
acceleration, which may be modelled with attenuation functions (see e.g. Ambraseys 
and Bommer 1991).  
In a river flood, excess river discharge leaves the river bed and inundates 
surrounding dry land. The flood development is determined by surrounding terrain and 
surface friction and is driven by gravitational forces. Hazard indices that might be used 
to characterise hazard actions on the system are water depth, water flow velocity and 
water contamination (see Kelman and Spence 2004 for a comprehensive list). The flood 
development process is generally modelled with flow routing models, allowing for 
determining floodplain water discharge.  
When selecting which hazard index/indices to consider in a risk assessment, it is 
important to consider that hazard indices form the interface between hazard assessment 
and vulnerability assessment; the chosen hazard indices should thus correlate with 
consequences. 
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2.4.4 Consequence assessment 
Consequences of a hazard event include all changes to the system induced by the event. 
In engineering risk assessment, consequences generally have a negative connotation, i.e. 
they entail a deterioration of the system, leading to a loss of value, lives and/or 
functionality. The nature of consequences depends on, and can vary greatly between, 
the system(s). Therefore, no general approach for the assessment of consequences can 
be provided. Instead, a common categorisation of consequences is described alongside 
several modelling principles common in engineering risk assessment.  
It is useful to distinguish different types of consequences. A first distinction is 
commonly made between direct and indirect consequences, see e.g. JCSS (2008) and 
Merz, Kreibich et al. (2010). JCSS (2008) describes direct consequences as “… 
consequences associated with damages or failures of the constituents of the system.” 
Indirect consequences are induced by direct consequences, and are described by the 
same source as “…any consequences associated with the loss of functionalities of the 
system and by any specific characteristic of the joint state of the constituents and the 
direct consequences themselves.”  
Several sources, e.g. Cochrane (2004), note that the distinction between direct and 
indirect consequences is not absolute and depends on the system definition, as 
exemplified in the following. Consider that a bridge within a transportation network is 
damaged by a hazard event. When the bridge is the system of interest, then the bridge 
closure is a direct consequence and the transportation network distribution is an indirect 
consequence. On the other hand, when the transportation network is the system of 
interest, the direct consequence of the bridge damage might be network disruption and 
the indirect consequence might be much broader and include business interruption for 
companies utilising the transportation network (JCSS 2008).  
Consequences can be further classified as tangible and intangible consequences; the 
former can easily be quantified in monetary terms, the latter cannot (Kübler 2007). 
Examples of consequences and a possible classification are given in  
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Figure 2.3 - Categorisation of consequences according to Merz, Kreibich et al. (2010) 
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, direct consequences can be assessed with a vulnerability 
model, indirect consequences with a robustness model. Most available vulnerability and 
robustness models only characterise tangible consequences. In the following, two 
vulnerability modelling approaches are described; then, observations are made on 
modelling of robustness, before the section is concluded with remarks on intangible 
consequences modelling.  
Two common vulnerability modelling approaches are the damage function approach 
and fragility approach. As the name suggests, in the damage function approach, 
consequences are modelled in function of one or more hazard indices (see Figure 2.4, 
left). Damage functions can either be relative (expressing consequences as a percentage 
of the value of the underlying asset) or absolute (consequences are directly expressed in 
monetary terms), and they are often derived from statistical analysis of empirical 
damage data from past hazard events, see e.g. the flood vulnerability curves in Maiwald 
(2007). Alternatively, damage functions can be determined through expert knowledge 
with what-if analyses and engineering models on hypothetical systems, see e.g. the 
flood vulnerability curves in Penning-Rowsell et al. (2010). 
In the second type of vulnerability modelling, the fragility approach, consequences 
are characterised in two modelling steps. In the first step, a fragility model describes the 
probability of the system being in a physical damage state iDS   (physical damages may 
be defined in descriptive terms, e.g. “No damage”, “Cracking in walls and broken 
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windows”, “Partial wall failure”, “Total collapse”) for given hazard index (see Figure 
2.4, right). In the second step, the direct consequences D are quantified in function of 
the physical damage state of the system,  iD f DS . Similar to damage functions, 
fragility models can be statistically inferred from empirical damage data. However, 
when considering engineered systems, it is common to characterise the probability of 
the system being in each damage state with an engineering model. Example applications 
of the fragility approach are found in earthquake risk assessment (Bayraktarli et al. 
2005), flood risk assessment (De Risi et al. 2013), strong wind risk assessment 
(Rosowsky and Ellingwood 2002) and multiple hazards risk assessment (Lee and 
Rosowsky 2006). 
 
Figure 2.4 - Schematic illustration of different types of vulnerability models: on the left a damage 
function, on the right a fragility model 
Robustness models characterise indirect consequences, which can be modelled 
either in function of hazard indices, direct consequences or both. The assessment is 
more complex than that of direct consequences, since the nature of indirect damages is 
even more diverse (cf. Figure 2.3). Moreover, the functional relationships between 
systems or components which lead from direct to indirect consequences are often 
complex and require a detailed analysis. As such, no comprehensive list of modelling 
approaches can be provided here. Instead, a general approach to measure the robustness 
of a system, which may be used to quantify indirect consequences, is detailed in the 
following. 
The term robustness may be associated with many different system properties: for a 
comprehensive list, see Baker et al. (2008). Generally, systems are considered robust if 
the consequences of a system failure are not disproportional to the effect causing the 
failure. As such, robustness is a desirable property of systems, and can be considered in 
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decision analysis. A robustness index is proposed in JCSS (2008), which relates direct 
risk to total risk (i.e. the sum of direct and indirect risk). Whereas JCSS (2008) specifies 
this robustness index for structural systems, it can just as well be used for other types of 
systems, e.g. social systems. When direct consequences are known, the robustness index 
allows for simple modelling of indirect consequences. 
Finally, the modelling of intangible consequences is addressed. Approaches are 
available to quantify intangible consequences in non-monetary terms: e.g., number of 
fatalities, number of injuries, or pollutant concentration. For instance, number of 
fatalities and injuries are modelled in Jonkman (2007) for floods and in Coburn and 
Spence (2002) for earthquakes. In principle, this type of quantification is sufficient and 
can be considered in a decision analysis with a multi-criteria utility function. However, 
full consistency in decision alternative evaluation may only be achieved when all 
consequences are expressed in terms of a common utility, e.g. in monetary terms. 
Although it is controversial and difficult to translate these consequences into monetary 
terms (Ayres et al. 1998), several methodologies are available to assign a monetary 
value to intangible consequences, e.g. stated preferences, revealed preferences, or 
informed preferences methodologies (see e.g. Schubert 2009). In engineering decision 
analysis, the Life-Quality Index (LQI) methodology (Nathwani et al. 1997) is gaining 
increasing attention. LQI is a compound indicator of human welfare, which can be 
utilised to evaluate the effectiveness of societal risk management activities.  
Once a monetary value is assigned to intangible consequences, decision analysis 
reduces to a simple comparison of costs and benefits of decision alternatives in 
monetary terms (Faber 2005).  
2.5 Engineering decision analysis 
Design of structures, evaluation of existing structures and optimisation of maintenance 
are examples of decision problems which can be approached with engineering decision 
analysis (Kübler 2007). Engineering decision analysis is the comparison of a set of 
possible system configurations (i.e. decision alternatives), with the goal of identifying 
the optimal one. To compare decision alternatives in an objective manner, a utility 
function is formulated allowing measurement of costs and benefits of each decision 
alternative over the considered time. In the general approach, the optimal decision 
alternative provides largest expected utility, while conforming to societal risk 
acceptance criteria. Engineering decision analysis is part of the normative branch of 
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decision theory, which aims at identifying and prescribing an optimal decision 
alternative according to rational criteria.  
While certain subjectivity is granted in decision problem formulation, the decision 
maker bears the ultimate responsibility for a decision and is always subject to societal 
laws and preferences, particularly in respect to safety of the individual and the 
environment; decisions must conform to societal risk acceptance criteria (Stewart and 
Melchers 1997).  
2.5.1 Decision alternatives and utility function 
An engineering decision analysis requires the definition of a set of decision alternatives 
 1 2, ,..., Na a aA  available to the decision maker, where , 1,2,...,ia i N  are decision 
alternatives. The nature of decision alternatives depends on the type of decision 
problem. For instance, in the conceptual design of a bridge, two decision alternatives 
may be given by a suspension bridge and a cable-stayed bridge. Conversely, in the 
detailed design of a bridge, decision alternatives may pertain to different dispositions of 
reinforcement bars in the bridge deck. Furthermore, in a decision problem involving 
inspection planning for an existing structure, decision alternatives may involve different 
inspection methods and time intervals between inspections.  
In an engineering decision analysis, decision alternatives are ranked according to a 
utility function, to identify the decision alternative with the largest expected utility over 
the given time span. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1943) lay the theoretical 
foundation for utility function formation. The utility function   , ,i iU a a   for 
decision alternative ia  normally considers all costs and benefits entailed by the decision 
alternative in the form of consequences  ,ia  . The consequences are considered to 
be a function of future system characteristics, which are uncertain, and are thus 
represented by random variable   (Benjamin and Cornell 1970). 
The utility function   , ,i iU a a   often considers costs and benefits incurred at 
different times over the lifetime of a system, which cannot be directly summed due to 
time value of money. To allow a comparison of decision alternatives from a current 
perspective, the utility function should consider the discounted net present value (NPV) 
of future costs and benefits. Whereas the mathematics of discounting are well 
established, see e.g. Mankiw (2011), opinions diverge on the choice of an appropriate 
discount rate, which should include considerations on time preference, economic 
growth and sustainability (see e.g. Nishijima et al. 2006). According to HM Treasury 
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(2003), a valid range for engineering projects with a long life time, in developed 
countries, is 2.5-3.5% . In France a rate of 4% is utilized. 
2.5.2 Decision problems 
Three types of decision problems are defined , depending on knowledge of the future 
state of the system   (Luce and Raiffa 1957): 
‐ Decision making under certainty – A decision problem is considered “under 
certainty” when the state of the system - after each decision - is known. 
Therefore, consequences  ia  are only a function of the decision alterative 
and the optimal decision is simply identified by choosing the alternative with 
highest utility value. 
‐ Decision making under risk – Decision making under risk occurs when the 
future state of the system   is not known, however its probabilistic 
characterisation  f   is known. Assuming that the decision maker is risk 
neutral, the optimal decision a  is given by the alternative with the largest 
expected utility over all realisations of  , i.e.  
   max , ,a E U a C a     a   (2.3) 
‐ Decision making under uncertainty - Here, future states of the system  , as 
well as its probabilistic characterisation  f  , are not known. Under these 
circumstances, the optimal decision alternative cannot be uniquely identified and 
several decision making criteria are available, e.g. maximin utility, Niehans-
Savage criterion, Hurwicz α, and Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason. Each 
criterion defines a rule to select a decision alternative in accordance with the 
preferences of the decision maker (see e.g. Kübler 2007 for details).  
Engineering decision problems are generally classified as either “under risk” or 
“under uncertainty”. However, for practical purposes, most cases of decisions “under 
uncertainty” can be translated to a decision “under risk” by postulating  f   based on 
experience, data, or personal preference (Kübler 2007). When postulating  f  , the 
question arises whether further data and knowledge on   should be obtained before a 
decision is made. The Bayesian decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961, Benjamin 
and Cornell 1970) provides a formal basis for answering this question; the theory is 
widely utilised in engineering decision making). In Bayesian decision theory, the 
distinction between prior, posterior and pre-posterior decision analysis is made: 
‐ Prior decision analysis – In the simplest form of decision analysis, expected 
utility for each alternative is evaluated with statistical information and 
probabilistic modelling available at the time of the decision. 
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‐ Posterior decision analysis – Posterior decision is structured like a prior 
decision analysis, however expected utilities are calculated based on 
probabilities updated to reflect changes in the system or increased knowledge on 
the system (i.e. from data collection). Posterior risk analysis is often used to 
analyse the impact of risk reducing measures. 
‐ Pre-posterior analysis – The pre-posterior decision analysis allows addressing 
questions on whether further data on the system should be collected before 
making the actual engineering decision. The practice involves a posterior 
analysis for each possible data collection outcome, assuming that data collection 
outcome follows the prior probability distribution and considering uncertainties 
associated with observation and interpretation of the outcome. The pre-posterior 
analysis may be interpreted as a posterior decision analysis made before new 
information is actually collected.  
2.5.3 Risk acceptance 
Cost-benefit optimality is always desirable; however, society has further requirements 
for engineered systems. An acceptable decision alternative must comply with societal 
standards in terms of personal safety (injuries and fatalities) and environmental 
consequences (e.g. pollution, loss of biodiversity), see JCSS (2008). These standards are 
referred to as risk acceptance criteria and are available in different forms.  
The ALARP criterion (“As Low As Reasonably Possible”) was developed by US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is widely used in practice (Stewart and Melchers 
1997). A system meets the ALARP criterion if it can be demonstrated that costs for 
further risk reduction are disproportionate compared to its potential benefits. ALARP is 
its non-committing terminology; “reasonably” and “possible” leave room for 
interpretation. 
A second type of risk acceptance criteria are safety goals, which specify a minimal 
safety requirement e.g. in terms of annual fatalities related to an activity (Stewart 2010). 
Safety goals are sometimes given in the form of F-N curves, relating frequency to 
magnitude of consequences, and allowing differentiation between acceptance criteria 
for societal risks and individual risks, see Faber and Stewart (2003). 
In recent decades, risk acceptance criteria based on the “societal willingness to pay” 
have emerged. They determine how much society is willing to invest in a marginal 
increase of safety for its members, which directly implies the risk the society is willing 
to accept. This approach may be based on the LQI methodology, see Nathwani et al. 
(1997) and Rackwitz et al. (2005). 
  
 
 
 
3 Flood risk management 
In this chapter, engineering risk assessment and decision analysis 
topics are revisited, in the context of flood risk; particular attention 
is paid to river floods and direct consequences for residential 
buildings, the focus of this thesis. 
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3.1 Flood 
Flood can be defined as “the overflow of a large amount of water beyond its normal 
limits, especially over what is normally dry land” (OED 2014). This might well be the 
only common element for all floods, which otherwise vary greatly in source, cause and 
characteristics.  
Floods generally originate from overflowing water bodies or streams, e.g. a river, 
lake or sea. Heavy rainfall can be the direct source of floods when rainwater cannot run 
off fast enough, due to saturated soils or insufficient capacity of the urban drainage 
system. Flood causes include long-lasting rainfall, snowmelt, dam break and temporary 
sea-level rise due to low pressure weather systems (IPCC 2014b). Next to source and 
cause, a flood event can be characterised with a plethora of attributes, e.g. description of 
its development in time and space in terms of water depth, water flow velocity, etc. 
A categorisation of different flood types and sources is given in Jonkman (2005) and 
Swiss Re (2007), the bases for the following summary: 
‐ River floods – River floods occur when a water stream carries excessive water, 
which may leave the river bed. They generally occur due to heavy rainfall in the 
river catchment, sometimes in combination with other causes, e.g. snow melt, 
blockage of the river bed by ice jams, landslides or a breach in a flood protection 
structure. River floods may be categorised as “slow rising” or “flash flood”. The 
former occur in the lower course of rivers and are characterised by slow water 
rise and slow water flow velocity. Slow rising floods can usually be predicted 
several hours or days in advance, thus allowing emergency risk management 
measures to be put in place, e.g. evacuations and local flood barriers. In contrast, 
flash floods occur in mountainous regions and are characterised by very quick 
water rise, high water flow velocity and debris flow. They are generally the 
consequence of extreme rainfall, but can also have other causes, e.g. landslides 
into a water basin, see Kilburn and Petley (2003). The warning time before a 
flash flood is often very short.  
‐ Coastal floods – Coastal floods occur on the shores of lakes and seas and have 
two main causes. Lakes can overflow due to heavy rainfall in the catchment of 
the lake and/or following the decision by authorities to limit the outflow of a 
lake to protect lowlands from river floods. The second main cause of coastal 
floods is an atmospheric low-pressure system over sea, which may cause the sea 
level to temporarily increase by several meters (storm surge). 
‐ Areal floods – Areal floods occur in flat lowlands when rainwater from extreme 
rainfall cannot run off fast enough and thus accumulates on the surface. In urban 
environments, they occur when storm sewer capacity is insufficient to drain 
rainwater fast enough; in rural areas, when the soil is saturated. 
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Source and type of flood are relevant to flood risk management for at least two reasons. 
First, they are factors in the hazard assessment; second, the effectiveness of individual 
risk management measures may vary depending on the flood type. 
3.2 Flood risk 
Following the definition of risk in Section 2.2, flood risk is characterised by the 
probability of flooding and its consequences.  
Let X be a random vector characterising flood hazard5 for the system of interest and 
C the flood consequences for the system. Furthermore, let  , ,Cf cX x  be the joint 
probability density function of X and C. Then, flood risk r can be characterised in 
general manner as:  
  , ,
c
C
D D
r c f c d dc  
x
X x x   (3.1) 
where cD  and Dx  are the domains of C  and X  respectively.  
3.3 Flood risk management 
Flood risk management is defined in Schanze (2006) as the “continuous and holistic 
societal analysis, assessment and mitigation of flood risk”. Recognising the importance 
of a holistic and integrated approach to flood risk management is relatively recent (ICE 
2001, Hall 2011). Previously, efforts focused on flood protection, rather than flood risk 
management. That is, protection structures were designed with one particular design 
event in mind (e.g. 200 year event) and little consideration for system vulnerability, 
system robustness and residual risk. The new paradigm of flood risk management has 
developed over the past decade and can be summarised in three points (Merz, Hall et al. 
2010): 
                                                 
5 As described in Section 2.4.3 hazard assessment may entail the characterisation of hazard 
sources, as well as the characterisation of hazard actions throughout the system. In the 
present and following chapters the designation “hazard" refers to hazard actions (e.g. 
water depth, water flow velocity, etc.). Conversely, “hazard source” refers to the flood 
source (e.g. river discharge). 
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‐ Risk based approach – Consideration is given to all possible flood events and 
their consequences. 
‐ Formal decision analysis – Flood risk management decisions are made on the 
basis of flood risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. 
‐ Integrated systems approach – Flood risk management strategies are 
developed, including structural and non-structural risk management measures. 
Approaches to, and frameworks for, flood risk management are described in e.g. ICE 
(2001), Schanze (2006), Merz, Hall et al. (2010), Hall (2011) and Jha et al. (2012). 
They are generally in good agreement with the risk management framework outlined in 
Section 2.3. Several aspects of interest are highlighted in the following.  
Merz, Hall et al. (2010) emphasises that, for flood risk management to be effective 
and sustainable, it must consider uncertainty and non-stationarity of flood risk. The 
authors underline the importance of optimising decisions for cost-benefit optimality, as 
well as for robustness6 and flexibility. 
Jha et al. (2012) emphasises the concept of integrated flood risk management, 
defined as “…a combination of flood risk management measures which, taken as a 
whole, can successfully reduce urban flood risk.” The concept is based on the 
recognition that large flood protection structures alone cannot effectively manage flood 
risk (because of large upfront costs, long planning and construction times and changing 
flood risk). The report proposes managing residual risk of large protection structures by 
implementing complementary structural and non-structural measures. The value of non-
structural measures, including early-warning systems and population education, is 
emphasised; these steps can have a large impact on preparedness and loss reduction, 
without requiring large upfront investments. 
The following sections examine flood risk assessment (next section) and flood risk 
management measures (Section 3.5). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6The meaning of the term "robustness" is different depending on whether it refers to a system or 
a decision. A robust system is described in Section 2.4.4; a robust decision performs well 
under a large number of future states of the world, i.e. its performance is insensitive to 
uncertainty variables and parameters.  
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3.4 Flood risk assessment 
Flood risk is assessed according to the general risk assessment framework illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. It includes system definition, hazard identification, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation. The approaches to system definition, hazard identification and risk 
evaluation described in Chapter 2 are valid for flood risk assessment and no further 
details are given here. However, flood risk analysis involves unique aspects, explained 
in the following.  
3.4.1 Flood risk analysis 
A common way to analyse flood risk is the Source-Pathway-Receptor framework (ICE 
2001), illustrated in Figure 3.1. Sources of floods are described in Section 3.1. Pathways 
are discharge routes through which water propagates from the source to locations where 
people, buildings and other assets are located. Receptors are people, buildings and 
assets that could be potentially damaged by floods. In Schanze (2006) and Hall (2011), 
the framework is extended with a fourth element: “harm”, i.e. flood consequences.   
Individual modelling elements in the Figure 3.1 are described in more detail in the 
next sections, with a focus on aspects relevant to this thesis, river floods and direct 
effects on residential buildings. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Schematic representation of the Source-Pathway-Receptor flood risk assessment 
framework (adapted from Hall 2011) 
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3.4.1.1 Source modelling 
Processes leading to heavy rainfall or excessive river discharge, which then may cause 
floods, are comprehensively described with the hydrologic cycle, see Chow et al. 
(1988). In broad strokes, the hydrological cycle includes rainfall, ground infiltration and 
surface runoff, river runoff, storage (in lakes and seas) and evaporation. As the 
hydrologic cycle is a continuous process, the step of the cycle, that can be considered 
the actual source of a flood event, is not unequivocally identifiable. However, it is 
reasonable to consider the meteorological processes that lead to heavy rainfall, or the 
river discharge process, as hazard source and therefore start flood risk analysis from 
there.  
When river discharge is considered as hazard source, probabilistic characterisation 
of the river discharge process can be derived from discharge time series data (generally 
available for most rivers in developed countries) by employing extreme value theory. 
From it, the probability of flood event occurrence can be derived. This approach avoids 
the modelling of complex, highly uncertain and computationally intensive 
meteorological processes. However, an underlying assumption of this approach is the 
stationarity of river discharge process. As previously mentioned, this assumption is 
challenged by climate change research. When the impact of climate change on flood 
risk is of interest, it is advisable to consider the meteorological process as hazard source 
by using global or regional circulation models as inputs (see e.g. Feyen et al. 2012).  
3.4.1.2 Pathway modelling 
The “pathway” from source to receptor is modelled as water flow routing in the river 
bed and on the flood plain. Several modelling methodologies are available, which can 
be broadly categorised as lumped system flow routing and distributed system flow 
routing. Lumped flow routing models characterise the water flow as a function solely of 
time; conversely, distributed system flow routing models water flow as a function of 
both time and space (Chow et al. 1988). 
Lumped flow routing models are based on the continuity equation of hydrology and 
functional relationships between discharges in different parts of the studied hydrological 
system. It is, generally less computationally intensive and less accurate than distributed 
flow routing. Nevertheless, it is used in applications where a large number of flow 
simulations is required, e.g. to estimate hazard uncertainty (Apel et al. 2006), or to 
consider a large number of dike breach scenarios (Gouldby et al. 2008, Bernini and 
Franchini 2013).  
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In distributed system flow routing models, water flow is most commonly modelled 
with an approximation of the Navier-Stokes equations for incompressible fluid motion. 
Most models rely on the St. Venant approximations, i.e. one-dimensional channel flow 
equations and two-dimensional shallow-water equations. See Chow et al. (1988) for 
equations, underlying assumptions and numerical solutions.  
Several academic and commercial distributed flow routing models are available. 
One-dimensional river channel flow models include Mike 11 (DHI 1995) and HEC-
RAS (USACE 1995). They offer a computationally efficient solution for river flow 
routing, require little input data; under certain conditions, they can also be used to 
model flood plain routing. However, they do not account well for complex terrain and 
water spreading in more than one direction. Two-dimensional routing models include 
TELEMAC-2D (Galland et al. 1991), SOBEK (Deltares 2014), ISIS2D (CH2MHill 
2014) and Tuflow (Syme 2001). They allow detailed flow routing over a flood plain and 
can account for complex terrain. However, they require more computational resources 
and runtime. LISFLOOD-FP (Bates and De Roo 2000) couples a one-dimensional river 
channel routing model with a two-dimensional raster-based flood plain routing model; 
for both routing models, several numeric algorithms are available to describe water flow 
routing. 
An overview and evaluation of these, and several other flow routing models is found 
in Wicks et al. (2004). Syme (2001) provides a performance comparison of ISIS2D, 
LISFLOOD-FP, TELMAC-2D and TUFLOW. Horritt and Bates (2002) compare HEC-
RAS, LISFLOOD and TELEMAC-2D. 
3.4.1.3 Receptor modelling 
A receptor is a person, building or other object subject to flood risk. In engineering risk 
assessment, these may be called system constituents; in an insurance context, they are 
referred to as exposure7.  
Receptor modelling is based on system representation described in Section 2.4.1. It 
entails the characterisation of all objects at risk, i.e. their tangible and intangible 
valuation, location, functionality and other features relevant to consequence assessment, 
like mobility and flood susceptibility.  
                                                 
7 In the paper reproduced in Chapter 5 the term "exposure" is also utilised to identify a portfolio 
of receptors. 
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In this thesis, the focus is on building receptors. For buildings, relevant features 
include structural details which may influence vulnerability: construction material, door 
types and presence or absence of basements. Tangible valuation of buildings may vary 
depending on the purpose of the analysis, as replacement value or depreciated value 
may be considered (see e.g. Jongman et al. 2012). Intangible valuation is inherently 
more challenging; however, valuation methodologies are available, e.g. in Holicky and 
Sykora (2010), for historical heritage building valuation.  
Receptors may be modelled with different levels of detail and spatial resolution, 
ranging from detailed modelling of individual receptors to aggregated modelling over 
whole administrative regions. The choice of detail level and spatial resolution are often 
related to study area size, with decreasing level of detail and resolution for increasingly 
larger study areas. At the largest scale of modelling, macro-scale exact locations and 
characteristics of receptors are not considered; the value of receptors is aggregated for 
whole administrative regions. On meso-scale, receptor characteristic may be considered 
in a statistically aggregated manner and the value of receptors is aggregated at grid cell 
level and/or by land use. On micro-scale, location, characteristics and valuation of 
receptors are considered in detail for individual receptors.  
In addition to spatial resolution of choice, level of receptor modelling detail depends 
on the quantity and quality of available data. In developed countries, authorities 
generally have detailed data on location and main features of building and infrastructure 
receptors. However, due to data protection rules, such data might not be publicly 
available, or only available in statistically aggregated form.  
3.4.1.4 Consequence modelling 
Flood consequences are modelled with vulnerability and robustness models. 
Vulnerability models with different degrees of sophistication are discussed in literature 
for a wide variety of receptors; however, fewer robustness models seem available. 
References to literature models are given throughout this section. 
Vulnerability models for residential building in floods aim at relating hazard indices 
and building characteristics to direct consequences. The hazard index with the strongest 
correlation to direct consequences is water depth, followed by water flow velocity, 
event duration and water contamination (Kelman and Spence 2004). Building 
characteristics with greatest influence on flood damage include building type, building 
material and whether flood proofing measures are in place (Kreibich et al. 2005 and 
Merz et al. 2013).  
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The most common flood vulnerability model type is a stage-damage curve, which is 
a damage function relating flood water depth to consequences. Models are commonly 
categorised according to how they are established (see e.g. Smith 1994); empirical 
models are derived from consequences data from past events through regression, or 
comparable methodologies. Conversely, synthetic models are established through 
“what-if” analyses on hypothetical buildings and expert judgment. Advantages and 
disadvantages of both approaches are summarised in Merz, Kreibich et al. (2010). A 
further distinction is made between absolute models, where consequences are given in 
absolute monetary terms (see e.g. Penning-Rowsell et al. 2010) and relative models, 
where consequences are expressed as a fraction of receptor value (see e.g. Scawthorn, 
Blais et al. 2006). While the former is generally easier to estimate, the latter has the 
advantage of better transferability in time and space (Merz, Kreibich et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, models are available at different levels of spatial aggregation to match the 
aggregation level of receptors (Messner et al. 2007). Macro- and meso-scale models 
generally specify consequences per areal unit, in some cases with consideration of land 
cover information (e.g. Thieken et al. 2008a). These models do not consider individual 
receptors, but instead provide aggregated estimates of direct consequences, e.g. for 
administrative units. Conversely, mico-scale models allow determination of direct 
consequences to individual receptors, therefore enabling detailed consideration of 
building characteristics and local flood characteristics.  
Empirical damage functions seem to be the most common type of vulnerability 
model. Their popularity may be explained by the straightforward derivation of the 
model from consequence data. However, these models are limited in several regards. 
First, empirical damage functions lack transferability in time and space, see Cammerer 
et al. (2013). Second, despite efforts to improve consequence data quality (Elmer 2012), 
damage data from past events underlying vulnerability models often lacks detail. 
Finally, damage data sample size is often too small to reliably infer damage functions 
for different connotations of each building characteristic and hazard index.  
Several of these concerns are addressed by synthetic vulnerability models; they are 
more flexible and allow for systematic accounting of building characteristics and hazard 
characteristics. A prominent example is found in the Multi-Coloured Handbook 
(Penning-Rowsell et al. 2010). Based on seminal work by the same authors from the 
last decades (e.g. Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton 1977), the Multi-Coloured Handbook 
characterises buildings as collections of components and estimates monetary losses for 
individual building components in function of water depth and the duration of flood. 
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The monetary loss to the building is then found by summing up component losses. 
Although the modelling approach is generally valid, the transferability of the resulting 
damage functions to other countries is still limited, since consequences are expressed in 
absolute monetary terms and the modelled building configurations are UK proprietary.  
A further dimension of vulnerability modelling approaches is found in process-
based vulnerability models, which aim at understanding and reproducing the actual 
damage processes; see Papathoma-Köhle et al. (2010) for an overview, and Mazzorana 
et al. (2014), Kelman (2002), Caraballo-Nadal et al. (2006) and De Risi et al. (2013), 
for examples. Process-based models often utilise the fragility concept described in 
Section 2.4.4. The first step in establishing a process-based vulnerability model is to 
identify relevant failure mechanisms and damage process; for residential buildings, a 
list of relevant failure mechanisms is found in Kelman and Spence (2003a). Then, an 
engineering model and limit state functions are established for each failure mechanism, 
allowing for calculating the probability of a building being in a certain damage state for 
a given hazard indices. Process-based fragility models are the most sophisticated 
vulnerability modelling approaches, as they allow for detailed consideration of building 
characteristics and can be readily improved when new knowledge on damage processes 
becomes available. However, the quality of the model hinges on good understanding of 
damage processes, which is not always available. The need for a better understanding of 
damage processes is emphasised in Meyer et al. (2013).  
3.4.2 Modelling framework and modelling choices  
Numerous comprehensive flood risk assessment models and methodologies are 
available. Examples of non-commercial models include HAZUS (Scawthorn, Blais et 
al. 2006, Scawthorn, Seligson et al. 2006) and the model by Dutta et al. (2003). 
Commercial models include solutions by Risk Management Solutions (RMS 2014) and 
Air Worldwide (AIR 2014), which are mainly employed for risk assessment in the 
insurance industry. No comprehensive list of flood risk assessment mythologies can be 
provided here; instead, an attempt is made to highlight modelling choices required when 
selecting or developing a flood risk assessment methodology. 
A flood risk assessment methodology necessitates a source, pathway, receptor and 
consequence model. The choice of models is a prerogative of the risk modeller and 
should be made considering boundary conditions, such as spatial scope, available data, 
available computational resources and the aim of the risk assessment. A modelling 
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methodology also must be selected, e.g. Monte Carlo simulation or Bayesian 
Probabilistic Network, which both allow for consistent consideration and propagation of 
uncertainty.  
In a common modelling approach, flood risk is approximated by simulating a set of 
flood events with different magnitudes and probability of occurrence. For each event, 
hazard characteristics are assessed and, from these, consequences are derived, possibly 
with consideration of uncertainty. The joint consideration of all events in the event set 
provides an approximation of flood risk. This is a sound approach; however, it often 
requires a large number of flood event simulations, which can be computationally 
expensive. The most expensive part of modelling is generally flow routing, and, as a 
consequence, the choice of flow routing model has implications for the rest of the 
model, as explained in the following. When a lumped flow routing model is chosen, an 
individual simulation is not very accurate (large model uncertainty); however, it 
becomes possible to simulate a large number of flood events. This allows, for instance, 
explicit consideration of hazard uncertainty and accounting for multiple protection 
structure breaching scenarios. Conversely, when a distributed flow routing model is 
chosen, each simulation is more accurate, but the number of events that can be 
simulated becomes smaller.  
Choice of vulnerability and fragility models is driven by the risk assessment goal. 
When risk assessment is utilised for decision analysis on protection structure 
optimisation or flood proofing of a building, the vulnerability model or fragility model 
of the structure must accommodate decision alternatives. Conversely, the 
accommodation of decision alternatives is not a requirement in risk assessment in an 
insurance context 
Ideally, receptor models, hazard models and consequence models are available on 
the same spatial scale. When they are not, it becomes necessary to spatially up-scale or 
down-scale models and/or data, to have matching resolutions of all elements in the risk 
assessment. Upscaling may involve aggregation of data and models; when input data 
and models are available at micro-scale, the change of model and data to meso- or 
macro-scale generally involves only statistical aggregation. For the aggregation to be 
correct, it is important to consistently consider uncertainty and dependencies from 
common-cause effects and epistemic uncertainty (Faber et al. 2007). Downscaling (or 
disaggregation) of models and data is inherently more challenging, since it involves 
moving from less detailed to a more detailed characterisation. It can be modelled based 
on statistical relationships, or based on underlying processes. Whichever approach is 
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chosen, it is important to consider and represent the uncertainty introduced in the 
downscaling process. 
3.5 Flood risk management measures  
Based on flood risk assessment, efficiency of different flood risk management measures 
can be evaluated using principles of risk-based decision analysis introduced in Section 
2.5. In the following, an overview of available risk management measures is provided.  
Flood risk management measures are generally categorised as structural and non-
structural. Most structural measures aim at restraining the flood waters from reaching a 
receptor, i.e. by keeping the water in the river bed, or by directing it to areas with low 
receptor value density. Such structures are available with a large range of costs, spatial 
scopes, protection height and structural resistance. They include different types of dams, 
dikes and local flood barriers. Another type of structural measures aims at reducing the 
vulnerability of receptors, e.g. by implementing water-proof materials. Non-structural 
measures are very diverse and include education and risk awareness raising in the 
population, implementation of early-warning systems, event management plans and 
post-event recovery management plans (see Jha et al. 2012). An overview of different 
flood risk management measures is provided in the following.   
3.5.1 Large scale structural measures 
Large structural measures include structures built across a river (i.e. dams and weirs), or 
along rivers (i.e. dikes and river walls). Structures built across rivers are often built for 
purposes other than flood risk management, i.e. energy production, to render rivers 
navigable, control river erosion and sediment transport. Nevertheless, such structures 
can be beneficial for flood risk management as they allow regulation of river discharge 
and possibly reduction of peak river discharge during a flood event. In contrast, dikes 
along rivers are specifically built for flood risk management; their design rationale is 
linked to the reduction of flood risk. As previously mentioned, dike design was 
traditionally based on a single design event (e.g. 100 year event), from which the 
structure should offer protection. Most structures built in the 20th century were built 
according to such criteria. Although the choice of design event may have included 
consideration of potential consequences, this approach generally did not give detailed 
consideration to the probability of a protection structure failure and its consequences. 
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More sophisticated design approaches consider the reliability of a dike structure, 
considering and possibly optimising, its probability of failure in a reliability-based 
approach (Voortman and Vrijling 2005). When dike reliability is considered and 
optimised together with the consequences of a failure, the design approach becomes 
risk-based (Voortman 2003).  
A dike reliability analysis starts with the identification of relevant failure 
mechanisms; see Morris et al. (2009) for an overview. Failure mechanisms of river 
dikes include overtopping, piping, inner and outer slope failure and erosion; see van 
Mierlo et al. (2007) for further detail and an illustration. According to ASCE/EWRI 
(2011), surface erosion due to overtopping and internal erosion by piping are the most 
common failure mechanisms. From each failure mechanism, a breach can initiate and, if 
the hydraulic load is large, gradually grow. As such, dike failure modelling includes two 
further steps: probability assessment of a breach initiating and assessment of the breach 
development. Fragility models for different types of dikes are widely discussed in 
literature; a state of the art is provided in Allsop et al. (2007). Other fragility models are 
found in Kingston et al. (2011), Vorogushyn et al. (2009), Buijs et al. (2009) and 
Voortman and Vrijling (2005).  
3.5.2 Local scale structural measures 
Local scale structural measures comprise several barriers to prevent or reduce flood 
hazard in small areas (such as villages or individual receptors), or to temporarily raise 
the protection height of existing large scale structural measures. A thorough summary of 
available local flood barriers, including advices for selecting and operating them, is 
available in Ogunyoye et al. (2011). Local flood protection measures include temporary 
and demountable barriers, with a sand bag wall as the most prominent example of a 
local flood barrier (Reeve et al. 2003). Temporary barriers include a range of solutions: 
air filled and water filled tubes, filled containers, freestanding barriers and frame 
barriers. Demountable barriers differ from temporary barriers in that they are partially 
preinstalled, with an anchoring system or foundations required to deploy the barrier.  
Local flood barriers differ greatly in protection height, which can range from few 
dozen centimetres to several meters and structural resistance (Bramley and Bowker 
2002). Each barrier type is subject to different failure modes, which may include 
overtopping, breaching, collapsing, excessive seepage, puncturing and sliding. 
Vulnerability models for local flood barriers are not widely available in literature. 
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However, commercial barrier vendors should generally have analytical vulnerability 
models and/or empirical results of structural tests available. 
Whereas most flood risk management measures can be designed and selected with 
only risk reduction in mind, the selection of local flood barrier requires consideration of 
the flood lead time, i.e. the time available between flood warning and the actual flood. If 
the lead time is very short, a pre-installed barrier must be selected.  
3.5.3 Micro scale structural measures 
Micro scale structural measures are directly applied to buildings and are often called 
flood proofing measures. While local protection structures aim at keeping the flood 
water away from buildings, flood proofing measures aim at reducing consequences 
when flood water reaches the building, by hindering water infiltration into the building 
or by reducing susceptibility of building components to water contact.  
An overview of flood proofing measures for residential building is given in Elliott 
and Leggett (2002), with several flood proofing measures often combined in one flood 
proofing strategy. Typical flood proofing strategies are (Zevenbergen et al. 2007): 
‐ Dry-proofing – A dry-proofing strategy aims at hindering the water from 
entering the building by closing all possible water infiltration routes (e.g. air 
bricks, ventilation shafts, door cracks, windows cracks and sewer system) up to 
ca. 1m  over terrain. Dry-proofing above this threshold is not recommended as it 
may favour hydrostatic pressure on the building envelope, which can, in turn, 
compromise the structural integrity of the building. Dry-proofing can be 
achieved with both temporary and permanent measures (Joseph 2014).  
‐ Wet-proofing – Wet-proofing allows for flood water entering the building; 
however, it aims at reducing the susceptibility of building components and 
contents to water contact. This includes employing water resistant materials and 
placing susceptible installations and contents in elevated positions.  
‐ Avoidance – The avoidance strategy entails constructing buildings so that water 
can hardly reach them, i.e. on top of stilts, columns or walls. 
Practical instructions on selection and implementation of flood proofing measures are 
found in Bramley and Bowker (2002), Bowker (2002) and Wingfield et al. (2005).  
Effectiveness of each strategy depends on local hazard characteristics, i.e. on the 
frequency and intensity of hazard actions impacting a receptor.  
Benefits of flood proofing are conceptually described in Naumann et al. (2011) 
which provides vulnerability curves for buildings with and without flood proofing 
measures. In Thieken et al. (2005) and Kreibich et al. (2005) the benefits of flood 
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proofing are illustrated by comparing damage data from flood proofed buildings and 
from buildings without flood proofing. Bubeck et al. (2012) compares damages from 
the 1993 and 1995 flooding of the Meus to identify the effectiveness of flood proofing 
measures applied between the two events. 
Cost-benefit analyses are found in several publications, e.g. Joseph (2014), 
Zevenbergen et al. (2007), Gersonius et al. (2008) and Kreibich et al. (2011), each 
taking a different approach to the estimation of costs and benefits. For instance, 
Kreibich et al. (2011) estimates the benefits from damage data and costs from actual 
expenses that might incur when implementing a flood proofing measure. Joseph (2014) 
estimates both costs and benefits (including reduction of intangible consequences) 
through a survey. Zevenbergen et al. (2007) and Gersonius et al. (2008) estimate 
benefits through an analytical calculation of vulnerability curve (albeit without 
providing modelling details) and costs seem to be postulated.  
Several sources, e.g. Kelman (2007) and Joseph (2014), underline the importance of 
considering intangible damages in any cost-benefit analyses for flood proofing of 
buildings. 
3.5.4 Non-structural measures 
Non-structural measures help manage consequences when a flood event occurs and are 
often employed to manage residual risk of structural measures.  
Non-structural measures are categorised by Jha et al. (2012) as increased 
preparedness, flood avoidance, emergency planning and management, recovery speed-
up and using recovery to increase resilience. Several measures are listed and detailed in 
the following. 
Increased preparedness includes measures such as risk awareness (education about 
the possibility of floods occurring), health awareness (education about the health risk of 
floods, e.g. drinking water contamination, faecal contamination of flood water or 
decaying human/animal remains). These measures help population and authorities to 
react appropriately in the event of a flood.  
A typical flood avoidance measure is spatial planning and zoning, which allows for 
limiting urban development in flood zones (see e.g. Poussin et al. 2012). 
Flood insurance allows the transferral of financial flood risk from a property or 
business owner to an insurance company (Swiss Re 2007). Insurance is increasingly 
recognised as beneficial for risk management, as the risk assessment of the insurance 
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company may raise risk awareness, thus encouraging the implementation of risk 
reduction measures (Jha et al. 2012, Poussin et al. 2013). According to Thieken et al. 
(2007) raised risk awareness has a similar positive impact on the implementation of 
flood proofing measures. 
Emergency planning and management aims at facilitating an optimal emergency 
response to minimise flooding consequences and allow for a prompt post-event 
recovery. As part of an emergency plan, an early warning system is generally put in 
place to give advance notice of an imminent flood, allowing emergency plans to be put 
into action and vulnerable members of society to be evacuated. Emergency planning 
may include the organisation of first aid and rescue activities, continuity planning of 
government activity and critical infrastructure (Jha et al. 2012).  
Lastly, non-structural risk management measure may include plans for recovery and 
reconstruction of areas affected by floods. Here, the focus should be on a speedy 
recovery of infrastructure functionality, as well as state of the art reconstruction of 
destroyed and damaged structures. This includes integrating lessons learned from the 
flood event, but also incorporating technological advances in building design, energy 
efficiency, transportation infrastructure, telecommunication infrastructure and urban 
planning. Through these steps, the negative consequences of the flood event can be 
partially offset by gains in efficiency and life quality that come from improved 
buildings and infrastructure. 
  
 
 
 
 
4 Hierarchical flood protection 
system  
A definition and characterisation of hierarchical flood protection 
system is provided and a modelling approach is proposed both for 
flood risk analysis in the presence of a hierarchical flood protection 
system and to identify its optimal configuration. The chapter 
concludes with possible challenges faced when modelling a 
hierarchical flood protection system. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Structural flood risk management measures, here referred to as flood protection 
structures, reduce flood risk by restraining flood water from reaching receptors. As 
described in Section 3.5, flood protection structures are available for a range of spatial 
scales; examples are dams, dikes and local flood barriers. Moreover, if a dry-proofing 
strategy is applied to a building, its building envelope is considered a flood protection 
structure for the building interior.  
Flood protection structures reduce risk; however, since they can fail, they always 
entail residual risk. This observation directly indicates the value of having several 
hierarchically integrated flood protection structures on the pathway between source and 
receptor, where each additional hierarchy level allows for a further reduction of flood 
risk. When two or more flood protection structures are sequentially integrated on 
different spatial scales, the flood protection system becomes hierarchical. Figure 4.1 
schematically illustrates a hierarchical flood protection system with four hierarchy 
levels. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Schematic illustration of a hierarchical flood protection system with indication of 
geographical scope and decision maker for each structure  
Figure 4.1 illustrates a hierarchical flood protection system for a single receptor; 
however, large protection structures generally offer protection to more than one 
building. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where a hierarchical flood protection system 
with several receptors is schematically illustrated. Whereas on the top hierarchy level 
there is generally only one protection structure, at lower hierarchical levels more 
protection structures can be present. Also, as illustrated in the figure, some receptors 
may be protected by more protection structures than others.  
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Figure 4.2 - Hierarchical flood protection system illustrated for several receptors 
When optimised, hierarchical flood protection systems generally allow for a larger 
expected utility than single-structure protection systems. The reason for a hierarchical 
flood protection system to be associated with larger expected utility are mathematically 
trivial, with each additional hierarchy level considered, the decision maker has a larger 
set of decision alternatives to choose from, which implies that the expected utility of the 
optimal decision alternative is non-decreasing with each additional hierarchy level.  
Literature recognises the value of managing flood risk by integrating a number of 
different structural and non-structural flood risk management measures (e.g. Hall, 
Dawson et al. 2003; Dawson et al. 2004; Jha et al. 2012). The similar concept of 
multiple layer of defence and multi-line safety is found in Tsimopoulou et al. (2012), 
Tsimopoulou et al. (2013), Lopez (2006), Jongejan et al. (2012).  An exception is found 
in Nehlsen et al. (2007), where a system of cascading (hierarchically integrated) dikes is 
described. The  
In the following, a characterisation of hierarchical flood protection system is 
provided before their modelling is examined.  
4.2 Characteristics of a hierarchical flood protection system 
Several characteristics of hierarchical flood protection systems are introduced; notably, 
advantages of hierarchical flood protection systems compared to single-structure 
protection systems are synthesised as: improved risk reduction, tailoring, robustness and 
flexibility. Furthermore, several cautionary observations are made, to highlight 
challenges potentially entailed in a hierarchical flood protection system. 
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4.2.1 Risk reduction 
In a hierarchical flood protection system, individual flood protection structures jointly 
reduce risk; however, the contribution to risk reduction differs by structure type. Large 
protection structures, such as dams and dikes effectively reduce risk from both small 
and large flood events. Smaller protection structures, such as local flood barriers and 
flood proofing measures, effectively reduce risk from small flood events; however, they 
are generally ineffective against large flood events. The hierarchical integration of 
several protection structures offers protection against small, as well as large flood 
events; for the latter, it reduces residual risk. Figure 4.3 schematically exemplifies these 
observations by illustrating the risk reduction for different protection systems and flood 
events of different magnitude8.  
These observations illustrate that the aim of hierarchical flood protection systems is 
not redundancy in the sense of having two or more structures with the same role (quite 
obviously, dike and local flood barriers cannot provide the same protection).  
 
Figure 4.3 - Schematic illustration of the risk reduction achieved by local flood barriers (b), a dike (c), 
and a hierarchical flood protection system (d). Each bar corresponds to one flood event. For each flood 
protection system risk reduction and residual risk are illustrated for three hypothetical events (small 
event, middle event and large event) 
                                                 
8 Note that Figure 4.3 is a schematic illustration of how risk is reduced for different protection 
systems; it is, without doubt, possible to design a dike which achieves a similar risk 
reduction as the hierarchical flood protection system, however, in all likelihood, at a 
higher cost.  
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4.2.2 Tailoring 
Hierarchical flood protection systems allow for tailoring of flood protection according 
to risk reduction requirements dictated by hazard characteristics and receptor 
characteristics. By hierarchically integrating different protection structures, individual 
protection structures may be designed to effectively complement each other. For 
instance, the extensive protection of a dike can be complemented with focused 
protection of local flood barriers where the receptor value density is high.  
For illustration, a flood plain with one village and extensive agricultural land is 
considered in Figure 4.4. In such a system, the higher receptor value density in the 
village would generally command a higher hazard reduction than agricultural land. 
When a single protection structure is responsible for flood risk reduction, it has to be 
built to meet the target risk reduction in the village (Figure 4.4, top). The surrounding 
agricultural land will profit from the same hazard reduction, and while this is welcome, 
it is probably not economically justifiable. Conversely, in a hierarchical flood protection 
system (Figure 4.4, bottom) the target hazard reduction for the village is jointly assured 
by a dike and local flood barriers. The dike can be built to a lower protection height and 
hazard reduction for agricultural land is smaller as a result, which is reasonable from an 
economic standpoint. In summary, a hierarchical flood protection system protects areas 
with a high receptor value density, without overprotecting areas with low receptor value 
density.  
 
Figure 4.4 - Comparison between two flood protection systems. On top, receptors and the whole flood 
plain are protected by a large dike; at the bottom, a smaller dike protects the flood plain; areas with high 
asset value concentration are additionally protected by a local flood barrier 
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4.2.3 Robustness 
A further advantage of hierarchical flood protection system is an increase in protection 
system robustness. A system is considered robust when the indirect consequences of its 
failure are commensurate to the direct consequences of its failure (see JCSS 2008). 
Failure in a flood protection system occurs when a protection structure is either 
breached or overtopped. When this happens in a single-structure protection system, 
receptors are directly exposed to flood water without any further protection. Conversely, 
in the presence of a hierarchical flood protection system, the failure of one structure is 
less consequential, since additional protection structures may still be in place. 
Therefore, a hierarchical flood protection system is generally expected to be more 
robust than a single-structure protection system.  
4.2.4 Flexibility and capacity for future changes in flood risk 
As described in previous chapters, future flood risk is subject to large uncertainty, e.g. 
due to climate change, which may cause future flood hazard increase or decrease. This 
uncertainty puts decision makers in a difficult position when planning large flood 
protection structures, which can take up to a decade for planning and construction, and 
have an expected life time of up to a century. Given the substantial uncertainty, 
protection height of a protection structure can easily be over- or under-designed in 
regard to future flood risk. Both cases amount to a waste of societal resources, and 
should be avoided. Furthermore, if decision makers realise that a dike is under-
designed, time required to increase protection height of a dike is generally long, leaving 
receptors with insufficient protection for a significant amount of time.  
This challenge might be alleviated through consideration of hierarchical flood 
protection systems, as their adaption to changing flood risk is easier; e.g. it is possible to 
improve flood protection by adding an additional hierarchy level or upgrading 
protection structures on a subordinate hierarchy level. Furthermore, the decision maker 
can consider the flexibility of hierarchical flood protection systems in the planning 
phase of large flood protection structures. That is, faced with large uncertainty in regard 
to future risk, decision makers may plan the flood protection system already considering 
future “risk reduction capacity”, i.e. potential future second or third hierarchy levels, 
which could be implemented in case future flood risk requires it.  
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4.2.5 Optimisation of hierarchical flood protection system 
Three main benefits of hierarchical flood protection system have been identified in 
optimised risk reduction through tailoring, increased robustness of the flood protection 
system, and increased flexibility for future flood risk reduction.  
When optimizing a flood protection system with a formal decision analysis, the 
decision maker may consider all the above benefits in a multi-objective utility function. 
However, he may also plan a hierarchical flood protection system with focus on one 
benefit, as it is generally not possible to optimise all benefits simultaneously. 
Regardless of preferences and aims of the decision maker, a flood risk assessment 
should always be the basis for decision analysis. 
4.2.6 Cautionary notes 
Flood protection through a hierarchical flood protection system seems to be beneficial; 
however, particular attention is required in its planning and implementation, especially 
when it is optimised for risk reduction. Compared to a single-structure flood protection 
system, such a system may deliberately accept a higher probability of flooding for 
certain areas, typically areas with low receptor value density. This may be economically 
sensible, since the costs for flood risk reduction cannot be justified. However, it 
becomes of paramount importance to accurately model all aspects of flood risk. In 
particular, a deliberate increase in probability of flooding (relative to a single-structure 
protection system) can be justified only if all types of consequences (cf. Figure 2.3) are 
considered.  
A second aspect requiring careful attention in a hierarchical flood protection system 
is the execution of flood risk management. Flood protection structures at different scales 
are, in all likelihood, managed by different authorities. The good functioning of the 
protection system hinges on correct execution of pre-event measures and event 
management on each hierarchy level.  
In summary, hierarchical flood protection system offer benefits compared to single-
structure protection system, but at the same time they require flawless planning and 
execution. 
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4.3 Flood risk assessment 
In this section a mathematical formalisation of hierarchical flood protection system is 
proposed along with a methodology for flood risk analysis in the presence of a 
hierarchical flood protection system. 
4.3.1 Hazard assessment in a hierarchical flood protection system 
When receptors are protected by one or more flood protection structures, flooding at the 
location of a receptor only occurs when all flood protection structures protecting the 
receptor are overtopped and/or breached. Hazard impacting a receptor is not only a 
function of the flood event itself, but also of the state of each protection structure 
protecting the receptor. Therefore, when modelling hazard impacting a receptor, hazard 
models and fragility models of protection structures need to be jointly considered (as 
illustrated in Figure 4.5). The fragility assessment of flood protection structures can be 
considered integral part of hazard assessment.  
 
Figure 4.5 - The hazard impacting a receptor is calculated by alternatively considering hazard and 
fragility models 
4.3.2 Methodology for flood risk assessment 
A hierarchical flood protection system is an integration of two or more flood protection 
structures on different spatial scales, which jointly contribute to flood risk reduction. 
Figure 4.6 schematically illustrates a generic hierarchical flood protection system. The 
hierarchy levels are numbered from 1i   for the most upstream level (closest to flood 
source), to i N  for the most downstream level. Each hierarchy level may entail 
several protection structures (cf. Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.6 - Hierarchical flood protection system: nomenclature used for the formalisation 
Flood events are random phenomena here approximated with a finite number of 
sample events. The sample space of flood events affecting a study area9 is defined as 
 , 1, 2,...,HZ mhz m M   , where mhz  is a sample hazard event and M  is the number 
of samples in HZ . Hazard event mhz  is characterised by parameter HZ ; HZ  is 
generally a physical parameter describing flood event characteristics at the hazard 
source, e.g. river discharge. In principle, HZ  may also be a vector of several 
parameters. The occurrence probability of mhz  is mhzp . As always, the occurrence 
probability of a hazard event is related to a reference time period, generally 1 year in 
natural hazard risk assessments. 
Hazard events m HZhz   may be utilised as an input for hazard assessment, by 
which the probabilistic characterisations of hazard indices throughout the studied 
system is assessed. To allow for a general representation of hazard indices, the study 
area is divided into different sections, each delimitated by a hierarchy level. Hazard 
indices upstream of the first protection structure ( 1i  ) are modelled by a random 
vector 0X . Hazard between the i th and  1i  th hierarchy levels is modelled by 
random vector , 1,...,i i NX . Random vector , 0,...,i i NX  may include the 
characterisation of development in time and space of water depth, water flow velocity 
and other hazard indices between the i th and  1i  th hierarchy levels. Parameters 
necessary to model iX  are summarised in the parameter vector iXφ , and may include 
terrain geometry, river bathymetry and surface friction.  
Random state variable , 1,2,...,iS i N  characterises the state of all protection 
structures at the i th hierarchy level. Variable iS  includes information on whether 
protection structures are structurally intact or breached, and in the latter case, the 
breaching location(s). Relevant characteristics of all flood protection structures 
                                                 
9 Study area is understood as the geographical region for which the flood risk assessment is 
carried out, e.g. a village, commune, flood plain or river basin. 
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(geometry, resistance and location) at the i th hierarchy level are characterised by 
parameter vector 
iS
φ .  
Receptors in the study area are indexed by 1,..., rj N , where rN  is the total 
number of receptors. Direct consequences to receptor j  are modelled by random 
variables , 1,...,j rL j N ; parameters necessary to model jL  are summarised by 
parameter vector 
jL
φ (receptor value, location and vulnerability parameters). Receptors 
are considered to be randomly distributed on the study area. As such, different receptors 
may be protected by a different number of protection structures as illustrated in Figure 
4.2. For receptor j , located between the i th and  1i  th hierarchy levels, the relevant 
hazard indices are given in iX . To unequivocally identify the hazard impacting receptor 
j , it is identified with  jX  which is equal to iX .  
Note that parameters in HZ , iSφ , iXφ , jLφ  may also be considered as random 
variables, e.g. to consider statistical uncertainty: Then, a formulation of the respective 
probability density functions becomes necessary to assess flood risk.  
Flood risk assessment aims at determining flood risk for all receptors 1,..., rj N  in 
the study area. In a general approach, this requires formulation of the joint probability 
density function of all introduced variables. A direct formulation of the joint probability 
density function with a large number of variables and dependencies is cumbersome and 
impractical. Therefore, assumptions are made allowing for a formulation of the joint 
probability density function as the product of conditional probability density functions. 
In particular the following assumptions are made: 
‐ Hazard variables 0X  are only conditional on hazard event mhz . 
‐ Hazard variables iX  at the i th hierarchy level are only conditional on hazard 
variables 1iX  and state variable 1iS   at the forgoing hierarchy level 1i  . 
‐ State variable iS  at the i th hierarchy level is only conditional on hazard 
variables 1iX  at the forgoing hierarchy level 1i  . 
‐ Direct consequence jL  is only conditional on hazard variables  jX . 
From these assumptions the following formulations follow. Hazard 0X  is modelled 
conditionally on hazard event mhz  and has conditional probability density function 
 00 0 | ;m mhzf hz XX x φ . The state iS  of protection structures on the i th hierarchy level is 
modelled conditionally on 1iX , and has conditional probability density function  1 1; ii i i i SSf s X x φ . Hazard vector iX  is modelled conditionally on 1iX  and iS , and 
has conditional probability density function  1 1,S , ; ii i i i i if s  XX X x x φ . Lastly, direct 
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consequences jL  to receptor j  are modelled conditionally on hazard variables  jX , and 
have conditional probability density function   ; jjj jj LLf lX x φ . 
Conditional probability density functions  00 0 ;m mhzf hz XX x φ  and  1 1,S , ; ii i i i i if s  XX X x x φ  are typically determined with a flow routing model; 
 1 1; ii i i i SSf s X x φ  with protection structure fragility models and   ; jjj jj LLf lX x φ  with 
receptor vulnerability models.  
The joint probability density function may be obtained by multiplying the 
conditional probability density function for all introduced variables; its formulation is 
however not necessary for this application. Instead the conditional probability density 
functions are successively combined and variables which are not explicitly necessary 
for the risk calculation are successively marginalized.  
First, the joint probabilistic characterisation of 0 1, ,..., NX X X  given hazard event 
mhz  is obtained through the chain rule and marginalisation of the state variables 
, 1,...,iS i N 10: 
    0 1 0 1 10 1, ,..., ,S
1, 1,...,
, ,..., ...
N m m i i i i i
si
N
N m ihz hz S
iD i N
f hz f f f ds
 
  X X X X X X Xx x x .   (4.1) 
where 
is
D  is the domain of iS .  
Based on the joint probability density function of all hazard variables in Equation 
(4.1), in the next modelling step direct consequences to receptors are characterised, first 
for an individual receptor j , thereafter jointly for all receptors 1,..., bj N . The 
probability density function of direct consequences jL  given flood event mhz  is 
modelled as: 
   

 jj m j mj
j
jj mL hz hzL
D
f l hz f f d 
x
XX
x ,  (4.2) 
where  jDx is the domain of 
 jX ,   j m j mhzf hzX x  is obtained from Equation (4.1) 
through a variable substitution  ji X X  and marginalisation of all other hazard 
variables. The joint probability density function of , 1,...,j rL j N  given flood event 
                                                 
10 Note that, to allow a compact notation in Equation (4.1) and following, the round brackets of 
probability density functions are omitted on the right side of equations. 
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mhz  is modelled as: 
    1 2 0 11 2, ,..., , ,...,
1, 0,...,
, ,..., ...
r
j m N m jj
i
N
j m iL L L hz hz L
ji N
f l l l hz f f d

   X X X X
x
x   (4.3) 
Direct consequences totL  to all receptors in the study area are calculated as:  
 
1
rN
tot j
j
L L

 ,  (4.4) 
While no general closed form of  
tot m tot mL hz
f l hz  is available, it is fully defined by 
Equation (4.3) and Equation (4.4). The expected value of jL  given flood event mhz  is:  
  
j m
L j
j m j j m jL hz
D
E L hz l f l hz dl     . (4.5) 
where 
jL
D is the domain of jL . The expected value of totL  given flood event mhz  is:  
 
1
rN
tot m j m
j
E L hz E L hz

       . (4.6) 
where 
totL
D is the domain of totL . 
In the following, risk jr  for individual receptors is first characterised, followed by a 
characterisation of total risk totr  for all receptors in the study area. In accordance with 
Equation (2.2), the flood risk for receptor j  is: 
 
m
m HZ
j hz j m
hz
r p E L hz

    ,  (4.7) 
and the total risk for the receptors 1,..., rj N  is:  
 
r
j
N
tot j
r
r r .  (4.8) 
This concludes the description of the flood risk assessment methodology in the 
presence of hierarchical flood protection systems. Several comments on the 
methodology follow. While the integrals in Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.3) seem 
prohibitive, in practice, the number of hierarchy levels is often limited to 4N  . 
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Furthermore, hazard and vulnerability model are often formulated in a deterministic 
manner, which significantly simplifies modelling.  
The conditional independence assumptions, on which the methodology hinges, seem 
reasonable; nonetheless, in some instances, they may not hold; e.g. when epistemic 
uncertainty is explicitly considered. In that case, the presented methodology can be 
adapted by making all considered probability density functions conditional on epistemic 
uncertainty variable  . When its probability density function  f   is known,   can 
be integrated out in the end result, see Faber et al. (2007). Furthermore, in some 
instances, the conditional independence assumption might not hold for a particular 
hierarchy level, since hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure downstream of the 
structure may affect its state iS  (Kelman 2002), or since the hazard upstream of a 
structure may be reduced when the structure is breached (see e.g. Apel et al. 2009). In 
these cases, on the hierarchical levels in questions the joint probability density function 
of all dependent variables has to be specified, whereas on all other hierarchy levels the 
methodology can be maintained as presented.  
Implementation challenges related to the flood risk assessment methodology 
presented are described in Section 4.5. 
4.4 Decision analysis for hierarchical flood protection systems 
Based on flood risk assessment, a hierarchical flood protection system can be optimised 
in accordance with the principles of engineering decision analysis outlined in Section 
2.5. Before the formal decision analysis is described, the decision context of a 
hierarchical flood protection system is briefly discussed.  
4.4.1 Decision governance 
When considering flood risk management measures on a range of spatial scales, it is 
important to recognise that a hierarchical flood protection system not only involves a 
hierarchy of protection structures, but also a hierarchy of decision makers, all of whom 
should act in a coordinated manner towards the same goal of managing flood risk in 
optimal manner. In the words of Dawson et al. (2004): "…decisions take place at a 
range of levels from national policy strategic planning decisions …, to local 
construction, operation and maintenance decisions.” 
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While optimal flood risk management should be in the best interest of all involved 
decision makers, stakeholders might disagree on cost allocation and have different 
preferences for, or against, development of a particular hierarchy level. For instance, a 
national government should be interested in optimally protecting its population and 
assets, but a local commune might have additional preferences, e.g. it might prefer the 
national government to carry costs for risk reduction measures and, for aesthetic 
reasons, it might prefer protection structures to be located far away and out of sight. In 
this thesis, the optimal decision alternative is identified through a normative engineering 
decision analysis. Utility, however it is defined, is optimised for the whole system, and 
does not consider particular preferences of individual stakeholders at a subordinate 
level. Once the optimal decision alternative is identified, it is assumed that all 
stakeholders enact it, independently of their individual preferences.   
4.4.2 Decision alternatives 
On each hierarchy level, a number of decision alternatives are available to the decision 
maker. Decision alternatives available at the i th hierarchical level, 1,2,...,i N , are 
defined in set  ( )(0) (1), ,..., iKi i i iA a a a , where (0)ia  identifies the “no action” alternative, 
i.e. the status quo, and 1iK   is the number of decision alternatives considered at the i
th hierarchy level. Decision alternatives for an individual hierarchy level may differ in 
several regards, i.e. in number and type of flood protection structures, as well as their 
protection height and structural resistance.  
A decision alternative for the whole protection system,  sa  , combines a decision 
alternative for each hierarchy level 1,2,...,i N  and is represented by 
 1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( )( ) ( )1 2, ,...,N Nk k k kk ks Na a a a . The set of different decision alternatives for the whole 
hierarchical flood protection system is: 
  1 2( , ,..., ) , 1, 2,..., , 1,2,...,Nk k ks s i iA a k K i N   .  (4.9) 
4.4.3 Utility function 
To evaluate and compare decision alternatives a utility function must be specified in 
accordance with principles of risk-based decision analysis outlined in Section 2.5.1. In 
the context of natural hazard risk management, the utility function should consider all 
costs and benefit entailed by the prospective risk management measure for the 
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considered system over the considered time span T . The benefit of a flood risk 
management measure is a reduction of flood risk totr . The costs associated with a 
decision alternative ( )ka  are modelled by  (k),c t a , which captures costs for 
construction, inspection, maintenance, operation and decommissioning in function of 
time t . The expected utility  ( )kE U a    of decision alternative ( )ka 11 is expressed as:  
           ( ) (0) ( ) ( )0 1 ,1
T
k k k
tot tott
t
E U a r a r a c t a
         ,  (4.10) 
where  ( )kU a  is the utility of decision alterative ( )ka , (0)a  is the current state of the 
protection system and   is the discounting rate. Note that an assumption underlying 
Equation (4.10) is stationarity of risk  ( ) , 0,1,...,ktotr a k K  for 0 t T  . Furthermore, 
note that expected utility is calculated relative to risk   0r a  entailed in the current 
protection system. Whereas this is not necessary to rank decision alternatives, it allows 
for easily identifying decision alternatives with lower expected utility compared to the 
current protection system, as they would be assigned negative expected utility. 
4.4.4 Decision optimisation 
All hierarchy levels of a hierarchical flood protection system are jointly optimised to 
identify the optimal configuration of the hierarchical flood protection system.  
Considering a hierarchical flood protection system with N  hierarchy levels, the set 
of different decision alternatives for the whole protection system is 1 2( , ,..., ) , 1, 2,..., , 1,2,...,Nk k ks s i iA a k K i N   . The optimal decision alterative s sa A   
maximises expected utility in Equation (4.10) and is identified as: 
    1 2( , ,..., )max N
s
k k k
s sA
E U a E U a        .  (4.11) 
where  1 2( , ,..., )Nk k ksE U a    is calculated according to Equation (4.10). 
                                                 
11 Depending on the decision problem, ( )ka can either represent a decision alternative for an 
individual hierarchy level ( )ikia or a decision alternative for the whole system 1 2
( , ,..., )Nk k k
sa . 
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4.5 Challenges in flood risk assessment in the presence of a hierarchical flood 
protection system 
Several challenges, while inherent to flood risk assessment in general, are particularly 
relevant when considering hierarchical flood protection systems.  
A first challenge pertains to consistent modelling of risk at different spatial scales. 
Considering and optimizing flood protection structures on a range of spatial scales may 
require flood risk assessment to be carried out at different spatial scales. Here, 
methodologies for upscaling and downscaling of models and/or data, with consistent 
consideration of uncertainties and dependencies are necessary.  
A second challenge is faced in the computation of the hazard constrained to the area 
between two hierarchy levels, which is necessary to determine conditional probability 
density functions  1 1,S , ; , 1,...,ii i i i i if s i N  XX X x x φ . A lumped flow routing model 
seems well indicated for this modelling step, as it allows subdividing the river 
catchment into compartments and explicitly model functional relationships between 
hazard indices in neighbouring compartments. However, as previously mentioned, 
lumped flow routing models are generally not very accurate. Conversely, the modelling 
of  1 1,S , ; , 1,...,ii i i i i if s i N  XX X x x φ , with more accurate distributed flow routing 
models, seems challenging; currently, no methodology allowing for modelling hazard 
only in the area between two hierarchy levels seems readily available literature. As 
such, when the accuracy of a distributed flow routing model is necessary, a different 
implementation approach is necessary. A possibility is to directly model hazard from 
source to receptor, with consideration of all protection structures and their respective 
states. That is, the flow routing model is run once for each hazard event 
, 1,...,mhz m M  and combination of states , 1,...,iS i N  (and, obviously, for each 
considered decision alternative in sA ). Although it is easier to implement, challenges 
may arise from the sheer number of combinations of states , 1,...,iS i N , which 
generally grows exponentially with the number of hierarchy levels. Approaches are 
available to model hazard in function of protection structure states (Dawson et al. 
2005); however, they only consider one protection structure/hierarchy level, and must 
be adapted and tested for the consideration of more hierarchy levels.  
A third challenge is fragility or vulnerability modelling. For all protection structures 
considered in the decision analysis, models allowing for the accommodation of decision 
alternatives are necessary. Dike fragility models are available, which are based on 
structural reliability theory and allow structural optimisation for flood risk management. 
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Not much research is found on fragility of local flood barriers. Whereas several 
vulnerability models for residential buildings are available that consider effects of flood 
proofing measures on building vulnerability, few are based on engineering models and 
none provide necessary modelling details to allow an immediate practical application. 
Last, a fourth challenge is the comprehensive modelling of consequences. For a 
meaningful decision analysis, all types of consequences need to be considered, 
including indirect and intangible consequences. This is particularly important when 
considering a hierarchical flood protection system, which, when compared to single-
structure protection systems, may imply higher probability of flooding for certain areas 
with low receptor value density. This can only be fully justified if all consequences are 
considered. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the comprehensive assessment of 
consequences, and in particular of indirect and intangible consequences, is challenging 
and might require further research. 
4.5.1 Challenges approached in this thesis 
This thesis makes a contribution towards the modelling of hierarchical flood protection 
systems. From the identified challenges, two are here selected and approached. The 
goals listed in the introduction are reiterated in the following. 
First, a contribution towards consistent modelling of risk at different spatial scales is 
made. A probabilistic disaggregation model is developed allowing for disaggregating 
spatially aggregated portfolios of receptors with consideration of uncertainty and spatial 
correlation in the receptor distribution. The proposed model is documented in a paper 
submitted for publication to Georisk and is reproduced in Chapter 5. 
Second, a vulnerability model for residential buildings is developed, allowing for 
representing the impact of flood proofing measures on vulnerability. The model can 
therefore be utilised as part of a risk-based decision analysis for flood proofing of 
buildings. The developed model is documented in a paper manuscript accepted for 
publication by Natural Hazards and is reproduced in Chapter 6.  
To further illustrate the concept and implementation of the developed 
methodologies for flood risk analysis and for the modelling of vulnerability of 
residential buildings, they are applied to an example study area in Switzerland; this is 
described in Chapter 7. 

  
 
 
5 Probabilistic disaggregation 
model (Paper 1) 
The present chapter describes a methodology for the probabilistic 
disaggregation of spatially aggregated amounts. The methodology 
can be used to disaggregate portfolios of receptors. The chapter is a 
reproduction of a paper manuscript under review at Georisk. As 
such, definition of variables and parameters, as well as 
terminology may be different in this chapter and the rest of the 
thesis.  
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The probabilistic disaggregation model within the thesis 
 
Probabilistic disaggregation may be necessary in flood risk assessment when models 
and data are not available at the same spatial resolution, and in particular, when data on 
the portfolio of receptors is available in a spatially aggregated form, while hazard is 
modelled at a higher spatial resolution. In such a situation, disaggregation is a possible 
method to transfer spatially aggregated data to a higher resolution. 
The author acknowledges that in developed countries, the location and 
characteristics of portfolios of receptors is generally known with good precision by 
authorities. However, this data may only be available to the public in aggregated form 
for reasons of data protection.  
For instance, insurance and reinsurance industry portfolios of receptors are often 
only available in aggregated form, and industry standards have long been established for 
the spatial aggregation of portfolio data (CRESTA 2015).  
This issue of data and model resolution mismatch is not particular to hierarchical 
flood risk management as it may be encountered in any flood risk assessment, however 
when optimizing a hierarchical flood protection system, the likelihood that data needs to 
be transferred from one resolution to another increases.  
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ABSTRACT: In natural hazard risk assessment, situations are 
encountered where information on the portfolio of exposure is only 
available in spatially aggregated form, hindering a precise risk 
assessment. Recourse might be found in the spatial disaggregation 
of the portfolio of exposure to the resolution of the hazard model. 
Given the uncertainty inherent to any disaggregation, it is argued 
that the disaggregation should be performed probabilistically. In 
this paper a methodology for probabilistic disaggregation of 
spatially aggregated values is presented. The methodology is 
applied to the disaggregation of a portfolio of buildings in two 
communes in Switzerland and results are compared to sample 
observations. The relevance of probabilistic disaggregation 
uncertainty in natural hazard risk assessment is illustrated with the 
example on a simple flood risk assessment.  
 
Keywords: disaggregation, portfolio, natural hazard, probabilistic, 
copula. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Natural hazard risk models are widely utilised to assess the occurrence of natural hazard 
events such as floods, earthquakes and tropical cyclones, and their impact on the built 
environment and more generally on society. The level of sophistication of natural 
hazard risk models has been increasing over the past few decades and it has become 
possible to simulate hazard at high spatial resolutions. Practitioners in civil and 
environmental engineering, earth science, as well as risk modelling professionals in the 
insurance industry, are confronted with situations where hazard information is available 
at a higher spatial resolution relative to the information on the portfolio of exposures; 
that is, hindering a precise assessment of natural hazard risk. For the purpose of 
improving the quality of risk assessment the portfolio data has to be spatially 
disaggregated, i.e. mapped from a coarse to a finer resolution. The mapping can be 
performed according to indicators, where an indicator is auxiliary information which 
correlates with the disaggregated and is available at the finer resolution.  
A common way to model disaggregation is to establish a statistical relationship 
between aggregated and disaggregated quantities, i.e. statistical disaggregation. 
Statistical disaggregation model can be either deterministic or probabilistic. In 
deterministic disaggregation, disaggregated quantities are a function of the indicator 
values with a given aggregated quantity. In probabilistic disaggregation, the 
disaggregated quantities are treated as random variables and thus consider uncertainty 
inherited in the process of disaggregation; i.e. disaggregation uncertainty. 
In the context of portfolio disaggregation for natural hazard risk assessment, 
disaggregation uncertainty is due to lack of knowledge, i.e. is of epistemic nature. It 
only arises when a portfolio of exposure is aggregated and thus information on the 
spatial distribution at a higher resolution is not available. In any risk assessment 
situation it is preferable to acquire data of higher resolution on the spatial distribution of 
the portfolio of exposures. However, this is sometimes not possible because of 
economic or technical reasons, making disaggregation a necessary compromise. If the 
disaggregation uncertainty is neglected in a natural hazard risk assessment the tails of 
the risk distribution may be underestimated. This can lead to e.g. suboptimal decision 
making in the context of natural hazard risk management or to an underestimation of 
risk premium in an insurance context. 
This paper aims at providing a methodology for probabilistic disaggregation of 
spatially aggregated quantities with a focus on the disaggregation of portfolios of 
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exposures for natural hazard risk assessment. Although the main focus of the paper is 
natural hazard risk assessment, the proposed methodology can be straightforwardly 
applied to similar spatial disaggregation problems in other applications. 
5.1.1 Literature review 
Few methods for portfolio disaggregation for natural hazard risk assessment are 
available in literature. Thieken et al.( 2006) and Wünsch et al.( 2009) give an overview 
on deterministic portfolio disaggregation methods and how the method choice affects 
flood risk assessment. Custer and Nishijima (2012) present a probabilistic 
disaggregation model based on the Dirichlet distribution. 
More works can be found in the literature in other contexts, for example, 
disaggregation of precipitation. In the following, spatial disaggregation model for the 
disaggregation of precipitation are first reviewed. Thereafter, attention is turned to two 
challenges in disaggregation modelling, namely modelling of dependent non-Gaussian 
random fields as well as modelling of compositional data.  
Precipitation time series disaggregation in the temporal dimension has been long 
utilised for the purpose to temporally interpolate rain gauge measurements. In recent 
years the spatial disaggregation of precipitation fields has also become increasingly 
important, e.g. when modelling local impacts of climate change. Future climate subject 
to climate change can be modelled with global circulation models (GCM) at resolutions 
above a few 10km and generally in the order of 100-200km (Chandler et al. 2000). In 
order to assess the impact of the climate change at a local scale, however, a finer 
resolution is required. Thus, the output of the GCM has to be down-scaled, or 
disaggregated.  
Several probabilistic precipitation disaggregation models in contiguous space, i.e. 
on a lattice, are found in literature. A common approach is the multiplicative cascade 
technique, which takes its basis in spatial fractality of precipitation fields and is found in 
e.g. Over and Gupta (1996), Shrestha et al. (2005), Rupp et al. (2012). In these 
publications, disaggregation is achieved by constructing spatial precipitation fields from 
discrete multiplicative cascades of independently identically distributed generator 
variables. With the cascade technique the aggregated amount is disaggregated in several 
sequential steps. In the first step, the aggregated precipitation amount is disaggregated 
to very coarse grid cells. In each subsequent step each coarse grid cell is divided into 
smaller grid cells, and the precipitation amount assigned to the coarse grid cell is 
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distributed to the smaller grid cells. A spatial correlation structure is inherent to this 
procedure, since the step-wise disaggregation introduces dependence between 
neighbouring grid cells. However, an additional (and generally unwanted) correlation 
pattern inherent to the methodology is also introduced, as the resulting correlation is 
smaller across the cell borders of the most coarse grid cells. Attempts to overcome this 
inconvenience have been undertaken in e.g. Shrestha et al. (2005), where the modelling 
of spatial correlation is improved by conditioning disaggregated variables at a fine 
resolution on the neighbouring disaggregated variables at a more coarse resolution.  
An assumption behind the multiplicative cascade approach is the presence of a 
fractal pattern in the disaggregated quantities; which, however, seems an improbable 
characteristic for portfolios of exposures.  
Another approach takes basis in Markovian methods, where the random variable in 
each grid cell is conditional on neighbouring grid cells to create a Markov field. 
Examples of Markovian disaggregation models are found in Allcroft and Glasbey 
(2003), Chandler et al. (2000), Mackay et al. (2001), which employ image 
reconstruction techniques to downscale the output of a GCM to a local resolution. In 
general, grid cells are first identified as wet or dry according to a Markov random field 
and thereafter rainfall intensity is allocated to each wet grid cell as a random variable. 
The average rainfall intensity for a given grid cell is determined as a function of the 
inverse distance to the nearest dry cell, implicitly creating spatial correlation between 
neighbouring grid cells. Another Markovian approach is found in Gagnon et al. (2012), 
where precipitation is disaggregated with a Gibbs sampling algorithm. Spatial 
correlation of disaggregated variables is modelled through dependence between 
neighbouring grid cells and sequentially updated with the Gibbs sampling algorithm. 
Non-Gaussian random fields are often modelled through transformation of Gaussian 
random fields. A flexible approach to modelling dependent non-Gaussian random fields 
is to represent the dependence structure with copula. In this approach marginal 
distributions and correlation structures, which together define the joint probability 
distribution, are separately modelled and brought together through the copula. A 
thorough introduction to copula from a risk management perspective is given in 
Embrechts et al. (2003). Copulae have been used in disaggregation methodologies, e.g. 
in the context of precipitation time series disaggregation, see Yang (2008). 
Compositional data gives quantitative descriptions of parts of a whole. In a 
disaggregation problem, the aggregated quantity is the whole and disaggregated 
variables are parts of the whole and are therefore compositional variables. Seminal work 
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on the analysis of compositional data is found in Aitchison (1986). A prominent 
probability distribution to model compositional data is the Dirichlet distribution 
(Connor and Mosimann, 1969). Although it facilitates to formulate a variety of 
disaggregation problems, it does not provide much flexibility in the modelling of 
variance and correlation structure, since it implies a strictly negative correlation 
structure among variables. Several attempts have been made to render the Dirichlet 
distribution more general and flexible, see e.g. Connor and Mosimann (1969), Thomas 
and Jacob (2006), Ongaro et al. (2008), Ng et al. (2009)). However, the aforementioned 
shortcomings have yet to be completely overcome. Another popular approach to 
modelling compositional data is based on log-ratio transformations of compositional 
data, which is free from the problem of a constrained sample space and allows using 
standard multivariate techniques (Aitchison 1986). 
5.1.2 Paper structure 
In the present paper a new approach for probabilistic disaggregation onto contiguous 
lattice grid cells is proposed. The paper is structured as follows. The disaggregation 
methodology is first introduced followed by a description of the model characteristics. 
Thereafter, the model is applied to an example in the natural hazard risk assessment 
domain, and results are presented. Finally, the model performance is discussed and 
conclusions are provided. 
5.2 Methodology 
A methodology for probabilistic disaggregation to an array of N  grid cells is 
introduced. It allows for probabilistically modelling spatial disaggregation of an 
aggregated variable X  to disaggregated variables  1 2, ,..., NZ Z ZZ , according to 
indicators  1 2, ,..., ND D DD , with iZ  and iD , 1,2,...,i N , attributed to the i -th grid 
cell. Indicators iD  are considered categorical variables, which can take values 
, 1, 2,...,i jd j M   and M  is the number of different indicator values.  
At first, the joint probability distribution function of Z  is expressed without 
considering the aggregated variable X , i.e. the unconditional joint probability 
distribution  1 2, ,... nF z z zZ D d  is formulated. Disaggregated random variables iZ  are 
modelled marginally and their spatial correlations are considered through a Gaussian 
copula. Thereafter, variables iZ  are conditioned such that 1
N
ii
X Z   to obtain the 
Probabilistic disaggregation model (Paper 1) 
85 
conditional probability distribution  1 2, , ,... ,NXF z z z xZ D d . A closed form of the latter 
is generally not available, however, its characteristics are described further on. 
5.2.1 Unconditional joint distribution 
A probability distribution family to model iZ  should possibly be flexible and easy to 
parameterise and needs to consider that 0iZ  . Possible distribution families are the 
gamma distribution and the lognormal distribution. The gamma distribution is chosen 
here to model marginal probability distribution of iZ , because of its association with the 
Dirichlet distribution; namely, the Dirichlet distribution can be generated from a set of 
independent gamma distribution with a common rate parameter  . Therefore, in the 
proposed approach the probability density function of iZ  given indicator iD  is assumed 
to marginally follow the gamma distribution. A straightforward way to model the 
influence of the indicator is to express the distribution parameters as a function of the 
indicator, i.e. shape parameter  i id  and rate parameter  i id  . The marginal 
probability density function ( )
i i i iZ D
f z d  is then written as: 
       ; , , 0
( )
i
i i i
i i
zi
Z i i Z i i i i i
i
f z d f z d d z e z

   
   ,  (5.1) 
where     is the complete gamma function. 
The joint distribution function ( )FZ D z d , of Z  given indicators D  is modelled with 
the Gaussian copula (Embrechts et al. 2003), according to (5.2):   
      1 1 2 21 1 1, 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) , ( ) ,..., ( )n nN n nZ D Z D Z DF F z d F z d F z d      Z D z d .   (5.2) 
N, (.)  is the cumulative distribution function of the N -dimensional normal random 
variables with zero means and the correlation matrix  , (.)  is the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal random variable, 1(.)  is its inverse 
function and ( )
i i i iZ D
F z d  is the cumulative distribution function of iZ  given indicator 
id . The elements of the covariance matrix   are defined through a correlation function 
 ;k s  , where s  is the distance between grid cell centroids and   is a correlation 
parameter, e.g. correlation length. A number of correlation functions can be found in 
e.g. Rasmussen and Williams (2006). In this paper an exponentially decaying 
correlation function is assumed, i.e.  
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   /; e sk s   .  (5.3) 
5.2.2 Conditional joint distribution  
In disaggregation problems, the value of the aggregated variable X  is known, and the 
variables iZ , 1,2,...,i N , are constrained by the equation 1N ii Z x  . To respect this 
constraint, variables iZ , 1,2,...,i N  are conditioned on x  as follows: 
 
1
i
i N
i
i
ZZ x x
Z

 

.  (5.4) 
Evidently, Equation (5.4) ensures that the disaggregated variables sum up to the 
aggregated variable, while maintaining proportions between variables iZ  invariant. The 
conditional joint probability distribution  1 2, , ,... ,NXF z z z xZ D d  is defined though 
Equations (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4). 
5.2.3 Parameter estimation 
Gamma distribution parameters and correlation parameters are generally estimated from 
sample observations, which are assumed to be available at the spatial resolution of 
disaggregated variables. It is further assumed that the samples are associated with a 
lattice of square grid cells and that spatial location at which each sample was collected 
is known.  
Given a sample set, the parameter estimation is generally straightforward with 
standard estimation methodologies. For each indicator value j  of interest, the shape 
parameter  j   and scale parameter  j   are estimated e.g. using method of 
moment estimators, 
     
2
z
ˆ jj
j
z
v
    and     zˆ jj j
v
z
   , (5.5) 
where  jz   is the sample mean and  z jv   is the sample variance of the number of 
exposures per grid cell for indicator value j .  
The estimation of the correlation length   in accordance with the proposed 
methodology requires transforming the observed sample data iz  to standard-normally 
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distributed sample data iy  using the estimated gamma distribution parameters  ˆ id  
and  ˆ id  as follows: 
      1 ˆˆ; ,ii Z i i iy F z d d   ,  (5.6) 
 where  
iZ
F   is the estimated gamma distribution function. The Pearson product-
moment sample correlation coefficient   s  is calculated from all observed iy  for 
different values of distance s . 
Given the choice of an exponential correlation function, the correlation parameter   
can be estimated from the sample correlation coefficient   s  through appropriate 
regression methods.  
5.3 Model characteristics 
The model characteristics are described for two distinct cases. Firstly, a special case is 
analysed, where the closed form of the joint probability distribution function is known. 
Thereafter, the general case is characterised where the closed form of the distribution is 
not known. 
5.3.1 Special case with known joint probability distribution 
The special case is given when the unconditional disaggregated variables iZ  are 
independent and parameter i  is constant for all variables iZ . The latter condition can 
be fulfilled either when the disaggregation problem only contains one indicator value or 
when  j   is constant for all indicator values. When these conditions are satisfied, the 
disaggregation ratios , 1,...,iW i N  , defined for grid cell i  as,  
 
1
i
i N
ii
ZW
Z
  ,  (5.7) 
jointly follow the Dirichlet distribution and thus have probability density function 
       
1 111 1
1
1
1
; 1
N
i
N
Ni Ni
i iN i
iii
f w w


  


 
 W w α , (5.8) 
where  1 2, ,..., NW W WW  and  1 2, ,..., N  α .  
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The conditional joint probability density function  ;Xf z xZ α  is obtained from 
Equation (5.8) through variable transformation and follows a Dirichlet distribution with 
scaled support simplex given in Equation (5.9): 
       1
1 1 111 1
1
1
1
;
N
i N
i i
N
Ni Ni
i iX N i
iii
f x x z x z
 


        

  
 Z z α . (5.9) 
Marginally, iZ x  follows a beta distribution with scaled support:  
    
  11
1
1; ,0
,
ii
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i i
i iZ X
i i
z x z
f z x z x
B x
 
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

 


  α , (5.10) 
where 
1
N
ii
     and  ,B    is the beta function. 
The compositional constraint introduced in Equation (5.4) causes the covariance 
between two conditional variables iZ  and jZ , , 1,2,...,i j N  to become negative with 
value 
  2, 1
i j
i jCov Z Z x

  
       . (5.11) 
The Dirichlet distribution is closed under subcomposition and amalgamation (Monti 
et al. 2011). These are valuable characteristics when performing disaggregation, as it 
allows for performing sequential disaggregation (see Figure 5.3).  
5.3.2 General case  
For the general case with dependent variables iZ  and/or different values for parameter 
i , closed forms of the joint probability distribution functions  ; ,fZ z α β  and 
 ; ,Xf xZ z α β  are not available. In the following, several characteristics of the latter 
are described in terms of moments of the marginal distribution. Moreover the 
correlation between disaggregated variables is characterised in terms of correlation 
coefficients as function of distance s .  
 
 
 
Probabilistic disaggregation model (Paper 1) 
89 
5.3.2.1 Conditional marginal distribution  
While the unconditional marginal distribution  ; , , 1, 2,...,
iZ i
f z i Nα β  are gamma 
distributed, the conditional marginal distributions  ; ,
i iZ X
f z x α β  follow an unspecified 
probability distribution family. Their shape not only depend on  ; ,
iZ i i i
f z    but also 
on disaggregation problem size N , aggregated value x ,indicators of all grid cells,  
correlation function  ;k s   and the correlation parameter  . In the following the 
expected value and variance of  ; ,
i iZ X
f z x α β  are described analytically where 
possible, and with a numeric study otherwise.  
The expected value iE Z x    is determined by the unconditional expected value 
 iE Z  and the normalisation in Equation (5.4), and can be expressed as:  
   1
i
i N
ii
E Z
E Z x x
E Z
      . (5.12) 
The value of iVar Z x    depends on  iVar Z  and parameters N  and  . Since no 
analytical expression for iVar Z x    is available, the influence of N  and   on 
iVar Z x    is analysed by a numeric study. Results are illustrated in Figure 5.1 in terms 
of the ratio  i iVar Z x Var Z   . In this numerical study variables , 1,2,...,iZ i N  are 
assumed to be identically distributed and that 
1
N
i
i
x E Z

     . As seen in from Figure 
5.1, when iZ  are identically distributed,  i iVar Z x Var Z     for any value of N  and 
  and the value of iVar Z x    decreases for increasing value of   and decreasing 
value of N . 
Note that for different value of x , the variance scales as follows: 
 
2
1
1 2
2
i i
xVar Z x Var Z x
x
          
. (5.13) 
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Figure 5.1 - Ratio  i iVar Z x Var Z    as a function of correlation length   for different values of N  
and for 
1
N
i
i
x E Z

      
For disaggregation problems where  i iVar Z x Var Z     (i.e. problems with small 
correlation length   and sufficiently large N ), the conditional marginal distributions 
 ; ,
i iZ X
f z x α β  can be well approximated with the scaled beta distribution given in 
Equation (5.10).  
5.3.2.2 Correlation structure 
The correlation structure of conditional variables , 1,...,iZ x i N  is determined by two 
contrasting effects. Firstly, the correlation structure of the unconditional variables 
, 1,...,iZ i N  defined by the correlation function  ;k s   and the Gaussian copula in 
Equation (5.2) generally specifies positive correlation. In contrast, the compositional 
constraint in Equation (5.4) introduces a negative correlation component, since 
disaggregated variables iZ  'compete' for portions of x , and the gain of iZ  will be the 
loss of jZ , i j . Figure 5.2 illustrates the correlation coefficients for unconditional 
disaggregated variables and conditional disaggregated variable for different size of 
disaggregation problem, i.e. for different values of N , as a function of the distance 
While the disaggregation problem size N  has no impact on the unconditional 
correlation structure, a smaller value of N  has a larger impact on the correlation 
structure of the conditional distribution.  
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Figure 5.2 - Illustration of the difference in spatial correlation between unconditional and conditional 
variables 
The correlation between neighbouring grid cells with different indicator value j  is 
generally not modelled correctly. The Gaussian copula transfers correlation from 
Gaussian variables to gamma variables through matching of the respective quantiles. As 
a consequence, when correlated grid cell have different indicator and thus different 
marginal distributions, their quantiles correlate, however, not necessarily the realisation 
of the variable; hence, a bias. 
A further bias in the correlation structure occurs when the model is used in a 
sequential disaggregation. The source of the bias is similar to the source of artificial 
correlation patterns produced by the multiplicative cascade disaggregation models, see 
the section for literature review. This is illustrated at the example of a two-step 
disaggregation in Figure 5.3. Disaggregated variables at a coarse resolution 
*, 1,...,k kZ k N , are introduced; in the first disaggregation step x  is disaggregated to  * * * *1 2, ,..., kNZ Z ZZ , i.e  * *Xf xZ z  is modelled. In the second disaggregation each 
*, 1,...,k kZ k N  is further disaggregated to , 1,...,iZ i N , i.e.  * * ,  1,...,
k
k kZ
f z k N
Z
z  is 
modelled. 
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Figure 5.3 - Schematic illustration of a two-step sequential disaggregation 
The presented methodology models spatial correlation of coarse resolution variables 
*, 1,...,k kZ k N  correctly, however, a systematic bias arises when modelling variables 
*
i kZ Z  because correlation between neighbouring variables at fine resolution is not 
considered across boundaries of the variables at coarse resolution. As a consequence, 
spatial correlation is slightly underestimated and takes an artificial pattern along the 
boundaries of coarse grid cells.  
5.4 Example application 
The performance of the model based on the proposed methodology is illustrated with 
the example of a disaggregation of residential building portfolio of two communes, 
Burgdorf and Ittigen, in the Canton Bern, Switzerland. The CORINE land cover data is 
used for the indicator (EEA 2006); it provides land cover data for all European 
countries at a 100m resolution. For this application, only grid cells with CORINE land 
cover class 111 ( 1 , urban) and 211-244 ( 2 , agricultural) are considered. All other 
CORINE land cover classes, e.g. forests, industrial areas, water bodies, are either not 
present in the communes or considered uninhabited.  
In the first step, sample observations of the number of buildings per grid cell are 
collected for each commune and indicator. The Burgdorf sample set is used as a training 
set, i.e. to estimate parameters, and the Ittigen sample set is used to cross validate the 
methodology. Here the underlying assumption is that both communes have the identical 
statistical characteristics up to the second central moment. Having estimated the 
parameters, disaggregation is modelled in both communes. The disaggregation results 
are compared to the respective sample statistics to validate the methodology. Finally the 
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example is extended with a simple flood risk assessment for Burgdorf, with the goal to 
illustrate the impact of probabilistic disaggregation on natural hazard risk assessment.  
5.4.1 Sample observations and statistics 
Sample observations of the number of buildings per grid cell are collected with the use 
of satellite imaginary; the CORINE land cover data as well as commune boundaries, are 
overlaid to satellite imagery of the communes and the number of buildings per grid cell 
is visually counted and classified according to the indicator value. In order to allow an 
estimation of spatial correlation, the location of each grid cell is also registered. Figure 
5.4 illustrates the data utilised for the sampling for the commune of Ittigen. 
 
Figure 5.4 - Data for the commune of Ittigen. On the left side satellite imagery (Bing Maps) and 
commune boundary; on the right side, CORINE land cover data and commune boundary 
The sample statistics for the sampled grid cells are given in Table 5.1; histograms of 
the sample sets are illustrated in Figure 5.5. Moreover, Figure 5.6 illustrates the sample 
correlation coefficients for urban grid cells in both communes as a function of the 
distance. Note that the correlations among agricultural grid cells, and between 
agricultural and urban grid cells, are not sampled.  
The aggregated value, i.e. the total number of buildings per commune, is 2486x   
for Burgdorf and 1446x   for Ittigen.  
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Table 5.1 - Sample statistics for each commune and indicator 
Indicator
Commune
1  (Urban)  2 (Agricultural) 
Burgdorf Ittigen Burgdorf Ittigen
Sample number  351 231 412 104 
Sample mean   i i jz d    buildings / grid  cell  6.69 6.19 0.34 2.01 
Sample variance  z i jv d 
 2buildings / grid  cell  15.55 14.72 0.16 0.37 
 
  
Figure 5.5 - Histograms of sample sets, on the left for urban, on the right for agricultural grid cells 
 
Figure 5.6 - Sample correlation coefficients as a function of distance s  
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5.4.2 Parameter estimation 
Parameters are estimated separately for urban and agricultural areas from the training 
sample set, i.e. the Burgdorf sample set. The gamma distribution parameters, 
summarised in Table 5.2, are calculated by inserting the sample moments in Table 5.1  
into the estimators in Equation (5.5).  
Table 5.2 - Estimated Gamma distribution parameters by indicator and sample set 
Indicator Sample set 
 Parameter estimates 
      
1  (Urban) Burgdorf 2.88 2.33 
2  (Agricultural) Burgdorf 0.056 5.97 
 
To estimate the sample correlation parameter, the collected samples are first 
transformed to standard normal samples according to Equation (5.6), for which the 
gamma distribution parameters in Table 5.2 are utilised. Thereafter, the sample Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient of the standard normal samples is estimated for 
different distances s . Visually analysing the functional relation between correlation 
coefficient and distance, a suitable correlation function is identified in the exponential 
function in Equation (5.3) where both s  and   are in meters. Parameter   is estimated 
by linearizing the correlation function  ;k s   followed by a regression analysis; the 
estimate   is given in Table 5.3. Note that only urban grid cells are considered in this 
estimation, since the majority of buildings are found in urban areas.  
Table 5.3 - Estimated correlation parameter 
Indicator Sample set    
1  (Urban) Burgdorf 125m 
 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the estimated correlation function together with the sample 
correlation coefficient 
iy
  of the transformed normal samples with 95% confidence 
interval, which is calculated using the Fischer z-transform. 
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Figure 5.7 - Sample correlation coefficients with 95% confidence interval and the estimated correlation 
function 
5.4.3 Disaggregation  
Disaggregation is performed separately for each commune. As the parameters are 
estimated based on the Burgdorf samples, the Burgdorf disaggregation aims at 
validating the proposed methodology and the parameter estimates, whereas the Ittigen 
disaggregation aims at cross validating the methodology for the purpose of making 
predictions in study areas where no sample observations are available.  
Each disaggregation is performed in the form of a Monte Carlo simulation with 
100,000 realisations. 
5.4.4 Flood risk assessment 
The impact of the consideration of disaggregation uncertainty on natural hazard risk 
assessment is illustrated with a simple flood risk assessment for the commune of 
Burgdorf.  
A set of 15 postulated flood hazard events are generated through the linear 
interpolation methodology, see Apel et al.( 2009). The river Emme, which crosses 
Burgdorf, is assumed to be the source of flooding, and the events are defined by the 
river's water level at river entry point into the commune, see Figure 5.8. The water 
levels are chosen such that the smallest event barely causes an inundation, and in each 
further event the water level at entry point is increased by 0.5m. The water level at exit 
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is assumed to be 11m below the water level at entry. The annual exceedance probability 
for water level at the river entry into the commune is modelled with the Gumbel 
distribution with location parameter 532 m.a.s.l. and shape parameter 1m.a.s.l; the 
resulting annual flooding probability is 25%. 
 
Figure 5.8 - Commune of Burgdorf with river Emme 
Water level at any point in the commune is obtained through linear interpolation 
between entrance water level and exit water level. Water levels are intersected with the 
digital elevation model of the commune (Swisstopo 2005), allowing to identify which 
grid cells are inundated by an event. In Figure 5.9, three resulting inundation extents are 
illustrated for events 5, 10 and 15. 
 
Figure 5.9 - Illustration of the inundation extent in three example events  
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The number of buildings affected by the flood is adopted as the proxy for 
quantifying the flood consequences. To assess the effect of considering disaggregation 
uncertainty on the risk distribution, a deterministic disaggregation model is required for 
comparison. In the comparison, the mode of the distribution of the number of affected 
buildings is taken as a representative deterministic value from the disaggregation model.  
5.4.5 Results 
In the following the results are presented. Modelling results are compared to sample 
statistics in terms of marginal distribution, as well as in terms of correlation coefficient 
in function of distance s . The results are thoroughly discussed in the following section.  
5.4.5.1 Marginal distributions  
The observed sample distributions and modelled marginal distributions are compared by 
means of QQ-plots in Figure 5.10. for Burgdorf and Figure 5.11. for Ittigen. Moreover, 
in Table 5.4 the sample moments given in the previous sections are compared to the 
modelled distribution moments.  
  
Figure 5.10 - QQ-plots for Burgdorf; on the left for urban grid cells, on the right for agricultural grid 
cells 
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Figure 5.11 - QQ-plots for Ittigen; on the left for urban grid cells, on the right for agricultural grid cells 
Table 5.4 - Comparison between sample moments and distribution moments 
Indicator
Commune
1  (Urban)  2 (Agricultural) 
Burgdorf Ittigen Burgdorf Ittigen  i i jz d    buildings / grid  cell  6.69 6.19 0.34 2.01 
,i i jE Z x d      buildings / grid  cell  6.69 6.13 0.335 0.31 
 z i jv d    2buildings / grid  cell  15.55 14.72 0,16 0.37 
,i i jVar Z x d      2buildings / grid  cell  15.29 12.70 1.97 1.66 
5.4.5.2 Spatial correlation 
Disaggregation results are analysed in terms of spatial correlation and compared to 
sample correlation (Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13). Whereas the correlation of both the 
unconditional and conditional distributions is presented, it is noted that the 
disaggregation result is given by the conditional distribution.  
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Figure 5.12 - Sample correlation coefficients and modelled correlation coefficients in function of grid 
cell centroid distance s  for urban grid cells in the commune of Burgdorf 
 
Figure 5.13 - Sample correlation coefficients and modelled correlation coefficients in function of grid 
cell centroid distance s  for urban grid cells in the commune of Ittigen 
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5.4.6 Flood risk assessment 
The results of the flood risk assessment are illustrated in Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15. 
Figure 5.14 illustrates the number of affected buildings per event, comparing the 
deterministic result with the probabilistic result. Figure 5.15 illustrates the annual 
exceedance probability of the number of affected buildings for both models.  
 
Figure 5.14 - Flood consequences per event in terms of number of affected buildings. The result from 
the probabilistic disaggregation is given by the distributions mean and the 5%-95% quantiles 
 
Figure 5.15 - Annual exceedance probability of the number of affected buildings 
Probabilistic disaggregation model (Paper 1) 
102 
5.5 Discussion 
The presented methodology allows for disaggregating a spatially aggregated variable 
under due consideration of disaggregation uncertainty and spatial correlation between 
variables. In the methodology, marginal distributions and correlation structure of 
disaggregated variables are modelled independently of each other and brought together 
by a Gaussian copula to a joint probability distribution function.  
In the example application, the comparison between results and sample observations 
indicate that both marginal distribution and correlation are reproduced with a precision 
deemed satisfactory for most engineering applications, including natural hazard risk 
assessment, see Figure 5.10 to Figure 5.13. 
As previously explained, it generally cannot be expected that observed sample 
distributions and conditional marginal distribution  ; ,
i iZ X
F z x α β  match. Whereas the 
unconditional distribution  ; ,
iZ i
F z α β  is modelled to follow sample observations and 
should therefore match,  ; ,
i iZ X
F z x α β  is also influenced by the size of the 
disaggregation problem, the type of indicator of all other grid cells, the value of x  and 
the correlation structure between variables , 1,...,iZ i N . However, for disaggregation 
problems of the size and parameterisation of the present example a reasonably good 
match between sample observation and conditional marginal distributions  ,
i iZ X
F z x d
is obtained. 
The results for Burgdorf illustrated in Figure 5.10, Figure 5.12 and Table 5.4 
compare well with sample observations, in particular for urban grid cells. This is not 
surprising as the parameters where estimated from the Burgdorf sample set. 
Nevertheless, it is noted that whereas the expected value for agricultural grid cells is 
well modelled, the variance is overestimated. This can be explained as follows: due to 
the compositional constraint, the iVar Z x   is not only a function of parameters i  and 
i  but also of all other disaggregated variables. Whereas iE Z x    is modelled 
correctly for all variables following the conditioning in Equation (5.4), iVar Z x    is 
predominantly determined by variables with large iE Z x   , i.e. urban grid cells in this 
example, which cause the variance, 2,i iVar Z x d     , of agricultural grid cells is 
overestimated. 
The results for Ittigen, given in Figure 5.11, Figure 5.13 and Table 5.4 compare less 
well with sample observations. Whereas the expected value 1,i iE Z x d      is well 
modelled, the variance 1,i iVar Z x d      is underestimated. For agricultural grid cells, 
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both expected value and variance compare poorly to sample observations. Two reasons 
to explain these deviations are given. Firstly, the cross validation can only be successful 
to the extent that the sample sets in the two commune are comparable, which was 
assumed in the example. In particular for agricultural grid cell the comparison is 
suboptimal. Secondly, the variance, 2,i iVar Z x d     , of agricultural grid cells is 
biased for the same reasons observed for Burgdorf. 
The correlation functions seem to approximately fit the sample correlation 
coefficients in both communes. Several sample correlation coefficients, in particular in 
Burgdorf, are negative and can thus not be correctly modelled with an exponential 
correlation function.  
As previously noted, the methodology cannot exactly represent correlation between 
variables associated with different indicator values. Correlations among agricultural 
grid cells, and between urban and agricultural grid cells, are not sampled nor 
specifically modelled. In the context of natural hazard risk assessment this is deemed 
acceptable and the bias of little impact on the risk distribution, because the majority of 
buildings is found in urban grid cells. However, in case where two or more indicators 
are differentiated for areas where buildings are dense, this bias may become significant. 
The impact of disaggregation uncertainty on natural hazard loss distribution is 
exemplified with a simple flood risk assessment. Figure 5.14 illustrates the increase in 
variability of the flood consequences when disaggregation uncertainty is taken into 
account. In Figure 5.15, the results of all events are aggregated to risk curves. 
Comparing the risk curve obtained through deterministic disaggregation and 
probabilistic disaggregation, it can be observed that disaggregation uncertainty 
increases the variability of the loss distribution, i.e. it has fatter tails. This observation 
highlights the relevance of probabilistic disaggregation to accurately assess the tail risks 
in natural hazard risk assessment.  
In future research it is recommended to apply the presented methodology to 
practical examples in both, risk management and insurance contexts, for a quantification 
of the effect of disaggregation uncertainty on risk distributions.  
Several modelling aspects are simplified and should be improved in further 
research. For instance, it is not considered that building counts are better modelled with 
discrete variables rather than the continuous gamma distribution. In practice, the size of 
the disaggregation problem N  is limited by the computation of the correlation matrix   
for the Gaussian copula, which has 2N  elements; when the   becomes prohibitively 
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large disaggregation problems can be approached through sequential disaggregation, at 
the cost of introducing an artificial spatial correlation pattern. Whereas the proposed 
methodology is applied to one example application, applications to other modelling 
context and with different parameterisations would be beneficial to further understand 
the methodologies properties and limitations. 
This paper focuses on practical aspects of probabilistic disaggregation and the 
analytical formulation of closed form expression of joint probability distribution 
functions are not examined in depth, which is recommended further research.  
5.6 Summary and conclusion 
The natural hazard risk assessment of portfolios of exposures often requires the 
disaggregation of spatially aggregated portfolios. Currently, disaggregation is often 
modelled deterministically, which can cause loss distribution tails to be underestimated. 
A sound approach is to model disaggregation in a probabilistic manner.  
In the proposed probabilistic disaggregation methodology, disaggregated variables 
are marginally modelled with the gamma distribution and the spatial correlation 
structure is modelled with a Gaussian copula. The compositional constraint is modelled 
through a normalisation of the variables. The model characteristics are described for 
two cases: For the special case without spatial correlation and with constant parameter 
, 1,2,...,i i N  , where the conditional joint probability distribution  ; ,XF xZ z α β  is 
known to follow a scaled Dirichlet distribution; for other cases a closed form expression 
is not available and the characteristics of the model are therefore described by means of 
numerical investigations.  
In an example application, the model is applied to a portfolio disaggregation for two 
communes in Switzerland, the communes of Burgdorf, used as a training set to estimate 
parameters, and the commune of Ittigen, used for cross validation. The disaggregation 
results generally compare favourably with sample observations. The example 
application includes a simple flood risk assessment for the commune of Burgdorf, 
which facilitates to illustrate the importance of considering disaggregation uncertainty 
in natural hazard risk assessment.  
The presented methodology contributes to natural hazard risk assessment by 
providing a simple and straightforward way of modelling disaggregation uncertainty, 
which in turns allows a more accurate natural hazard risk assessment. 
  
 
6 Flood vulnerability assessment of 
residential buildings (Paper 2) 
The present chapter, a reproduction of a paper manuscript 
published by the journal Natural Hazards, describes a vulnerability 
modelling approach for residential building in floods. As such, 
definition of variables and parameters, as well as terminology may 
be different in this chapter and the rest of the thesis. 
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ABSTRACT: The present paper introduces a vulnerability 
modelling approach for residential buildings in flood. The 
modelling approach explicitly considers relevant damage 
processes, i.e. water infiltration into the building, mechanical 
failure of components in the building envelope and damage from 
water contact. Damage processes are modelled at a building 
component level, utilizing engineering models where possible. The 
modelling approach is presented in general terms, which should be 
applicable to a large variety of building types. The paper illustrates 
the implementation of the approach for a 2-storey masonry 
building. Results are presented in terms of a parameter study for 
several building parameters and hazard characteristics, as well as, 
in terms of a comparison with damage data and literature 
vulnerability models. The parameter study indicates that hazard 
characteristics and building characteristics impact damage ratios as 
expected. Furthermore, the results are comparable to vulnerability 
models in literature. Strengths and shortcomings of the model are 
discussed. The modelling approach is considered as a step towards 
the establishment of vulnerability models that can serve as a basis 
for engineering decision making for flood risk management for 
residential buildings. 
 
Keywords: Flood; Vulnerability; Residential building; Damage 
process modelling; Engineering vulnerability model. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Flood vulnerability assessment of residential buildings aims at determining the direct 
consequences incurred by residential buildings in a flood event. Flood vulnerability 
assessment is therefore an integral part of any flood risk assessment, and is generally 
necessary for flood risk management.  
Approaches to assess flood vulnerability of residential buildings have been available 
for several decades (see Smith 1994 for historical references). However, in recent years 
flood risk management has changed significantly, and hence, the requirements to 
vulnerability models. In particular, flood risk management has extended its focus from 
the construction of single large protection structures (e.g. dikes) towards an integrated 
approach, where flood risk is managed with a portfolio of structural and non-structural 
risk management measures (Jha et al. 2012). Amongst these, flood proofing measures 
for residential buildings (i.e. modifications to a building to reduce its vulnerability to 
floods, see e.g. Elliott and Leggett 2002) have gained increased attention, e.g. in Joseph 
(2014). When evaluating flood proofing measures, a cost-benefit analysis can indicate 
which flood proofing measure is most efficient. To consider flood proofing measures in 
a formal cost-benefit analysis, vulnerability modelling approaches are necessary, which 
fulfil the following requirements: 
‐ Vulnerability needs to be modelled for individual buildings rather than in 
aggregated manner. 
‐ Building and hazard characteristics need to be considered in detailed manner 
with engineering parameters. 
‐ The vulnerability model needs to reflect the change in vulnerability from 
prospective flood proofing measures. 
Furthermore, the modelling approach should be formulated in a general manner to allow 
its application to a large variety of building types. 
Recent reviews of vulnerability models available for residential buildings in floods 
are found in Jongman et al. (2012) and Merz, Kreibich et al. (2010). The most common 
form of vulnerability model is a stage-damage curve, i.e. a function relating flood water 
depth to damages. Depending on the model, damages are represented in absolute 
monetary terms (absolute damage curve, see e.g. Penning-Rowsell et al. 2010), or as a 
ratio of building value (relative damage curve, see e.g. Scawthorn, Blais et al. 2006). 
Whereas the former is generally easier to identify, the latter has the advantage of better 
transferability in time and space, see Merz, Kreibich et al. (2010). Models also differ in 
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the way they are established, see e.g. Smith (1994). Empirical models are based on 
damage data from past events; the stage-damage curve is generally established through 
regression or comparable methodology. In contrast, synthetic models are established 
through what-if analyses on hypothetical buildings and expert judgment. Advantages 
and disadvantages of both approaches are summarised in Merz, Kreibich et al. (2010). 
Another key difference between models is the spatial aggregation level of modelling 
(Messner et al. 2007). Macro-scale models (e.g. Scawthorn, Blais et al. 2006) assess 
damages in aggregated manner at administrative unit scale. Meso-scale models (e.g. 
Thieken et al. 2008) generally take land-use into consideration and have resolution of 
100m-1km. Finally, micro-scale models consider damages for individual objects at risk, 
e.g. buildings.  
Empirical damage functions seem to be the most common type of vulnerability 
model. However, empirical vulnerability models generally do not provide the accuracy 
required to capture a reduction in vulnerability introduced by prospective flood proofing 
measures. An exception might be found in the recent development of an empirical 
vulnerability model based on Bayesian probabilistic networks, see Vogel et al. (2012), 
where a large number of explanatory variables are considered. Nevertheless, lacking 
large sets of data in good quality, a synthetic vulnerability model at micro-scale seems 
the best approach to address the outlined modelling requirements. 
Several such models are available in literature, maybe most prominently the Multi-
Coloured Handbook (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2010). Building upon seminal work from 
the 1970s by the same authors (e.g. Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton 1977), it details 
stage-damage curves for several residential building types in the UK in terms of 
absolute monetary losses. Losses are specified for individual building components and 
contents, and then summed up to building losses. The model considers water depth and 
flood duration as hazard parameters. Although the modelling approach is generally 
valid, the transferability of the stage-damage curves in time and space is limited, since 
the damages are specified in absolute monetary terms and because the modelled 
buildings are proprietary to the UK.  
A further sophistication is found in synthetic vulnerability models, which explicitly 
consider relevant damage processes. By modelling damage processes, they are best 
indicated to be applicable to different building types, as it is reasonable to assume that 
physical processes that lead to damages are comparable between building types. 
In Kelman (2002) a vulnerability analysis of residential buildings in the UK is 
detailed, which takes basis in the physical damage processes. Damages are modelled at 
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a component level, utilising engineering models where possible. The mechanical failure 
of wall and windows is modelled in detail. The work also emphasises the importance of 
considering the flood rise process and water infiltration process, as well as the water 
head differential between interior and exterior of the building. The model output is 
given in terms of discrete building damage state for combinations of water depth and 
water flow velocity. However, lacking a precise quantification of damages, the results 
of the vulnerability cannot be straightforwardly used for a cost-benefit analysis in 
regard to flood proofing of residential buildings. A similar model is found in Nadal et 
al. (2010); it provides stage-damage curves, albeit without much modelling details. De 
Risi et al. (2013) simulate damage processes and derive analytical vulnerability curves 
from the simulation results. In Mazzorana et al. (2014) relevant physical processes are 
modelled in great detail and under consideration of a multitude of system 
characteristics. The model allows for a cost-benefit analysis of flood proofing measures. 
Nevertheless, its application is limited to modelling of single buildings due to high 
computational demands.  
Taking basis in damage process-based flood vulnerability models available in the 
literature, the present paper introduces a vulnerability modelling approach for 
residential buildings in floods. It allows for explicitly considering relevant hazard 
characteristics and buildings characteristics, and can reflect changes in vulnerability 
from implemented flood proofing measures. As such, it can be used as a base for cost-
benefit analysis for flood proofing of residential buildings.  
6.1.1 Characterisation of flood damage processes 
Before the proposed modelling approach is described in the next chapter, in the 
following a survey of literature on relevant flood and building characteristics and flood 
damage processes is given. 
Building characteristics with the largest influence on flood damage include building 
type, building material and whether flood proofing measures are in place (Kreibich et 
al. 2005). Building type indicators can include information on the occupancy of the 
building (i.e. residential, commercial or industrial), on the construction type, (e.g. 
detached house, row house, terrace house, apartment house, see Penning-Rowsell et al. 
2010), and the number of stories (USACE 1992). The role of building material is 
emphasised in Maiwald and Schwarz (2011), where a categorisation of buildings 
according to their vulnerability is proposed. The building material is relevant in two 
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regards: firstly, it is decisive in determining how fast water infiltrates the building; 
secondly, when the building is subject to large hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure, 
structural damage may occur depending on the building material (Kelman 2002). Next 
to the main building characteristics, relatively minor building details play a significant 
role in determining vulnerability (Wingfield et al. 2005). For instance, the presence or 
absence of a basement, window or an airbrick can determine whether building interiors 
get flooded or not.  
Damages to buildings follow from the flood actions on the building, which are 
defined in Kelman and Spence (2004) as “…acts which a flood could directly do to a 
building, potentially causing damage or failure.”, and they may include “… energy 
transfers, forces, pressures, or the consequences of water or contaminant contact”. The 
same paper lists relevant flood actions: hydrostatic lateral pressure, hydrodynamic 
lateral pressure from water flow velocity, buoyancy forces, erosion, wave action, debris 
impact, and chemical and physical deterioration of building components due to water 
contact. Flood actions on a building follow from flood characteristics in proximity of 
the building, i.e. water depth, water flow velocity, flood rise rate and flood duration, 
debris flow and water contamination. According to the same paper, water depth is the 
flood characteristic with the largest correlation with damages, followed by water flow 
velocity, event duration and water contamination. Moreover, large emphasis is given to 
the flood rise rate and the water head differential, i.e. the difference between water 
depth inside and outside a building. According to an expert survey in Proverbs and 
Soetanto (2004), flood water depth and contaminant content are the most relevant flood 
characteristics for damage estimation. According to Penning-Rowsell (1981) water flow 
velocity is only relevant in rare cases of structural failure. Kreibich et al. (2009) 
confirms that water flow velocity shows limited correlation with building damage, and 
indicates that derived criteria combining water depth and water flow velocity perform 
better in explaining damages. Such criteria can be found in e.g. Clausen (1989) and 
USACE (1998). In Thieken et al. (2005) damage data is analysed as a function of flood 
event duration, indicating that extended flood durations tend to increase damages. The 
importance of a detailed consideration of hazard in analytical vulnerability studies is 
emphasised in Mazzorana et al. (2014). 
From the multitude of flood actions a variety of damage mechanisms arise; an 
overview is given in Kelman and Spence (2003a). Most important damage mechanisms 
are: physical and chemical deterioration through water contact, failure of an external 
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wall or windows from lateral hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure, contamination, 
scour of foundation and buoyancy.  
Damage to building components from water contact can arise through a number of 
different chemical or physical processes, e.g. metal corrosion, wood rotting, etc. Due to 
the multitude of damage processes, no general modelling approach taking basis in 
damage processes seems available. Recurs might be found in literature specific to the 
contact between different component categories and water (e.g. woods components, 
appliances, soft furnishing, electrical system etc.), which however, is not approached 
this paper. Büchele et al. (2006) proposes various types of parametric vulnerability 
curves which can be utilised to model damage from water contact.  
Wall failure from lateral hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure is modelled in 
Kelman (2002) and Kelman and Spence (2003b) for masonry buildings, Nadal et al. 
(2010) for concrete frame buildings, and Roos (2003) for masonry and concrete 
buildings; the latter also considers debris impact. Further literature on the failure of 
walls under out-of-plane action is available, e.g. experimental results for masonry walls 
in USACE (1988). Window and door failure under lateral hydrostatic and 
hydrodynamic pressure is treated in Kelman and Spence (2003a). Modelling of 
foundation scour is described in Nadal et al. (2010). Recent literature on buoyancy of 
buildings in flood seems sparse; Black (1975) writes about buoyancy of rural buildings.  
6.1.2 Goal and outline of this paper 
In accordance with the formulated modelling requirements in the previous section, the 
proposed modelling approach aims at being applicable to a broad range of building 
types, however at the same time allow for detailed consideration of building and hazard 
characteristics. 
The balancing between broad applicability and detailed consideration of system 
characteristics determines several modelling choices. Firstly, as in Penning-Rowsell et 
al. (2010) and Kelman (2002), the building is consdiered a collection of components 
and damages are modelled at a building component level. Secondly, similarly to 
Kelman (2002) and Mazzorana et al. (2014), damages are assessed by explicit 
modelling of relevant damage processes, namely water infiltration process, damage 
from water contact and mechanical failure of components in the building envelope. 
Thirdly, wherever possible, engineering models are employed in the assessment.  
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The uniqueness of the presented work lays in the formulation of a modelling 
approach, which is general in its logic, consistently considers uncertainty and is based 
on the damage-process modelling at a building component level. The consideration of 
building components and damage processes is abstracted to make the modelling 
approach applicable to a large variety of buildings. In its implementation, however, the 
modelling approach allows for detailed consideration of characteristics of individual 
components and their behaviour, thus allowing for discriminating different realisations 
of building types. Furthermore, the proposed modelling approach allows for consistent 
treatment of uncertainty and uncertainty propagation and can be utilised to model 
individual buildings as well as portfolios of buildings. 
In the next chapter the modelling approach is introduced. Thereafter, an example 
implementation of the modelling approach is described for a 2-storey masonry building. 
Results are presented in a parameter study, as well as with comparison to empirical 
damage data and vulnerability models in the literature. The paper concludes with a 
thorough discussion and an outlook on further research work.  
6.2 Flood vulnerability modelling approach for residential buildings 
In a general risk assessment modelling approach, adapted from JCSS (2008), the 
damaging hazard event HZ , with probabilistic characterisation  P HZ , causes the 
considered system to be in damage state D , whose probabilistic characterisation is 
P D HZ   . In general, damage state D  has both direct and indirect consequences. 
However, in the present paper, only direct consequences are considered in terms of 
monetary loss L , modelled with the probability term P L D   , see Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 - General risk assessment framework, adapted from JCSS (2008) 
The aim of the vulnerability model is to determine direct consequences L  for given 
hazard event HZ  under due consideration of uncertainties, that is: 
Flood vulnerability assessment of residential buildings (Paper 2) 
114 
 
DD
P L HZ P L D P D HZ dD            . (6.1) 
where DD  is the domain of D . 
The present paper proposes a modelling approach for a vulnerability model, as 
defined in the figure and equation above, for residential buildings in flood. 
Note that the paper makes an extensive use of conditional probability terms and the 
notation P A B    is used for different meanings. Whereas the notation is formally 
correct if A  is an event. In case A  is a random variable the notation implies the 
abbreviation of P A a B    , i.e. the probability density (continuous case) or 
probability mass (discrete case). 
In the following the representation of buildings and hazard events is introduced 
before considerations are made on damage processes and modelling thereof. A list of 
abbreviations introduced throughout this chapter is provided in Table 6.9 in the Annex 
of Chapter 6. 
6.2.1 System representation 
The considered system is a residential building. The behaviour of residential buildings 
in flood is complex and for given flood event HZ  damage can vary greatly. Part of the 
complexity stems from the large number of building characteristics that influence 
vulnerability. This has to be considered in the building representation scheme in 
consistent and tractable manner. Additionally, the chosen system representation should 
facilitate an efficient analysis of probabilities and risk associated with a flood event. A 
hierarchical system representation, see e.g. Nishijima et al. (2009), seems an ideal 
choice. The building characteristics are primarily represented in terms of a hierarchical 
aggregation of the characteristics and interrelations of its components, i.e. the building 
is considered a collection of its components, see Figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2 - Hierarchical representation of a building as a collection of components 
The hierarchical representation has several advantages. First, due to their 
complexity, modelling building fragility by means of engineering models is 
challenging. Conversely, the behaviour in flood of individual components is generally 
reasonably well understood and can often be represented with an engineering model, i.e. 
it is easier to model component fragilities rather than building fragilities. Second, by 
modelling the building as a collection of components, changes to building configuration 
can easily be represented by adding or modifying individual components. Similar 
building representations are adopted in other flood vulnerability modelling approaches, 
e.g. Kelman (2002), Nadal et al. (2010) and Penning-Rowsell et al. (2010). 
6.2.1.1 Building parameterisation 
Building characteristics that are not inherent to a component, such as the number of 
stories and the presence/absence of a basement are captured with building parameter 
vector  1 2, ,..., bN  ψ , where , 1,2,...,i bi N  , are building parameters and bN  is 
the number of building parameters. According to the hierarchical representation, all 
other characteristics of the building are captured at a component level. The building is 
considered a collection of N  components , 1,...,jC j N , and each component jC  is 
characterised through a component parameter vector  1 2, ,..., jj N  γ , where 
, 1, 2,...,i ji N   are component parameters and jN  is the number of parameters needed 
to characterise jC . Parameters in jγ  characterise the monetary value of components, 
position within the building, functionality within the building and fragility in regard to 
all considered damage mechanisms. The elements in jγ  may vary depending on the 
nature of the component. The collection of component parameter vectors of all 
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components is  2, ,..., Nγ 1S γ γ γ . 
6.2.1.2  Types of components 
In the context of flood vulnerability modelling two component types are identified, 
which take a special role within buildings, namely structural and envelope components.  
Structural components differ from other components in the sense that their failure 
can lead to the failure of the whole building.  
Envelope components together form the building envelope, which is considered the 
last flood protection for building interiors. As such, a failure of an envelope component 
is likely to influence damage to other components, since water enters the building and 
causes damage to internal components. At the same time, further failures in the building 
envelope become less likely, since the water head differential between interior and 
exterior of the building reduces (as thoroughly explained later on). Figure 6.3 lists 
examples of structural and envelope components as well as non-structural and non-
envelope components. Note that a component can be both structural and part of the 
building envelope. 
 
Figure 6.3 – Examples of component classification  
Given their roles within the building, envelope and structural components are 
treated with special consideration in the present modelling approach. Mechanical failure 
from hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure is only considered to affect envelope 
components, since they can be subject to a water head differential and are directly 
exposed to water flow velocity. On the other hand, in analysing the collapse of a 
building following damage to an individual component, only structural components are 
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relevant. The set of all envelope components is EnvC ; the set of all structural 
components is StruC .  
6.2.2 Hazard 
Hazard event HZ  is assumed to be characterised through following basic hazard 
variables: water depth H , water flow velocity V  and flood rise rate R . Following 
Kelman (2002), the present modelling approach explicitly considers the water level 
inside the building, IH , since it plays an important role in assessing mechanical failures 
in the building envelope. IH  is modelled as a function of the basic hazard variables H , 
V , R  under consideration of the behaviour of the building envelope, i.e. IH  is a 
derived hazard variable.  
During the flood rise process the building is subject to different load cases given by 
a combination of H , IH  and V . Since it is not known at which point during the flood 
rise a critical load case occurs, the whole time series must be considered. The water 
depth tH , where the subscript t  indicates the time at which the variable is evaluated, is 
modelled as  
  min ,tH t R H  , (6.2)  
with 0 t T  , where 0t   is the starting time of the event and t T  is the time when 
water depth H  and IH  have both reached their respective maximal value. The water 
recession process, as well as the flood event duration, is not explicitly considered. 
6.2.3 Damage processes 
In the present paper the two most relevant damage mechanisms are considered at a 
component level, namely damage from water contact and mechanical component failure 
due to hydrostatic and hydrodynamic pressure. Moreover, it is considered that, upon 
mechanical failure of a structural component(s), the whole system (i.e. the building) 
might collapse. Other damage mechanisms, such as foundation scour and buoyancy, are 
not considered, since they are only relevant in very particular situations (very high 
water flow velocity and a water-tight building envelope respectively).  
The water head differential IH H H    is of great relevance for the assessment of 
mechanical failures in the building envelope, as it determines the hydrostatic pressure 
on envelope components. During the flood rise process, the envelope components are 
subject to a number of different load cases, which are a function of water depth H , 
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flood rise rate R  and water infiltration flow rate Q  into the building. The latter is a 
function of the opening area A  in the envelope, through which water can infiltrate the 
building. This, in turn, is a function of the damage state DM of envelope components. 
An illustration of a flood rise process with a hypothetical failure in the envelope is given 
in Figure 6.4. It exemplifies the relation between different variables over time, in 
particular how a failure in the envelope affects the water infiltration flow rate Q  and 
therefore IH  and H . 
 
Figure 6.4 - Qualitative illustration of a flood rise process with failure in the envelope and the following 
increase in water infiltration and internal water depth 
Following these observations, mechanical failures and water infiltration process are 
considered to be dependent and are modelled under consideration of the time process. 
Given these premises, the modelling tasks required to formulate a vulnerability model 
are summarised in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 - Required model components to assess flood vulnerability of residential building 
Model 
Component 
Hierarchical 
level of 
consideration 
State variable 
Time 
process 
considered 
Probabilistic 
characterisation 
Mechanical 
failure model 
Component 
Damage state jDM ,
j EnvC ; 
 ,jDM j  EnvDM C . 
Yes 
, ; ,IP H HZ   DM ψ S  
Water 
infiltration 
model 
Component Internal water depth IH . Yes 
Water damage 
model 
Component 
Damage state jDW  for all 
, 1,...,jC j N ; 
 , 1,...,jDW j N DW  
No , ; ,j IP DW H H   ψ S  
Structural 
system failure 
System System failure event F   No ; ,P F   DM ψ S  
Consequence 
model 
System / 
Component 
Monetary loss L   No , ; ,P L F 
  DM DW, ψ S
 
 
In the following, parameter vector ψ  and set γS  are omitted from conditional 
probability terms to allow a compact notation. Next to water depth H , variables IH ,
,jDM j EnvC  and DM  are modelled at different time steps in the flood rise process; 
the subscript t  indicates the time at which the variable is evaluated. The subscript is 
omitted for t T . 
In the following sections the modelling of conditional probability terms in Table 6.1 
is detailed.  
6.2.4 Mechanical failure and water infiltration 
In this section the modelling of , IP H HZ  DM  is detailed. The dependency between 
damage state vector DM  and internal water level IH  is modelled with a Markov Chain 
model.  
The time process in Equation (6.2) is evaluated at discrete time intervals t , at each 
of which damage states , , 1,...,j tDM j N  and internal water depth ,I tH  are calculated 
with a water infiltration model and a mechanical failure model respectively. The 
probabilistic characterisation of the damage state ,j tDM  is 
, , , ,
, , ,
j tDM j t j t t I t t t t
P P DM DM H H V      ; the probabilistic characterisation of the 
internal water depth ,I tH  is , I, ,, , ,I tH t t t I t t t tP P H H H V     DM . Given tH  as per 
Equation (6.2) and postulating initial conditions , 0I tH  , V  constant over the flood 
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rise process and that all components are in an undamaged state, the conditional 
probability term , IP H HZ  DM  is modelled as: 
  
, ,
All values of 0 1
all marginalised
variables
, ...
I t j t
T N
I
t j
H DMP H HZ P P
 
       DM .  (6.3) 
Note that whereas 
,j tDM
P  and 
,I tH
P  are not explicitly conditional on R , they are 
implicitly, since  ; ,tH f t H R . The assumption underlying Equation (6.3) is that the 
Markov condition holds, i.e. that ,j tDM  and I,tH  are conditionally independent given 
variables at the previous time step, i.e. ,j t tDM   , t tH   and ,I t tH  . Also, 1 ,j tDM  and 
2 ,j t
DM  for 1 2j j  are considered conditionally independent.  
6.2.4.1 Mechanical failure model 
The mechanical failure model defines , , ,, , ,j t j t t I t t t tP DM DM H H V     , i.e. the 
probability of mechanical failure at time t  for given load case at time t t  . 
In the general procedure, a finite set of 1K   mutually exclusive damage states, 
, 0,...,j jkDM dm k K  , are considered for each component. A limit state function 
 ,, , ,jk j t I tg H H Vγ  is formulated for each damage state. The probability of the 
component being in damage state k  is evaluated as follows. 
 
   
 
1
, , 1
1- 0                           0
, , 0 - 0     1,..., 1
0                              
j
j t jk I t t t t jk jk
jk
P g k
P DM dm H H V P g P g k K
P g k K
  
                             
  (6.4) 
The evaluation of limit state function generally requires a structural analysis of 
component jC . Concrete or masonry wall panels with out-of plane loads can be 
analysed with a variety of models available in literature, including FEM analysis (De 
Risi et al. 2013), yielding line analysis (Kelman and Spence 2003b) and 2D structural 
analysis (Roos 2003). Modelling approaches for the structural analysis of windows are 
found in Kelman (2002). Glass doors can be treated with the same model as windows; 
basis for modelling of non-glass doors is found in Kelman and Spence (2003a).  
Note that ,j tDM  is considered conditional on ,j t tDM   to assure that damage is non-
decreasing with increasing time t . Nevertheless, ,j t tDM   is not considered in the 
structural analysis.  
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6.2.4.2 Water infiltration model 
The water infiltration model defines I, ,, , ,t t t I t t t tP H H H V    DM . The internal water 
depth is calculated as:  
 , , tI t I t t
floor
QH H t
A
   ,  (6.5) 
where floorA  is the floor area of the building and ,t j tjQ Q  EnvC . Water flow rate ,j tQ  
through envelope component jC  is modelled with conditional probability term 
, , ,, , ,j t t t I t t j t tP Q H H DM V     . The probabilistic characterisation of tQ  is found 
through convolution of , , ,, , , ,j t t t I t t j t tP Q H H DM V j      envC .  
Modelling approaches for , , ,, , ,j t t t I t t j t tP Q H H DM V      depend on the size of 
the opening area in component jC , through which water flows into the building. 
Opening areas range from narrow cracks (e.g. wall crack) to large breaches (e.g. broken 
window). For crack flow literature, see e.g. Clarke et al. (1997) and Etheridge et al. 
(1977); for larger breaches Bernoulli’s flow equation, with or without friction losses, 
can be utilised. Kelman (2002) provides a starting point for modelling of water 
infiltration between the two extreme cases.  
6.2.5 Damage from water contact 
The great majority of flood damage is caused by water contact with components. The 
general conditional probability term for water damage jDW  to component jC  is 
,j IP DW H H   . Note that for the calculation of water contact only the water depth at 
time t T  is relevant. Despite the notation, jDW  is only conditional on one water 
depth, H  or IH , depending on whether component jC  is an envelope component or an 
internal component.  
No general modelling approach to represent actual damage processes seems 
available in literature. However, a model can be established with the parametric 
vulnerability curves in Büchele et al. (2006), and the expert knowledge in Proverbs and 
Soetanto (2004). 
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6.2.6 Structural system failure 
Mechanical failures are modelled at a component level, i.e. as local damages. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of progressive damage in the building as a consequence of 
local damage has to be considered. This type of analysis is typically found in robustness 
assessment; for an overview see Narasimhan (2012). 
System failure event F  is modelled conditionally on component damage states, i.e. 
 |P F DM . The assessment of  |P F DM  is challenging: it may vary for different 
building configurations, entail several failure modes, and generally requires detailed 
structural analysis of the building for different realisations of DM . An approximated 
approach is presented in the following. It assumes that each system failure mode is 
associated with damage to only one component. First, event | jF DM  is defined as 
system failure following damage to component jC , whose occurrence probability is 
| jP F DM   . Second, the probability | jP F DM    is assumed to be approximated with 
the assumption that all other components are undamaged. The probability of system 
failure is then approximated as: 
    | 1 1 | j
j
P F P F DM

     
StruC
DM .  (6.6) 
Equation (6.6) is exact when only one structural component is damaged or when two or 
more components are damaged, however no two damaged components contribute to the 
same system failure mode. When damaged components contribute to the same system 
failure mode, Equation (6.6) generally underestimates the probability of failure 
 |P F DM .  
The probability | jP F DM   can be assessed through different approaches, e.g. 
expert judgement or engineering analysis. For the latter case, a possible approach is to 
perform a structural analysis of the whole building with component jC  in damage state 
j jkDM dm  and all other components undamaged, and calculate the probability of 
system failure j jkF DM dm , e.g. with reliability methods.  
 
 
6.2.7 Consequence model 
In the last modelling step, monetary losses L  are calculated based on the damage states 
jDM  and jDW , as well as system failure event F . Depending on whether a system 
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failure occurred, monetary loss L  is determined with different approaches. In case of 
system failure, the full building value Bw  is considered to be lost, i.e. 1bP L w F     . 
In the case no system failure occurred monetary loss L  is the sum of component losses 
jL  for all components: 
 
1
N
j
j
L L

  . (6.7) 
Monetary loss jL  to component jC  has probabilistic characterisation 
,j j jP L DM DW    and can be modelled from empirical data (e.g. from insurance 
claims), through heuristics or expert knowledge, i.e. by considering costs of component 
repair strategies. The probabilistic characterisation of component loss jL  given hazard 
event HZ  and that no system failure occurs is:  
All values of 
all marginalised
variables
..., , , ,j j j j j I IP L F HZ P L DM DW P DW H P H F HZ              DM .  (6.8) 
where , ,IP H F HZ  DM  is obtained from , IP H HZ  DM  and P F  DM  through 
Bayes’ theorem. The probabilistic characterisation of ,P L F HZ    can be found by 
convolution of , , 1,...,jP L F HZ j N    , and its cumulative distribution function is 
   
0
, ,
bw
P L l F HZ I l x P L l F HZ dx          ,  (6.9) 
where x  is an integration variable and  I   is an indicator function which returns unity 
when the condition in the bracket is satisfied and zero otherwise. The cumulative 
distribution function of L  in case of system failure F  is:  
 
0,     
,
1,      
b
b
l w
P L l F HZ
l w
      
.  (6.10) 
The cumulative distribution function P L l HZ    of loss L  given event HZ  is 
obtained through weighted summation of ,P L l F HZ    and ,P L l F HZ    , see 
Equation (6.11) and Figure 6.5.  
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 , ,P L l HZ P F HZ P L l F HZ P F HZ P L l F HZ                       . (6.11) 
 
Figure 6.5 - Illustration of CDFs for ,L F HZ  on the left, F,L HZ at the centre, and L HZ  on the 
right 
An implementation of the approach, including parameterisation of a building and 
estimation of the conditional probability terms, is described in the next chapter.  
6.3 Example implementation of the modelling approach 
In the present chapter the modelling approach is implemented for a single family, 2-
storey masonry building, as found throughout Europe, see Figure 6.6. The aim of the 
example implementation is to give detailed illustration of one possible application of the 
modelling approach.  
In the example implementation all conditional probability terms are modelled and 
parametrised. However the logical linking of the conditional probability terms is not 
further detailed here, as it is fully defined in the modelling approach. Table 6.2 provides 
an overview of the main sub-models entailed by the modelling approach and how they 
are implemented in the present example implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 - Overview of the modelling approach and its implementation 
 Modelling approach Example implementation Section 
Building 
parameterisation 
The building is considered a 
collection of its components and is 
- The list of considered components 
is given in Table 6.4. 6.3.1 
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characterised with building 
parameter vector ψ and the 
collection of component parameter 
vectors  2, ,..., Nγ 1S γ γ γ . 
- Considered building parameters 
are listed in Table 6.3. 
- Considered component parameters 
are listed in Figure 6.7. 
Mechanical 
failure model 
, , ,, , ,j t j t t I t t t tP DM DM H H V    
 
- The failure of walls is considered 
with a structural model according to 
Roos (2003). 
- The failure of windows is 
considered with a structural model 
according to Kelman (2002). 
6.3.2.1 
Water infiltration 
model , , ,
, , ,j t t t I t t j t tP Q H H DM V      
- The opening area jA  in 
component jC  given jDM  is 
postulated. 
- The water flow rate through jA  is 
modelled with the Bernoulli 
equation for the flow of 
incompressible fluids.  
6.3.2.2 
Water damage 
model 
,j IP DW H H    
- The expected value 
 ,j IE DW f H H     is modelled 
with a piecewise linear function. 
- Uncertainty of jDW  is modelled 
with a beta distribution. 
6.3.2.3 
Structural system 
failure 
| j jkP F DM dm    
- The probability of failure 
| j jkP F DM dm    is postulated. 6.3.2.4 
Consequence 
model 
,j j jP L DM DW    
- The value of components 
, 1,...,jW j N  is modelled with a 
Dirichlet distribution.  
- The monetary loss for component 
jC  is determined as 
 , ,j j j jL f DM DW W .  
6.3.2.5 
 
In the following, the system representation scheme introduced in Section 6.2.1 is 
applied for the chosen building type, i.e. building parameters and component parameters 
are defined, and the list of considered components is detailed. Thereafter, in Section 
6.3.2 models are specified to determine the conditional probability terms, which are part 
of the modelling approach. Note that hazard modelling is not detailed here as it is 
considered an input to the vulnerability model. The water depth H  is measured from 
external terrain height refh , see Figure 6.6. 
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Figure 6.6 - Simplified representation of a 2-storey masonry building as found in continental Europe 
6.3.1 Building parameterisation 
In this implementation the building is parameterised with a high level of detail, i.e. 
many components are considered and each component is characterised by several 
parameters. The elements of the building parameter vector ψ  are given in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 - List of building parameters 
 Name Description 
sn   Number of stories Number of stories excluding basement. 
bw  Building value Monetary value of the building. 
floora  Floor area Floor area of one storey. 
gfh  Ground floor level The height of the ground floor level above refh   
u   Basement indicator A Boolean parameter indicating the presence or absence of 
a basement.  
 
The high level of detail entails a significant burden in defining the building and 
estimating parameters. In order to facilitate component parameterisation, three 
component classes , 1,2,3m m   are defined: 1  for all internal components, 2  for 
non-structural envelope components and 3  for structural envelope components (refer 
to Figure 6.3 for examples). A class m  defines the elements of parameter vector jγ  by 
which each component jC , instance of m , is characterised. The parameters defined for 
each component class are shown in Figure 6.7. The list of considered components, as 
well as their classification, is given in Table 6.4. 
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Figure 6.7 - Component parameters for each component class 
The component list in Table 6.4 is given in Penning-Rowsell et al. (2010) for a UK 
building, however, it is believed to be generally valid for 1-to-2 storey masonry building 
in Europe. Similar component lists can be found in BMVBW (2005). An alternative list 
considering only few components can be found in Nadal et al. (2010). 
A modelled building can include several instances of each component in Table 6.4, 
e.g. a window component can be instantiated several times on the ground floor and on 
the upper floors to have a faithful representation of a building. 
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Table 6.4 - List of considered components with classification 
Component Name 
Component 
class 
 
Component Name 
Component 
class 
Wall 
3   Heating radiators 
1  
Roof structure  Electrical system 
Wall finishing 
2  
 Technical installations 
External doors  Hi-Fi/TV/Electrical goods 
Windows  Upholstered 
Basement Windows  Chipboard furniture 
Internal walls 
1  
 Polished wood furniture 
Internal wall finishing  Soft furnishing 
Internal doors and frames  Personal belongings 
Fitted furniture  Sanitary fittings 
Floor structure  Boiler 
Floor finishing  Heating firing unit 
Plumbing pipes    
 
6.3.1.1 Parameter assessment 
A rationale for the assessment of parameter values and, if necessary, uncertainty is 
provided.  
In engineering applications, many parameters are often not known with precision 
due to lack of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty) and to natural variability (aleatory 
uncertainty). In either case it is advisable to model a parameter as a random variable, i.e. 
considering parameter uncertainty. Depending on the type of analysis at hand, that is, 
whether a single building with known configuration or a portfolio of buildings, with 
incomplete knowledge on building configuration is analysed, the parameters that are 
considered as random variables may change.  
There are generally three means of assessment: expert/engineering knowledge 
(including literature), statistical knowledge and direct measurement. Expert and 
engineering knowledge can be applied in the assessment of material properties, 
probabilities of failure, and fragility parameters for water damage. The assessment of 
geometry and monetary value parameters has to be differentiated by type of analysis. 
For the analysis of a specific (known) building, these can often be directly observed, 
e.g. measured or estimated with very good precision. For the analysis of a building, 
whose configuration is uncertain (e.g. when analysing a portfolio of buildings) the 
direct measurement becomes prohibitive and a statistical assessment is recommended.  
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As such, in a single building analysis, the geometrical features ( floora  of the 
building; minh , maxh , w , b  of each component) are considered deterministic and the 
monetary values of components is modelled with small variance. In a portfolio analysis 
geometrical features differ between buildings and are generally not known with 
precision for all the buildings. Therefore, they are considered as random variables. 
Moreover, also due to lack of knowledge, the monetary value of components is 
modelled with larger variance. For both types of analysis, material characteristics ( tf  
and cf ), water fragility parameters (  and  ) as well as well opening area vector a  
are modelled as random variables. In the present implementation of the modelling 
approach the building value bw , component value weight   and the probability of 
failure vector fp  are considered deterministically. The impact of parameter uncertainty 
on the results is significant, as will be shown in Figure 6.12. 
Parameter values utilised for this implementation of the modelling approach are 
given in Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 in the Annex to Chapter 6. The uncertainty 
parameterisation for single building analyses and portfolio analyses is given in Table 
6.12 in the Annex to Chapter 6.  
6.3.2 Modelling of conditional probability terms 
The present section describes the calculation of the conditional probability terms to 
model flood vulnerability of the building described in the previous section. 
6.3.2.1 Mechanical failure model  
The modelling of , , ,, , ,j t j t t I t t t tP DM DM H H V      is detailed. In principle, 
mechanical failure is considered for each envelope component, i.e. component classes 
2  and 3 , including windows, walls, doors and roof. However, according to Kelman 
and Spence (2003a) the probability of mechanical failure of a door during a flood is 
negligible, since masonry wall panels generally fail before. Therefore, no mechanical 
failure model for doors is specified. Moreover, the mechanical failure of roof is not 
considered; it is assumed that if a flood would endanger the integrity of the roof 
structure, the building would fail before the water depth reaches the roof level. 
Therefore, the following analysis is only carried out for windows and wall components.  
For each analysed component jC , a set of jK  discrete damage states 
, 1,...,j jk jDM dm k K   and corresponding limit state functions  jkg   are specified.  
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For wall components the postulated damage states and limit state functions are given in 
Table 6.5. A structural analysis of wall component is carried out according to Roos 
(2003) with a 2D structural analysis. The maximal loading moment sM  is calculated as 
illustrated in Figure 6.8. Note that water flow velocity V  is considered constant over 
the water depth and, ground water is not considered. The limit state functions, given in 
Table 6.5, compare sM  to the wall cracking moment and ultimate moment, which are 
calculated as:  
 2
6
t N
c
fM w b   ,  (6.12) 
 2
6
c N
u
fM w b   .  (6.13) 
where N  is the compressive stress from the normal force in the wall. Only bending 
failures in the wall are considered. Wall openings, irregularities and horizontal load 
transfer in the wall are not considered in the analysis. Linear elastic material behaviour 
is assumed. 
 
Figure 6.8 - Structural models utilised for the assessment of wall loading and bending moment diagram 
 
Flood vulnerability assessment of residential buildings (Paper 2) 
131 
Table 6.5 - Damage states and respective limit state function for wall components 
Damage state jDM  Limit state function   
0jdm  No damage - 
1jdm  Cracking 1 c sg M M   
2jdm  Partial collapse 2 u sg M M   
3jdm  Collapse 
3 1.2 u sg M M   (The factor 1.2 is postulated and is justified 
by the fact that plasticity and horizontal load transfer where not 
considered in the structural analysis.) 
 
Structural analysis of windows is modelled according to Kelman (2002). Bending 
failure of glass panels is considered under the assumption that glass panels are simply 
supported by the window frame. Horizontal and vertical load transfers in the window 
pane are considered. Only two damage states are modelled for windows as described in 
Table 6.6.  
Table 6.6 - Damage states and respective limit state function for windows components 
Damage state jDM  Limit state function  
0jdm  No damage - 
1jdm  Full damage  1 26 st Mg f wb     
6.3.2.2 Water infiltration model 
The water infiltration model I, ,, , ,t t t I t t t tP H H H V    DM  is modelled through 
Equation (6.5) and , , ,, , ,j t t t I t t j t tP Q H H DM V     . Here the modelling of 
, , ,, , ,j t t t I t t j t tP Q H H DM V      is described. 
As previously mentioned, crack flow should be treated separately from free water 
flow through large openings. Nevertheless, here only the Bernoulli equation for the flow 
of incompressible fluids is utilised to determine the water flow rate into the building. 
Friction and flow velocity V  are neglected. The water flow rate ,j tQ  through 
component jC  at time t  is calculated as: 
 , 2j t j t tQ A r g H    ,  (6.14) 
where g  is the gravitation constant, ,t t I tH H H    and tr  is the proportion of the 
component under water, i.e.  
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  max min
max min
min , t
t
h H h
r
h h
  ,  (6.15) 
where minh  and maxh  are the elevation of the components bottom and top edge above the 
external terrain level refh  respectively. The opening area jA  in component jC  through 
which water can flow into the building is modelled conditionally on the damage state of 
the component, i.e.    kj j jkA DM dm a  , where  ka  is the k th element of 
parameter vector a , see Figure 6.7.  
6.3.2.3 Damage from water contact model 
In this section the modelling of ,j IP DW H H    is addresses. Due to the lack of data 
and models describing damage to components from water contact, a simple approach is 
postulated. Water damage state jDW  is considered a continuous variable that can take 
values between 0jDW   (no damage) and 1jDW   (full damage). The expected value 
jE DW    is modelled as follows:  
    , min 1, max tan ,0j IE DW H H H      , (6.16) 
where minH H h
   for envelope components and minIH H h   for internal 
components. As illustrated in Figure 6.9, parameter   is a threshold value; when 
H    the component is damaged. Parameter   is the gradient of the linear fragility 
curve. The beta distribution is chosen to model uncertainty in jDW , since the beta 
distribution is bounded between 0 and 1 (just as jDW ), and since it is flexible to 
parameterise. Given jE DW   , the value of the variance jVar DW   is postulated as 
  220.2 0.5 0.5j jVar DW E DW          , which corresponds to 20% of the 
maximum variance allowed by the beta distribution. Given jE DW    and jVar DW    
the beta distribution parameters can be estimated straightforwardly. 
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Figure 6.9 - Generic component fragility curve for water damage 
6.3.2.4 Structural system failure model 
The probability | j jkP F DM dm    of building failure event F  given that component 
jC  is in damage state j jkDM dm  is postulated with parameter ( )kfp  defined in Figure 
6.7.  
6.3.2.5 Consequence model 
The monetary loss in case of structural failure F  is BL w . The probabilistic 
characterisation of component losses , 1,...,jL j N , i.e. ,j j jP L DM DW    is detailed 
in the following. The assumed general formulation of the monetary loss is: 
 j j jL W    (6.17) 
where j  is the damage ratio of component jC , i.e. the ratio between monetary loss jL  
and component value jW . The damage ratio   for the whole building follows from the 
definition of damage ratio and Equations (6.7) and (6.17).  
The component damage ratio j  is a function of jDM  and jDW , and is postulated 
for envelope component as  ,min ,1j m j jDW   ,where ,m j  is damage ratio from 
mechanical failure (given in Table 6.7 for wall components and Table 6.8 for windows 
components), and for all other component as j jDW  .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flood vulnerability assessment of residential buildings (Paper 2) 
134 
Table 6.7 - Postulated damage ratios ,m j  for given jDM  for wall components 
Damage state jDM  Damage ratio ,m j  
0jdm  0 
1jdm  0.33 
2jdm  0.67 
3jdm  1 
Table 6.8 - Postulated damage ratios ,m j  for given jDM  for window components 
Damage state jDM   Damage ratio ,m j  
0jdm  0 
1jdm  1 
 
Whereas the monetary value of the building Bw  is assumed to be known, the value jW  
of individual component jC  is uncertain. The variables , 1, 2,...,jW j N  are “parts of a 
whole” as they are constrained by 
1
N
j B
j
W w

 , i.e. they are of compositional nature and 
are defined on a simplex. A probability distribution, which is well indicated to model 
compositional variables, is the Dirichlet distribution (Aitchinson 1986). Although its 
flexibility in modelling variance is limited and the covariance structure is strictly 
negative, the Dirichlet offers a compact formulation and simple parametrisation, and is 
thus utilised for this application. The vector  1 2, ,..., NW W WW  is defined on the 
simplex  1 2 3
1
, , ,..., 0, 1, 2,..., ;
N
N N
N j j b
j
S w w w w w j N w w

          w   and is 
modelled to follow the Dirichlet distribution with scaled support: 
      1
1 1 111 1
1
1
1
; , ,
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j N
j j
N
Nj Nj
B B j b jN j
j
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f w w w w w
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

        


 

 W
w ω , (6.18) 
with     the gamma function, value weight parameter j j BE W w     , 
 1 2, ,..., N  ω  and   is a parameter controlling the variance in W , see Custer and 
Nishijima (2012). It follows from this approach, that 
1
N
j B
j
W w

  and j j bE W w     . 
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6.4 Results and comparisons 
A Monte Carlo simulation is performed with the models detailed in Section 6.2 and 6.3. 
For each Monte Carlo sample, building and component parameters are sampled to 
obtain a sample building. For each sample building a vulnerability curve is obtained by 
calculating losses for hazard events HZ  with different water depths H . If not 
otherwise stated, 0V m s  and 0.0001R m s  for each hazard event. Time interval is 
chosen to be 1000t s  .  
Most results shown in the following are for the example building described in 
Section 6.3.1, i.e., a 2-storey masonry building with basement. For comparison 
purposes, simulations are also made for buildings with the same component 
parameterisation, but with/without basement and 1- or 2-stories.  
Furthermore, most results are for the assumption of incomplete knowledge of the 
building configuration (which is encountered in portfolio analysis where geometrical 
features are uncertain and the variance of component values is larger); when a building 
with known building configuration (geometrical characteristics are assumed to be 
known with precision and the component values are considered to have small variance) 
is considered, it is duly labelled.  
In Section 6.4.1 vulnerability curves for different building parameterisation and 
hazard characteristics are presented. In Section 6.4.2, model results are compared to 
literature vulnerability models and damage data. Results are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
6.4.1 Parameter studies 
In this section model results for several parameterisations are presented, illustrating how 
building parameters and hazard characteristics influence vulnerability.  
In Figure 6.10 the vulnerability curve for the 2-storey masonry building with 
basement is illustrated in terms of expected value of the damage ratio,  E  , as well as 
the 10% and 90%-quantile values. In Figure 6.11 a comparison is made, between 
expected damage ratios of masonry buildings with different number of stories, and with 
or without basement. In Figure 6.12 the impact of uncertainty parameterisation on the 
vulnerability curve is illustrated. The comparison is made between vulnerability curves 
for a building with known building configuration and a building with incomplete 
knowledge of the building configuration. The two vulnerability curves are 
representative for a single building analysis and a single building in a portfolio analysis 
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respectively. Figure 6.13 illustrates the impact of different water flow velocities V  on 
expected damage ratios. 
 
Figure 6.10 - Vulnerability curve with uncertainty bounds for a 2-storey masonry building with 
basement 
 
Figure 6.11 - Comparison of vulnerability curves for masonry buildings with different number of stories 
and with/without basement knowledge 
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Figure 6.12 - Comparison of vulnerability curves with uncertainty bounds for a building with known 
configuration (small parameter uncertainty) and a building with incomplete knowledge on the building 
configuration (large parameter uncertainty) 
 
Figure 6.13.- Vulnerability curves for different water flow velocities V  
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6.4.2 Comparison with damage data and literature vulnerability models 
A full validation of the presented model is not feasible due to its complexity and the 
lack of damage data in good quality. For partial validation, the model results are 
compared to vulnerability models available in literature and damage data from 
Germany.  
In Figure 6.14 comparison is made with damage data from the German HOWAS 
database (HOWAS 2012). From the large database only relevant data points with good 
quality are considered, i.e. data points for 2-storey buildings with basement that 
included information on water depth and damage ratio.  
In Figure 6.15 results are compared to vulnerability curve for “pre-1919 detached 
house” given in the appendix of the “Multi-Coloured Handbook”, MCH, (Penning-
Rowsell et al. 2010), where vulnerability curves for short floods (less than 12 hours 
duration) and long floods (more than 12 hour duration) are specified.  
A third comparison is made in Figure 6.16 with the vulnerability curves proposed in 
USACE (2003) for 1- and 2-storey buildings with basement and in USACE (2000) for 
1- and 2-storey buildings without basement. For all USACE-curves it is assumed that 
the content value is 40% of the structure value. Note that these literature vulnerability 
curves are obtained through regression of damage data from past events. The 
construction material of the buildings underlying the vulnerability curves is not known 
and may include timber and masonry buildings.  
Both MCH and USACE vulnerability curves are given as a function of water depth 
over ground floor level. The vulnerability curves of the present model are adapted for 
comparability. As a consequence, the water depth can be negative when water enters the 
basement, however does not reach the ground floor. 
The final comparison is made in Figure 6.17, where the probability of building 
failure  P F  is plotted as contour lines in function of water depth H  and water flow 
velocity V . The contour lines are compared to a damage criterion for “Total building 
destruction” for brick and masonry buildings by Clausen (1989). 
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Figure 6.14 - Comparison of model results with damage data (HOWAS 2012) for two hazard indices: 
external water depth H (left) and water depth over ground floor (right) 
 
Figure 6.15 - Comparison of model results with MCH vulnerability curve from Penning-Rowsell et al. 
(2010) 
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Figure 6.16 - Comparison of model result with vulnerability curves from USACE (2000) and USACE 
(2003) 
 
Figure 6.17 - Comparison of model result with Clausen (1989) damage criterion for “Total building 
destruction for brick and masonry buildings 
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6.5 Discussion 
In the present chapter, the results are discussed and the advantages and shortcomings of 
the model are addressed in the context of the state of the art vulnerability models and 
the modelling objectives stated at the beginning of the paper. 
6.5.1 Result discussion 
The parameter studies generally indicate that the model can well capture the influence 
of hazard characteristics and building parameterisation on damage ratios.  
In Figure 6.10 the expected damage ratio  E   of a 2-storey building with 
basement steadily increases with water depth, however, the gradient of the curve is not 
constant. The changes in gradient are mainly due to a non-uniform distribution of 
components, and hence, monetary value, within each of the stories; i.e. components are 
concentrated in the lower part of each storey. For the same reason uncertainty bounds 
are not parallel to the expected damage ratio curve. It increases at water depths with 
large value concentration and decreases otherwise. 
Figure 6.11 compares the vulnerability curves of different building types in terms of 
expected damage ratio  E  . The presence of a basement significantly increases 
damage ratio compared to the same building without basement. The difference is 
particularly large for small water depth H  and reduces with increasing water depth. 1-
storey buildings consistently shows larger expected damage ratios compared to its 2-
storey counterpart. The reason for this difference can be illustrated with additional study 
shown in Figure 6.18. Defining s  as the damage ratio for a single storey analogously 
to the damage ratio   for the whole building, the expected damage ratio  sE   by 
storey is illustrated for a 1-storey building with basement (left) and a 2-storey building 
with basement (right). The basements and ground floors of the two buildings have very 
similar vulnerability curves. Therefore, the difference in vulnerability between 1-storey 
and 2-storey buildings observed in Figure 6.11 mainly arises, since 2-storey buildings 
have their value distributed over two stories rather than one. For instance, a total loss on 
the ground floor (approximately 3H m ) results in a much higher damage ratio for the 
1-storey building compared to the 2-storey building. 
Flood vulnerability assessment of residential buildings (Paper 2) 
142 
 
Figure 6.18 - Expected damage ratio  sE   for individual stories for 1-storey building with basement 
(left) and 2-storey building with basement (right) 
According to Figure 6.12 parameter uncertainty has a major impact on the 
vulnerability curve and associated uncertainty bounds. Firstly, the uncertainty bounds 
are much larger when parameter uncertainty is large. Secondly, the changes in gradient 
of the expected damage ratio observed in Figure 6.10 are amplified when parameter 
uncertainty is reduced. The abrupt changes in gradient at 0.8H m  and 4H m  of the 
“Known building configuration” curves in Figure 6.12 correspond to ground floor level 
and first floor level of the modelled building respectively. Whenever the water reaches a 
higher storey, the damage ratio gradient increases as several components get watered, 
hence, damaged. In contrast, when the water rises to the upper parts of a storey, the 
damage gradient is small, since fewer components are situated in the upper part of a 
storey. When uncertainty is large this effect is less pronounced, since the levels of the 
floor, and therefore the value distribution, are considered uncertain.  
Figure 6.13 illustrates the impact of water flow velocity. As expected, high water 
flow velocity V  increases the damage ratios for given water depth H . Whereas the 
impact of water flow velocity is relatively minor at small water depth H , it becomes 
large as the water depth H  increases. The reason for the increased expected damage 
ratio  E    is that the probability of building failure event F  increases remarkably with 
increasing water flow velocity V , see Figure 6.19. 
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Figure 6.19 - Probability of building failure of a 2-storey masonry building with basement for different 
water flow velocities V  
In the following, the comparison of model results with empirical damage data and 
literature vulnerability models is discussed. 
Figure 6.14 indicates that the model tends to overestimate damages. The variability 
of damage ratio for given water depth seems to be larger in the HOWAS (2012) dataset 
compared to the model result, and most damage data points lay outside the uncertainty 
bounds of the model result. Given these results, the HOWAS damage data cannot 
validate the model. However, it should be noted that the HOWAS data points are 
concentrated at small water depths, and therefore they do not allow evaluating the 
vulnerability curve at larger water depths.  
As illustrated in Figure 6.15, the model results compare favourably with the 
vulnerability curve for short floods from Penning-Rowsell et al. (2010), since the curve 
is within the uncertainty bounds of the model result. The vulnerability curve for long 
floods, however, lays outside the uncertainty bounds. 
Figure 6.16 indicates that although the shape of vulnerability curves generally 
compare well, the model tends to overestimates damage ratios compared to USACE 
(2000) and USACE (2003). Whereas the USACE vulnerability curves for two storey 
buildings are mostly within the uncertainty bounds of the model result, this is not the 
case for 1-storey buildings.  
As illustrated in Figure 6.17 the damage criterion for “Total building destruction” by 
Clausen (1989) approximately corresponds to the contour line for   0.2P F  . Although 
it could be argued that the criterion should follow a contour line corresponding to a 
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larger or smaller probability of failure, the fact that it follows the contour line so closely 
implies that the impact of water flow velocity on building failures is considered in a 
comparable manner. 
Summarising, the model seems to be qualitatively sound in terms of parameters 
sensitivity and yields comparable results to literature models. Nevertheless, further 
validation efforts have to be undertaken, possibly with better damage data and other 
literature models.  
6.5.2 Model discussion 
The presented vulnerability modelling approach allows for consideration of a large 
variety of building and hazard characteristics through explicit consideration of relevant 
damage processes. The considered damage processes are modelled with sub-models in 
terms of conditional probability. The modelling approach provides a guideline to 
logically link the sub-models. However, the modelling of individual sub-models is not 
prescribed in the modelling approach and may vary between implementations. 
By considering buildings through its components and representing the most relevant 
damage processes, the modelling approach is in principle applicable to many building 
types and hazard situations, for which the represented damage processes are relevant 
(conversely, situations in which other damage processes, such as foundation scour and 
debris impact, are relevant, cannot be well represented). In an implementation of the 
modelling approach, component list and the specification of sub-models can be chosen 
in consideration of building type and the level of detail of the implementation. The 
possibility to apply the same modelling approach to a large variety of circumstances is 
seen as strength of the presented work. It allows for consistently developing 
vulnerability models for different building types and levels of detail. This is a distinct 
advantage over other vulnerability models, whose transferability in time and space is 
often limited (Cammerer et al., 2013). Considering the building as a collection of 
components allows for a flexible representation of the spatial value distribution within 
the building (i.e. distribution of the components) and to model damage mechanisms at a 
component level. This is useful for the evaluation of the benefits of flood risk reduction 
measures. Flood proofing measures can be introduced in the building as additional 
components (e.g. a flood barrier which keeps water away from the building up to a 
certain height) or through reduction of the components fragility (e.g. when wet-proofing 
a building). The effect of early-warning systems can also be represented, in that 
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building contents can be moved to higher floors and ground floor openings can be 
sealed reducing the water infiltration flow rate into the building.  
The use of conditional probability terms renders the modelling approach modular. 
Individual sub-models (i.e. one conditional probability term) can be replaced and 
improved when a more sophisticated sub-model becomes available, without need to 
change other parts of the modelling approach. Also, additional damage mechanisms can 
be considered with further conditional probability terms, without need of modifying 
other sub-models. Parameter uncertainty is considered in such a way that it is possible 
to consistently model the vulnerability of well-defined buildings with little uncertainty 
as well as the vulnerability of buildings within a portfolio, which is subject to larger 
uncertainties.  
As mentioned in Mazzorana et al. (2014), for a meaningful analytical vulnerability 
study it is of great importance to accurately capture flood hazard impacting a residential 
building. While the modelling of hazard is not addressed in this paper, when 
implementing the modelling approach, hazard should be appropriately modelled in 
consideration of the level of detail of the implementation.  
The implemented model is more complex than many other vulnerability models 
available in literature. Whereas model complexity is not necessarily negative, (see 
Schröter and Kreibich 2014) it raises the toll on establishing, implementing and 
validating the model. Development of individual sub-models, e.g. mechanical failures, 
water infiltration and water damage models, for each of the considered components is 
challenging and often requires expert judgement. Several postulations are made in the 
assessment of the large number of parameters and considered damage processes are 
implemented with simplified models. Furthermore, several hazard characteristics (e.g. 
flood duration, debris and contamination contents) and several damage mechanisms 
(e.g. buoyancy and foundation scour) are not considered.  
Full validation of the modelling approach and its implementation, beyond the 
anecdotal attempt made in this paper is challenging, since it would require an analysis 
of results for a multitude of possible parameter combinations. 
Further research works are recommended to improve and extend the model in the 
following. The applicability of the modelling approach for other building types, e.g. 
concrete or timber buildings should be demonstrated. The individual damage 
mechanism and water infiltration models should be individually refined and validated. 
A rationale for the estimation of the large number of parameters should be established. 
A sensitivity analysis in regard to the number and the type of considered components 
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should be made. The damage mechanisms that are not considered should be included in 
the modelling approach. Furthermore, it is recommended to improve the modelling of 
the hazard event, and test the modelling approach with real hazard event time series as a 
hazard input.  
Despite the shortcomings and identified challenges, the proposed modelling 
approach and its implementation are an important step towards the establishment of a 
vulnerability model that can serve as a basis for engineering decision making for flood 
proofing of residential buildings. 
6.6 Summary and conclusion 
In order to quantify the benefits of applying flood proofing measures to a residential 
building, a flood risk analysis is necessary. Furthermore, to compare the benefits of 
different flood proofing measures, the vulnerability model needs to accommodate the 
effect of the different flood proofing measures, i.e. decision alternatives, on 
consequences. 
Such vulnerability models seem not to be available in literature. Due to the 
complexity of flood damage processes most vulnerability models are based on 
regression, only consider few building and hazard characteristics as explanatory 
variables, and cannot reflect the vulnerability reduction introduced by flood proofing 
measures.  
In the present paper a new vulnerability modelling approach is proposed. The 
building is considered a collection of components, and fragility is modelled at a 
component level for two damage mechanisms: mechanical failure due to hydrostatic and 
hydrodynamic pressure, and damage from water contact. Moreover, it is considered that 
the building may collapse upon mechanical failure of a structural component. To 
accurately model damages, the water infiltration process into the building is modelled in 
detail and fragility is represented with engineering models where possible. 
The modelling approach is defined in terms of conditional probability terms in a 
general manner, which should be applicable to a large variety of building types. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the modelling approach for a 2-storey masonry 
building with basement is detailed.  
In a parameter study the impact of different hazard and building parameters on 
vulnerability is analysed. Moreover, results are compared to literature vulnerability 
models and to damage data from Germany.  
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The model shows the expected sensitivity to changes in building and hazard 
parameterisation and results are comparable to literature vulnerability models.  
As such, the general model framework is considered valid to model vulnerbaility of 
residential building in floods. Its flexibility and reliance of engineering models make it 
well suited to be utilised as a basis for engineering decision making for flood proofing 
of residential buildings. Shortcomings of the model are thorughly discussed; they are 
generally related to the complexity of establishing, implementing and validating the 
model. The presented modelling approach provides a strong foundation for future 
development and can be improved over time.  
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Annex to Chapter 6 
Table 6.9 - List of abbreviations utilised in Chapter 6 
Abbreviation Definition 
floorA   Building floor area. 
, 1,...,jC j N   The j th building component. 
EnvC  Set of all envelope components. 
StrC  Set of all structural components. 
D   Damage state. 
jDM  and ,j tDM
* Damage state of component jC  from mechanical damage. 
May take values , 0,...,j jkDM dm k K  . 
DM  and tDM
*  1 2, ,..., NDM DM DMDM  contains damage states from 
mechanical failure for all components. 
jDW  Damage state of component jC  from water contact. 
DW   1 2, ,..., NDW DW DWDW  contains damage states from water 
damage for all components. 
F   System failure event. 
 jkg    Limit state function for component jC  and damage state 
j jkDM dm  . 
H  and tH
* Water height external to the building. 
IH  and ,I tH
* Water height internal to the building. 
HZ   Hazard event. 
L   Monetary loss to the building. 
, 1,...,jL j N   Monetary loss to component jC .  
N   Number of building components. 
bN   Number of building parameters. 
jN   Number of component parameters for component jC .  
Q  and tQ
* Water infiltration flow rate through the whole envelope. 
jQ  and ,j tQ
* Water infiltration flow rate through component jC . 
R   Water rise rate. 
γS  Collection of all component parameter vectors  2, ,..., Nγ 1S γ γ γ  
t   Time 0 t T  . 
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Table 6.9 (continuation) - List of abbreviations utilised in Chapter 6 
Abbreviation Definition 
T   t T  is the time when water depth H  and IH  have both 
reached their respective maximal value. 
V   Water flow velocity. 
bw   Building value. 
, 1,...,i ji N    Component parameters.  
jγ   1 2, ,..., jj N  γ  contains the component parameter for 
component jC . 
H   Water head differential between building interior and exterior 
IH H H   .  
t  Time step. 
, 1,...,i bi N   Building parameter. 
Ψ    1 2, ,..., bN  ψ  contains all building parameters. 
* The subscript t  indicates the time at which the variable(s) is evaluated. The subscript 
is omitted for t T . 
Note that additional parameters and variables defined in the example application are 
summarised in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.7. 
 
Table 6.10 - Building parameters 
 
sn    bw USD   2floora m      gfh m   u  
2-storey masonry building 2 1000000 150 0.8 1 
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Table 6.11 – Parametrisation  of components. For components present on several floors, the ground flood 
parametrisation is provided 
C
la
ss
 
 
minh
m
  
maxh
m
     
b
m
 
 
w
m
  
 
cf
MPa
   
tf
MPa
  2m  a
  
fp
  
Wall 3  0 4 0.5 30 0.23 1 14 0.24 (0,1,0.3,5,20) (0,0,0.1,0.6) 
Wall 
finishing 2  0 4 0.2 45       
Roof 3  4 5 0.2 75     (1,2,5,20) (0,0,0,0.1) 
External 
doors 2  0 2.6 0.2 75 0.04 0.8   (0.01,1)  
Windows 2  1 2.8 0.2 75 0.004 1  10 (0.01,1)  
Internal 
walls 1  0 4 0.2 30       
Internal wall 
finishing 1  0 4 0.1 45       
Internal 
doors and 
frames 
1  0 2.6 0.2 75       
Fitted 
furniture 1  0 1.6 0.2 75       
Floor 
structure 1  0 0.6 0.5 90       
Floor 
finishing 1  0 0.62 0.01 90       
Plumbing 
pipes 1  0 1 2 20       
Sanitary 
fittings 1  0 1.6 1 90       
Heating 
radiators 1  0.1 1.2 1 90       
Electrical 
system 1  0 4 0.01 90       
Technical 
installations 1  0 4 0.01 90       
HiFi/TV/ 
Electrical 
goods 
1  0.5 1.4 0.01 90       
Upholstered 1  0 1.6 0.01 90       
Chipboard 1  0 1.2 0.2 90       
Polished 
wood 1  0 1.8 0.2 90       
Soft 
furnishing 1  0 2 0.01 90       
Personal 
belongings 1  0 2 0.01 45       
Boiler 1  -2.2 -0.5 1 90       
Heating  1  -2.2 -0.5 0.2 90       
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Table 6.12 - Uncertainty parameterisation 
Parameter 
Expected value 
Distribution 
family 
COV 
Single 
risk Portfolio Single risk Portfolio 
   10000 100 - - - 
gfh  -1 Gamma 0.001 0.82 
floora  -1 Lognormal 0.001 12 
cf   -1 Lognormal 0.17 0.173 
tf  -1 Lognormal 0,30 0,303 
 ,    -1 Normal 1 1 
w  , b , minh  
, maxh   -1 Normal 0.01 0.5 
a  -1 Truncated Normal 0.1 0.1 
 
1 – The expected value is given in the parameter tables above.  
2- Source: Statistical analysis of HOWAS (2012). 
3 – Source: JCSS (2001). 
All other values are postulated. 

  
 
 
7 Modelling and optimisation of a 
hierarchical flood protection 
system  
The present chapter describes an example application of the 
methodologies introduced in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. A 
hierarchical flood protection system with three hierarchy levels 
(dike, local flood barriers and dry-proofing of individual 
buildings) is proposed and optimised for a small village in 
Switzerland. The aim of the example is to further illustrate the 
concept of hierarchical flood protection systems and the proposed 
methodologies. However, due to insufficient data quality and 
several assumptions and postulations the results are not of 
immediate practical relevance.  
 
 
  
Modelling and optimisation of a hierarchical flood protection system 
154 
7.1 Introduction 
The example application is carried out for the village of Kriessern, located in the Canton 
St. Gallen in Eastern Switzerland (see Figure 7.1); the river Rhine flows in close 
proximity to the village. The Rhine has its source in the central Alps, and feeds into the 
North Sea in The Netherlands. The part of the Rhine relevant to this study is called 
Alpine Rhine, which leads from Reichenau to the Lake Constance and in particular the 
“international section” of the Alpine Rhine, which forms the border between 
Switzerland and Austria, is of interest.  
Over the last centuries, this river section has seen several course corrections and 
improvements to the flood protection system. The current flood protection system was 
constructed in early 20th century (Schenk et al. 2014); its main protection structure is a 
dike designed to protect the flood plain from river discharges of up to 3100m3/s, 
corresponding to a 100 year event. The dike has been breached several times in the past, 
most recently in Fussach in 1987 (IRR 2012). 
 
Figure 7.1 - The location of Kriessern in Northeastern Switzerland  
The ageing dike, continued flood plain urbanisation and increased flood protection 
requirements have prompted governments of Austria and Switzerland to plan 
improvements to the flood protection system, with the goal of increasing protection for 
events with a river discharge of at least 4300m3/s, equivalent to a 300 year event, with a 
contingent plan for extreme events with discharges up to 5800m3/s. Several 
improvements to the flood protection system are currently being planned or 
implemented (IRR 2012, IRKA 2014, Schenk et al. 2014).  
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7.2 Study area 
The international section of the Alpine Rhine is chosen for this example application due 
to the current state of its flood protection system. Kriessern is chosen because of its 
proximity to the Rhine and its small size, which is ideal for testing the implementation 
of the proposed methodologies. The study area is chosen to include a section of the river 
upstream and downstream of the village, see Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2 - Study area with river Rhine, dikes and Kriessern (Data: Swisstopo 2010) 
At the end of 2013, Kriessern had 1738 inhabitants (Politische Gemeinde Oberriet 
2014). Its economy includes small industrial, commercial and tourist sectors. Next to 
the village itself, the study area mainly includes agricultural land and small patches of 
forest.  
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7.2.1 Scope of analysis 
The goal of this analysis is to identify an appropriate flood protection system for 
Kriessern. Taking the current dike as a starting point, a hierarchical flood protection 
system with three hierarchy levels is proposed and the optimised through a risk-based 
decision analysis.  
While the Austrian side of the Rhine Valley is included in the flow routing model, 
consequences are modelled only on the Swiss river bank. Flood consequences to 
agriculture, forest, industry and infrastructure are disregarded.  
7.2.2 Data 
The location of buildings and infrastructure (including the dike) in the study area is 
available from Swisstopo (2010), which also provides information on the floor area of 
buildings. Several further building characteristics are available as aggregate statistics 
from BFS (2014). As the exact location of receptors is known, the probabilistic 
disaggregation model introduced in Chapter 5 is not necessary to model the spatial 
distribution of receptors. 
The digital elevation model (DEM) for the study area is available from Swisstopo 
(2005) at a 25m  resolution, with an average error in the elevation value of 1.5m . Profile 
and cross-section data for the river, as well as geometrical and resistance features of the 
dike, are not available.  
Several water gauges are present on the Alpine Rhine within or in proximity of the 
study area, i.e. in Oberriet and Diepoldsau on the Swiss river bank (BAFU 2014a) and 
in Bangs on the Austrian river bank (Land Voralberg 2014). A recent discharge history 
is available for each station. For Diepoldsau, the annual maximum discharge data from 
1919 to present is also available. 
7.2.3 Current flood protection system 
Currently Kriessern is protected by the earth dike built at the beginning of the 20th 
century. The resulting single-structure flood protection system is schematically 
illustrated in Figure 7.3. As mentioned, no details on the geometry and structural 
resistance of the current dike are available. The current dike height is assumed to be 
hdike=3m  above terrain; this assumption is based on the discharge-stage relationship in 
Diepoldsau available from BAFU (2014b) and the information that the dike is 
overtopped when river discharge reaches 3100m3/s (Schenk et al. 2014). 
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Figure 7.3 - Schematic representation of the current flood protection system in Kriessern 
Different sources indicate that the dike is in poor conditions, as earth cavities have 
been repeatedly discovered (Rhesi 2012), and the dike has been breached on several 
occasions, most recently in 1987 in Fussach (Schenk et al. 2014). For this reason, the 
breaching probability of the current dike is assumed to be high (see fragility model in 
Section 7.3.2.1). 
7.2.4 Proposed hierarchical flood protection system 
A hierarchical flood protection system with three hierarchy levels is proposed. The first 
hierarchy level is formed by the dike, the second level by local flood barriers and the 
third level by building envelopes, which protect the interiors of buildings; dry-proofing 
is considered as a measure to improve building envelopes. The proposed hierarchical 
flood protection system is schematically illustrated in Figure 7.4. In the next sections, 
the decision alternatives considered on each hierarchy level are detailed. 
 
Figure 7.4 - Schematic representation of a hierarchical flood protection system considered for Kriessern 
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7.2.4.1 Dike  
Next to the current dike configuration, two additional alternative configurations are 
considered. Alternative 1 entails a dike with the same height as the current dike, but 
with increased structural resistance. Alternative 2 entails a dike with both increased 
height and increased structural resistance. Figure 7.5 illustrates the three considered 
configurations. 
  
Figure 7.5 - Illustration of the considered dike decision alternatives 
On the first hierarchy level, the set of decision alternatives available to the decision 
maker is  (0) (1) (2)1 1 1 1, ,A a a a . Decision alternative  01a  is the current dike, and (1)1a  and 
(2)
1a are Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 respectively.  
The dike section protecting Kriessern is assumed to be 6km  long. Construction costs 
entailed by each decision alternative are summarised in Table 7.1. Construction costs 
for (1)1a  are derived from IRKA (2014); construction costs for (2)1a are derived from 
Delcan (2012). Life time of the dike is considered to be 1 100T   years for all decision 
alternatives; construction time is disregarded. Inspection, maintenance and 
decommissioning costs are not considered in this analysis. 
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Table 7.1 - Construction costs for considered dike alternatives 
Decision alternative Construction cost per km 
[CHF] 12 
Total construction costs 
[CHF] 
Current state -  01a   0 0 
Alternative 1 -  11a   217'000 1'302'000 
Alternative 2 -  21a  1'500'000 9'000'000 
 
7.2.4.2 Local flood barrier 
As detailed in Section 3.5.2, local flood barriers are available in a plethora of forms, 
with different protection heights and resistance specifications; Ogunyoye et al. (2011) 
give an overview of commercially available products, providing structural and 
operational details, as well as installation costs of each barrier. For this analysis only 
one type of barrier is considered, namely the Harbeck BigBag system, see Ogunyoye et 
al. (2011) and Big Bag Harbeck Gmbh (2014). 
The Harbeck BigBag barrier is made from wooden frames and specially coated 
woven geo-textile bags filled with sand and it is 0.75m  high. It is possible to stack up to 
three bags on top of each other, for a maximal protection height of 2.25m . The barrier 
system does not necessitate previous installation of fundament or anchoring system and 
is fast in its deployment. According to Ogunyoye et al. (2011), it is unlikely to breach 
and it is recommended for use on several terrain types and as a second line of defence 
away from the water course. Figure 7.4 illustrates an individual element of the Harbeck 
BigBag system, as well a barrier in use during a flood event.  
                                                 
12 All currencies from literature are translated into Swiss Francs (CHF), with September 2014 
exchange rates. 
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Figure 7.6 - On top one Harbeck BigBag barrier element, at the bottom Harbeck BigBag local flood 
barrier deployed (all pictures Copyright Harbeck GmbH) 
In the present application, it is considered that local flood barriers consist of three 
stacked layers of Harbeck BigBag, i.e. the protection height is 2.25barrierh m . Given the 
flexibility of this barrier system, in practice, the decision maker could choose the barrier 
locations almost freely. However, it is here considered that the local flood barriers are 
placed on borders of grid cells as illustrated in Figure 7.7. The considered grid cells are 
square with 100 m  side length; therefore, 400 m  of Harbeck BigBag barrier are 
necessary to protect one grid cell. A building is considered to be protected by a local 
flood barrier when its centroid lies within the protected area.  
 
Figure 7.7 - Grid cells on which boarders the deployment of local flood barrier is considered 
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For each grid cell two decision alternatives are considered in the decision analysis: 
‐ Do not deploy a local flood barrier. 
‐ Deploy a local flood barrier. 
The number of decision alternatives for the whole second hierarchy level entails all 
possible combinations of decisions for individual grid cells. The set of decision 
alternatives is  2( )(0) (1)2 2 2 2, ,..., KA a a a  and includes 2 2 LFBNK   decision alternatives, where 
89LFBN   is the number of considered grid cells. However, decisions are taken for each 
grid cell individually, resulting in LFBN  binary decisions rather than one decision with 
2 1K   decision alternatives.  
The cost for 100m of barrier is 31’200 CHF (Ogunyoye et al. 2011), the protection 
of a grid cell therefore costs 124’800 CHF. The cost of each decision alternative is 
found by multiplying the number of protected grid cells by the cost of protecting one 
grid cell. If two or more contiguous grid cells are protected, it is considered that the 
shared cell side is not protected twice. The life time of a local flood barrier is assumed 
to be 2 50T   years. Furthermore, it is assumed that the deployment time of local flood 
barriers is never an issue.  
7.2.4.3 Building envelope 
The third hierarchy level is formed by building envelopes, considered as a last 
protection for building interiors. Protection provided by the building envelope might be 
improved by applying dry-proofing measures, i.e. by making the building envelope 
watertight to reduce water infiltration into the building interior. Dry-proofing of a 
building generally involves a number of individual measures, which together effectively 
reduce water infiltration. A detailed overview of measures to dry-proof a building is 
found, e.g. in Wingfield et al. (2005). In this example, dry-proofing of a residential 
building is considered to entail the measures listed in Table 7.2. As described in Section 
7.3.2.3, the effect of these measures on water infiltration is captured by adapting the 
building parameterisation in the vulnerability model. 
Dry-proofing measures are assumed to be implemented up to 1m  over ground floor 
level. According to several sources, e.g. Kelman (2002), dry-proofing above this 
threshold significantly increases the failure probability of the building envelope due to 
hydrostatic pressure differential and it is therefore not recommended.  
A decision on dry-proofing is taken for each building individually. As such, for each 
building the following decision alternatives are available:  
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‐ Do not dry-proof the building. 
‐ Dry-proof the building. 
Given the number of buildings in the study area 480rN   , the set  3( )(0) (1)3 3 3 3, ,..., KA a a a  includes 3 2 rNK   decision alternatives. However, similarly to 
local flood barriers, an independent decision is taken for each individual building, 
reducing the complexity of the decision problem.  
Table 7.2 - List of measures required to dry proof a masonry building 
Measure Description 
Sprayed on cement 
The external building walls are sealed with 
spray-on cement. This reduces water 
infiltration through wall cracks. 
Flood resistant external door or flood gate 
Normal doors, especially of a certain age, tend 
to have large door cracks through which water 
can infiltrate the building. Here two options 
are available for flood proofing the door: 1) 
install a water- proofed door, or 2) install a 
flood gate in front of the door. 
Airbrick covers 
Air bricks are used to ventilate the building 
and the cavity between building sheets in 
cavity walls; they can be sealed with simple 
covers. 
Non-return valves in waste pipes and outlets 
When sewer system is at capacity and flood 
water pressure is increasing, water can flow 
backwards through sanitary installations into 
the building. A backflow valve blocks waste 
water from flowing into the building. 
Wall openings (e.g. windows and doors) are 
reinforced 
Wall openings, in particular windows, may 
fail due to hydrostatic and hydrodynamic 
pressure and a failure may lead to a rapid 
flooding of the building. Such failures can be 
avoided through appropriate reinforcement of 
wall openings. 
 
Indications from literature on the costs for dry-proofing of a building differ 
(Gersonius et al. 2008, Kreibich et al. 2011, Poussin et al. 2012, Joseph 2014), ranging 
from 3 '000  CHF (Gersonius et al. 2008) to over 24 '000  CHF (Kreibich et al. 2011). 
In this analysis, dry-proofing costs for a building are assumed to be proportional to the 
building perimeter. A cost of 200 CHF /m  is postulated, which results in dry-proofing 
costs per building between 8'000 CHF and 15'000 CHF, comparable to Zevenbergen et 
Modelling and optimisation of a hierarchical flood protection system 
163 
al. (2007) and Joseph (2014). The life time of dry-proofing measures is assumed to be 
3 25T years . 
7.2.4.4 Decision alternatives for the hierarchical flood protection system 
Given the set of decision alternatives 1 2 3, ,A A A  for each considered hierarchy level, the 
set of decision alternatives available for the whole flood protection system is: 
  1 2 3( , , ) 1 2 2 3 3, 1,2,3; 1,2,.., ; 1,2,..,k k ks sA a k k K k K    ,  (7.1) 
where  1 2 3 31 2( , , ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 3, ,k k k kk ksa a a a . 
7.3 Flood risk assessment 
Flood risk is assessed according to the general methodology for hierarchical flood 
protection systems outlined in Section 4.3, with several simplifications: 
‐ Given a hazard event and dike failure scenario, hazard is modelled in a 
deterministic manner; this means that the conditional probability density 
functions  00 0 ;m mhzf hz XX x φ  and  1 1,S , ; , 1,...,ii i i i i if s i N  XX X x x φ  introduced in 
Chapter 4 are degenerate.  
‐ The breaching of local flood barriers is not considered, i.e. the area protected by 
a local flood barrier is only considered to be flooded when the barrier is 
overtopped. 
‐ As described in Chapter 6, the state of the building envelope and water depth 
inside the building are considered to be dependent. As such, the assumption of 
conditional independence between the state of a protection structure and the 
hazard downstream of the structure does not hold.  
Figure 7.8 illustrates the methodology introduced in Section 4.3 and its implementation 
in the present example. 
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Figure 7.8 - Modelling overview 
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In this example, water depth wh  is considered as the only hazard index. As such, 0x  
contains realisations of water depth for the whole river channel. Similarly, 1x  contains 
realisations of water depth for the whole flood plain between the dike and any local 
flood barrier; 2x  contains realisations of water depth in the area protected by local flood 
barriers and 3x  contains realisations of water depth inside buildings. As wh  is the only 
considered hazard index, dike breaching, local flood barrier overtopping and monetary 
loss to buildings are assessed in function of, or conditional on, wh  impacting the 
protection structure or building. In the following, the notation , 0,1,2,3i i x  is utilised 
for water depth across whole areas (e.g. the whole river channel or the whole flood 
plain) and the notation wh  is utilised for water depth impacting a particular protection 
structure or building.  
Categorical variable 1S  indicates the state of the dike. Breaching of local flood 
barrier is neglected, therefore, the state 2S  of local flood barrier is considered constant. 
The state 3S  of building envelopes is modelled with the vulnerability model described 
in Chapter 6.  
The parameter vectors 
0X
φ  and 
1X
φ  contain the parameterisation of the flow routing 
model, including the digital elevation model of the study area (Swisstopo 2005), surface 
roughness parameter (Manning's n ), and river geometry. Parameter vector 
1S
φ  contains 
dike height dikeh  as well as parameterisation of the dike fragility model (as described in 
Section 7.3.2.1). Parameter vector 
2S
φ  contains height barrierh  and location of local flood 
barriers. Parameter vector , 1,2,...,
jL r
j Nφ  contains all parameters to assess monetary 
loss to building j  in accordance with the vulnerability model described in Chapter 6. 
As such, parameter vector 
3S
φ  is a collection of all , 1,...,
jL r
j Nφ . 
In the right column of Figure 7.8, the implementation approach of all modelling 
steps is given; each is described in more detail in the following sections, however, a 
comment on hazard modelling is given here. According to the general methodology, 
hazard is modelled in steps, with each step delimited by the protection structures at two 
hierarchy levels. As previously mentioned, this would require a lumped flow routing 
model to be employed; however, to allow an accurate modelling of hazard a distributed 
flow routing model is chosen and thus a different implementation approach is identified. 
Hazards in the river channel and on the flood plain are jointly assessed conditionally on 
the state 1S  of the dike and without consideration of any local flood barriers. From the 
results of the flow routing model, the functions  00 0 ,mg hz Xx φ  and 
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 11 1 0 1, ,g s Xx x φ  can be derived if necessary. The impact of local flood barriers on 
hazard is modelled by modifying the results of the flood routing model. 
7.3.1 Receptors 
Receptors considered in this application are 480rN   buildings, identified with 
subindex 1,..., rj N . Each building j  is characterised by parameter vector jLφ , which 
not only parametrises building vulnerability in accordance with Chapter 6, but also its 
location. As such, 
jL
φ  includes all information necessary to determine monetary loss to 
building j . 
Data on location and floor area of each building is available from Swisstopo (2010). 
Information on the number of stories is available as an aggregated statistics from 
Bundesamt für Statistik (2014); it indicates that 90% of single-family residential 
buildings in Canton St. Gallen are 2-storey. No data is available in regard to other 
building characteristics. It is therefore postulated that the main building material for all 
buildings is masonry and that 50% of buildings have a basement. Storey heights are 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 3m  and standard deviation 0.5m . The 
building value is modelled in function of its volume; the monetary value per cubic 
meter is assumed to be 2000 3CHF m . 
Each building is characterised with available knowledge and by sampling from 
aggregated statistics. Given the lack of data, epistemic uncertainty on building 
configuration and its monetary value is large, prompting a building parameterisation 
reflecting large uncertainty. However, the choice is made to parameterise buildings with 
little uncertainty. The reason for this modelling choice is to replicate the conditions 
under which a decision maker would optimise a hierarchical flood protection system in 
practice. At the scale of this model, it is reasonable to assume that the decision maker 
would have detailed data on each building; hence the modelling choice is taken to 
utilise the parameterisation for “Known building configuration” described in Chapter 6.  
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7.3.2 Fragility and vulnerability models  
Fragility models for dike and local flood barriers, as well as a building vulnerability 
model are introduced. 
7.3.2.1 Dike fragility 
The dike fragility model allows for modelling breaching of the dike. In a common 
modelling approach, see e.g. Hall, Dawson et al. (2003), the dike is subdivided into dike 
sections. In particular, the 6km  dike here considered is divided into 10sN   dike 
sections of 600m  length as illustrated in Figure 7.9. According to several sources, e.g. 
Vorogushyn et al. (2010), for dike sections of this length, the structural response of 
individual dike sections can be assumed to be conditionally independent given the load 
from a hazard event. A breach is understood as structural failure of a dike section, 
leading to a removal of the dike cross-section. 
 
Figure 7.9 - Considered dike sections and breaching locations 
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In the present analysis, no information on dike geometry and construction material is 
available. Therefore, the fragility of dike sections cannot be modelled in detail and a 
simplified approach is taken instead. A fragility curve is postulated for each considered 
dike decision alternative in set 1A . Each fragility model defines the breaching 
probability for dike sections 1,..., 10su N   in function of the water depth ( )uwh  from 
the foot of the dike (see Figure 7.10). As ( )uwh  is the water depth within the river 
channel, it is an element of 0x . 
 
Figure 7.10 - Water depth ( )uwh  from the foot of the dike used to calculate the dike breaching 
probability  
Defining random event  uB  as a breach of the u th dike section, the probability 
  ( )u u
wP B h    is assumed to follow the lognormal distribution function. That is: 
    ( )( ) ln uwu uw hP B h 
         
  (7.2) 
where     is the standard normal distribution function,   is the scale parameter of the 
lognormal distribution and   is its log-shape parameter. Parameter values for each dike 
decision alternatives are provided in the table below. The resulting fragilities curves are 
illustrated in Figure 7.11. 
Table 7.3 - Parameter values for each dike decision alternatives 
Decision alternative Dike height over floodplain Distribution parameters 
Current state - (0)1a   3 m   1  , 0.7   
Alternative 1 - (1)1a   3 m  1.4  , 0.6   
Alternative 2 - (2)1a  5 m  1.7  , 0.4   
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Figure 7.11 - Postulated fragility curve for each dike decision alternative 
7.3.2.2 Fragility of local flood barrier 
According to Ogunyoye et al. (2011), likely failure modes for the Harbeck BigBag 
barrier system are overtopping, overturning, sliding and seepage. Conversely, collapse, 
rolling and breach of the barrier are deemed unlikely.  
Overturning and sliding of the barrier can be avoided by stabilising the barrier with 
a support structure on its dry side. Seepage is deemed to be smaller than 40 litres per 
hour and meter of installed barrier. As such, it seems that, if the barrier is correctly 
installed, only overtopping is a significant failure mode and no further fragility model is 
necessary.  
7.3.2.3 Vulnerability of residential buildings 
The vulnerability model introduced in Chapter 6 is utilised to model vulnerability of 
residential buildings, allowing representation of the impact of dry-proofing measures on 
vulnerability. Each building in the study area is modelled individually to allow for 
detailed consideration of its characteristics. As mentioned in Section 7.3.1, the j th 
building is characterised by parameter vector 
jL
φ . The parameterisation of building 
without dry-proofing follows the description in Chapter 6. From it, the parameterisation 
of the building with dry-proofing is derived by modifying parameters to reproduce the 
impact of dry-proofing measures described in Table 7.2. To identify which parameters 
to modify, heuristics are formulated describing the impact of individual dry-proofing 
measures on damage processes. Then, building and component parameters are identified 
which allow reproducing the heuristic in the model, see Table 7.4. 
 
Modelling and optimisation of a hierarchical flood protection system 
170 
Table 7.4 - Heuristic effect of flood proofing measure on building vulnerability and corresponding change 
in parameterisation (the parameters are defined in Chapter 6) 
Flood proofing measure Heuristic Modified parameters 
- Spray-on cement 
- Air brick cover 
- Backflow valves 
No water infiltration below 
1m  from the ground floor 
level. 
 0 0j j jA DM dm   13 
for all envelope 
components below 1m  
from the ground floor 
level. 
- Flood-gate /flood proofed 
door 
- Obstruct basement windows 
The building components 
below 1m  from the ground 
floor level are reinforced so 
that a mechanical failure from 
water pressure differential 
becomes unlikely. 
- cf   for all envelope 
components below 1m  
from the ground floor 
level14. 
- tf   for all envelope 
components below 1m  
from the ground floor 
level. 
 
An example of resulting vulnerability curves are illustrated in the figure below for a 2-
storey building without basement. 
 
Figure 7.12 - Vulnerability curves for an example 2-storey masonry building without basement with 
and without dry-proofing measures  
                                                 
13 For definition of  0j j jA DM dm  see Section 6.3.2.2 on page 131. 
14 For definition of cf , tf  see Figure 6.7 on page 127. 
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The vulnerability curves in Figure 7.12 illustrate how dry-proofing markedly reduces 
damage ratios at small water depth, since the water cannot infiltrate the building. When 
water depth increases, the dry-proofing measures lose their effect and water can enter 
the building.  
The monetary loss jL  for building j  is modelled (as described in Chapter 6) by 
multiplying damage ratio with building value. 
7.3.3 Hazard assessment 
The aim of the hazard assessment is to determine the probabilistic characterisation of 
water depth at each location in the study area. The hazard assessment entails several 
steps; Figure 7.13 provides an overview.  
In a first step the hazard source process (river discharge) is characterised. The 
probabilistic characterisation of extreme river discharge Q  is modelled through its 
probability density function  Qf q . The sample space HZ  of all possible flood events 
affecting the study area is approximated through an event set  1 2, ,..., Mhz hz hzHZ . 
Each event mhz  is characterised by a synthetic event hydrograph and a maximum river 
discharge ,maxmq , which is sampled from  Qf q  with a risk-based sampling method 
derived from Dawson et al. (2005). The occurrence probability 
mhz
p  of the event mhz  is 
also determined from  Qf q . River discharges and flood plain discharges are 
determined with a flow routing model (LISFLOOD-FP, Bates and De Roo 2000) for 
each hazard event mhz  and dike breaching scenario (where necessary).  
Local flood barriers are not considered in the flow routing model as the impact of 
local flood barriers on hazard is modelled in a later step. The water depth within 
buildings is calculated with the vulnerability model described in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 7.13 - Hazard assessment overview 
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7.3.3.1 Probabilistic characterisation of extreme river discharge  
Probabilistic characterisation of extreme river discharge is modelled through analysis of 
the annual maxima series. Annual maximum discharge data for the gauging station of 
Diepoldsau is available from BAFU (2014) from 1919 until present. From it, the 
probability density function of annual maximum discharge  Qf q  can be estimated15. 
The probability distribution proposed by BAFU (2014) is utilised to model  Qf q , i.e. 
a gamma distribution with mean 1337.48m3/s and standard deviation 448.87 m3/s. In 
this example application it is assumed that natural processes underlying floods are 
stationary; this means that any possible change in future flood risk, e.g. due to climate 
change, is disregarded. 
By modelling the hydrological load through an analysis of annual maxima series, 
the modelled risk will be on an annual basis and it is implicitly assumed that the 
probability of two or more events per year is negligible. 
7.3.3.2 Hydrological event 
Hydrological event mhz HZ  is characterised with a synthetic hydrograph  mq t  at the 
river inflow into the study area. Methods are available to define the shape of synthetic 
hydrographs from empirical observations, e.g. through cluster analysis of past events, 
see Apel et al. (2006). However, data to perform such an analysis is not available for the 
present study. Therefore, a synthetic hydrograph is freely postulated. The shape of the 
hydrograph is illustrated in Figure 7.14. In each event inflow discharge is assumed to 
start at 200m3/s and linearly increase to peak discharge ,maxmq , stay constant at peak-
discharge for approximately 90 minutes and decrease thereafter. Note that the base 
discharge (normal river discharge before the start of a hazard event) is directly 
considered in the initial conditions of the flow routing model.  
The peak river discharge ,maxmq  is sampled from  Qf q  in such a way, that the 
whole event set HZ  allows for a good representation of flood risk in the study area. 
The sampling methodology is described in Section 7.3.3.6.  
                                                 
15 Note that the gauging station of Diepoldsau is located well within the study area, i.e. not at 
the river inflow into the study area. The catchment areas (which generally correlate with the 
river discharge) at the river inflow into the study area and at the gauging station of 
Diepoldsau are similar in size, hence, it is reasonable to utilize the annual maximum 
discharge data from the gauging station to model the probability distribution of extreme river 
discharge at the river inflow into the study area. 
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 Figure 7.14 - Synthetic hydrograph 
7.3.3.3 Breaching scenarios 
Breaches can in principle, occur at any location along the dike, however breaches are 
here considered to occur in discrete dike sections 1,..., su N  (as illustrated in Figure 
7.9). The structural response of dike sections is modelled with the fragility model 
described in Section 7.3.2.1; the responses of individual dike sections are assumed to be 
conditionally independent given the hydrologic load from flood event mhz , i.e. beaching 
of each section 1,..., su N  is considered conditionally independent given river water 
depth 0x . 
In principle more than one dike section can breach during a hazard event, however 
here it is assumed that only one breach at a time occurs. As such, for each hazard event 
mhz , 1sN   scenarios are considered. Scenarios are identified through dike state 
variable 1S : the scenario with no breach is identified as 
 0
1S s , the scenario entailing 
a breach in the u th dike section, 1,..., su N , is identified as  1 uS s .  
The probability    u uwP B h    of a breach event in section u  is calculated with the 
dike fragility model formulated in Equation (7.2). From it, the probability of scenarios 
 0
1S s  and  1 , 1,...,u sS s u N   is derived:  
‐ Scenario  1 uS s  entails a breach only in the u th section and no breach in any 
other sections. Given that breaches are considered conditionally independent 
given hazard event mhz , the occurrence probability of scenario
 
1
uS s  is 
calculated as: 
       ( ) ( )1
1\
1
sN
u u u
m w w
u
P S s hz P B h P B h 

             ,  (7.3) 
‐ The probability of scenario entailing no dike breaches is: 
     01 1
1
1 1
sN
u
m m
u
P S s hz P S s hz

             (7.4) 
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This formulation assumes that probability of scenarios with two or more breaches is 
negligible.  
Whereas the occurrence of breaches is considered probabilistically, its geometrical 
features are modelled deterministically; based on observed earth dike breaches as 
reported by Apel et al. (2009) and Vorogushyn et al. (2010), a rectangular breach with 
depth 3m  and the width 120m  is postulated.  
7.3.3.4 Flow routing 
River channel and flood plain flow routing are modelled with the distributed flow 
routing model LISFLOOD-FP. Within LISFLOOD-FP, river channel flow routing is 
modelled with the one-dimensional kinematic wave approximation of the Navier-Stokes 
equations and floodplain flow routing is modelled for floodplain grid cells as a function 
of flood plain friction and free surface height difference across each cell face (Bates et 
al. 2013).  
LISFLOOD-FP is run for each considered hazard event mhz HZ and scenario 
(0)
1S s . The results of the model runs includes the water depth  uwh  impacting dike 
section 1,..., su N ; the probability of breach    u uwP B h    can thus be assessed for 
each dike section with the dike fragility model. LISFLOOD-FP is run again to model 
scenario ( )1
uS s  for all 1,..., su N  where     0u uwP B h    . 
The dike geometry is directly modelled within LISFLOOD-FP and dike overtopping 
is automatically considered with the standard weir equations see e.g. Chadwick et al. 
(2004). However, dike breach scenarios  1 , 1, 2,...,u sS s u N   need to be given special 
consideration, by modifying the dike geometry in LISFLOOD-FP as described in the 
following. At start of scenario  1 uS s  the dike is assumed to be intact. When river 
water depth ( )uwh  reaches its maximal value, LISFLOOD-FP is stopped and the 
intermediate results stored. A breach is then inserted in the dike geometry of section u , 
and the flow routing model is restarted from the stored intermediate results. 
The output of LISFLOOD-FP includes a time series of water depth for each river 
cross-section and each floodplain grid cell in the study area. As previously mentioned 
only the maximal water depth wh  throughout the study area is considered as a hazard 
index and stored in hazard vectors 0x  and 1x  for all hazard events mhz HZ  and 
breaching scenarios ( )1 , 0,1,...,
u
sS s u N  . The stored flow routing results would allow 
for extrapolating functions  00 0 ,mg hz Xx φ  and  11 1 0 1, ,g s Xx x φ  in accordance 
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with the flood risk assessment methodology described in Chapter 4. However, the 
explicit extrapolation is not necessary for this example application.  
The impact of local flood barriers on flow routing is disregarded, i.e. it is assumed 
that local flood barriers are too small to significantly affect the floodplain water flow. 
However, the impact of local flood barriers on hazard characteristics is considered, as 
described in the following paragraph. 
7.3.3.5 Hazard considering local flood barriers 
For areas protected by a local flood barrier, hazard within flood barriers is described 
with function  22 2 1, Sgx x φ . As detailed in the Section 7.3.2.2, breaching of local 
flood barriers is not considered and a protected grid cell is only flooded when its barrier 
is overtopped.  
Overtopping occurs when the water depth wh  impacting the barrier exceeds the 
barrier height barrierh . Although initial water flow into a protected area may be small, it 
is assumed a barrier loses its functionality when overtopped. As a consequences, if wh  
exceeds barrierh , water depth within the protected area is assumed to become what it 
would have been, had there been no local flood barrier, i.e: 
    22 2 1 1, S w barrierg I h h   x x φ x   (7.5) 
where  I   is an indicator function which returns 1 when the condition in brackets is 
satisfied and 0 otherwise, 1wh x  is the water depth impacting the local flood barrier 
and 
2barrier S
h φ  is the local flood barrier height. 
7.3.3.6 Event sampling 
For each event mhz HZ , peak discharge ,maxmq  is sampled from the probability density 
function  Qf q  of annual maximum discharge. The sampled events must be chosen so 
that the event set HZ  gives a good approximation of flood risk in the study area. Due to 
computational costs of flow routing, a crude Monte Carlo sampling approach is 
infeasible. Instead a risk-based sampling approach derived from Dawson et al. (2005) is 
utilised. The approach is first introduced in general terms and detailed thereafter.  
A small number (0)M  of peak event discharges (0),max , 1,...,mq m M  is sampled in 
regular intervals from  Qf q . The initial sample range is chosen so that all discharge 
values that could possibly contribute to flood risk are within the range. For each of these 
initial events, an approximated risk measure is calculated. This gives a first approximate 
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distribution of risk in function of peak event discharge Q. It then becomes clear which 
values of Q make the largest contribution to risk. Thereafter, additional sampling rounds 
are undertaken, and in each round, a sample is added to the sample set at a value of Q, 
which is expected to make a large contribution to risk. The size of the sample set ( )M   , 
where   is the sampling round, is thus increased, until convergence of total risk is 
reached. The detailed procedure is as follows: 
1) A first event set HZ  with (0) 10M   samples is created. Maximal discharge 
value maxm,q  for event , (0)mhz m = 1,...,M  is sampled from  Qf q  in regular 
intervals. The range of sampling is chosen such that the smallest event 
cannot produce any flooding and the largest has a negligible probability of 
occurrence.  
2) The probability of occurrence ( )
mhz
p    of each event mhz  is calculated as: 
  
 1,max ,max ,max
1,max ,max ,max 1,max ( )
( ),max 1,max
, 12
, 2,..., 1
2 2
1 ,
2
m
m m
Q Q m
m m m m
hz Q Q
m m
Q
q q
F F q m
q q q q
p F F m M
q q m MF
 


 

                              
, (7.6) 
where  QF q  is the cumulative distribution function of the annual maximum 
discharge. Note that  
mhz
p   may change with each sampling round, since it 
depends on the event sampling density. 
3) Each event is modelled in the flow routing model for all considered 
scenarios,  1 , 0,...,10uS s u  , with  1 0u mP S s hz    .  
4) Given the flow routing results for event mhz  and scenario  1 uS s , the 
approximated scenario consequences ,m ud  are estimated with an 
approximated damage function and the database of building location. The 
approximated damage function assumes damages to be proportional to the 
flooded building floor area. 
5) The risk integral for event mhz  is approximated with 
    ( ) , 1
0
s
m
N
u
m hz m u m
u
r p d P S s hz
 

     ,  (7.7) 
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and the total risk measure after the  th sampling round is: 
 
 
( ) ( )
1
M
tot m
m
r r
 

   . (7.8) 
6) The convergence of 
( )
totr
  is checked as:  
 
( ) ( 1)
( ) 1%
tot tot
tot
r r
r
 

     (7.9) 
7) If the convergence criteria is not met and additional sampling round ( 1  ) 
is started by sampling an additional event from  Qf q . The discharge for the 
new event is sampled as a neighbour of the event that had the largest value 
( )
mr
 . Thereafter the procedure from 2) to 6) is repeated.  
 
Note that the above procedure is only employed for the dike decision alternative (0)1a  
and without considering further flood protection structures. For all other configurations 
of the flood protection system, the same event set HZ  is utilised.  
7.3.4 Flood risk 
Annual risk jr  for building 1,..., rj N  (which is equivalent to the annual expected 
flood loss) can be calculated as: 
     1 1
0
,
s
m
N
u u
j hz m j m
u
r p P S s hz E L hz S s

              HZ ,  (7.10) 
where 
mhz
p  is calculated according to Equation (7.6) and  1, uj mE L hz S s    is the 
vulnerability model result given hazard event and breaching scenario. Total risk totr  for 
all receptors in the study area is: 
 
1
rN
tot j
j
r r

  .  (7.11) 
Annual expected loss is assumed to be stationary over time, i.e. the hazard and the 
receptor characteristics are assumed to be constant in time.  
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7.4 Decision model 
The flood risk assessment described in Section 7.3 is carried out for all configurations 
of the hierarchical flood protection system. As such, total risk   1 2 3, ,k k ktot sr a  is a 
function of decision alternative  1 2 3, ,k k ksa . 
7.4.1 Expected utility 
The expected utility of decision alternative  1 2 3, ,k k ksa  is defined in function of risk 
reduction,   1 2 3, ,k k ksr a , and costs    1 2 3, ,k k ksc t  it entails. Risk reduction for  1 2 3, ,k k ksa  is 
calculated as: 
         1 2 3 1 2 3, , , ,0,0,0k k k k k ks tot s tot sr a r a r a     (7.12) 
Expected utility is calculated over T=100 years which corresponds to the expected dike 
life time. It is assumed that, in the considered time frame, local flood barriers and flood 
proofing measures are renewed according to their respective life times. The construction 
cost for decision alternatives are captured in    1 2 3, ,k k ksc t . The expected utility of 
1 2 3( , , )k k k
sa  is then: 
           1 2 31 2 3 1 2 3 , ,( , , ) ( , , )0 11
T
k k kk k k k k k
s s st
t
E U a r a c t
           (7.13) 
where 4%   is the discounting rate.  
7.4.2 Optimal configuration of the flood protection system 
The optimal configuration sa
  of the hierarchical flood protection system is found by 
identifying the decision alternative with the largest expected utility, i.e.: 
    1 2 3( , , )max
s
k k k
s sA
E U a E U a        .  (7.14) 
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7.5 Results  
The results of this example application are presented as follows: first, the effect of 
hierarchical flood protection system on flood risk is analysed by comparing results for 
several postulated protection system configurations, with the aim of illustrating the 
impact on flood risk of different protection hierarchy levels. Then, the decision 
optimisation result is presented. The value of hierarchical flood protection systems is 
illustrated through a comparison of optimal system configurations under a number of 
different decision constraints. Results are described in the present section and discussed 
in Section 7.6. 
7.5.1 Risk reduction 
A common way of representing natural hazard risk is an exceedance probability curve 
(EP-curve), which captures the annual probability that a certain loss tot totL l  is 
exceeded. In a first step, an analysis of the risk reduction potential of hierarchical flood 
protection system is presented. Figure 7.15 illustrates an EP-curve for 12 different flood 
protection system configurations. These system configurations combine one of the three 
dike decision alternatives with minimal (no protection) and maximal protection 
available on the second and third hierarchy levels (i.e. all local flood barriers deployed 
respectively all buildings dry-proofed). As such, they are indicative for the risk 
reduction potential available at each hierarchy level and combination thereof. The 
considered system configurations are (for 1 0,1,2k  ): 
‐ Only dike ( 1( ,0,0)ksa ). 
‐ Dike and all local flood barriers ( 1 2( , ,0)k Nsa ). 
‐ Dike and dry-proofing for all buildings ( 1 3( ,0, )k Nsa ). 
‐ Dike, all local flood barriers and dry-proofing for all buildings ( 1 2 3( , , )k N Nsa ). 
The EP-curves for these system configurations are illustrated in Figure 7.15. 
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Figure 7.15 - Annual exceedance probability of loss totL  for different configurations of the protection 
system 
From Figure 7.15 the following observations are made. The current system 
configuration  0,0,0sa  entails the largest flood risk. Compared to the current dike, a 
strengthened dike (  1,0,0sa ) reduces risk slightly; a heightening and strengthening of the 
dike (  2,0,0sa ) reduces risk markedly. The addition of further protection levels effectively 
reduces risk entailed in each dike decision alternative. However, the marginal risk 
reduction from adding a protection level seems to decrease with increasing number of 
protection levels. Dry-proofing (decision alternatives  1 3,0, 1, 0,1, 2k Nsa k  ) seems to 
reduce size of losses, but does not affect the probability of incurring a loss. Conversely, 
local flood barriers (decision alternatives  1 2, ,0 1, 0,1, 2k Nsa k  ) reduce loss size, as well as 
the probability of incurring a loss. The combination of dry-proofing and local flood 
barriers is only marginally better than the system configuration, comprising only local 
flood barriers.  
7.5.2 Optimised flood protection system 
The hierarchical flood protection system for Kriessern is optimisation to maximise 
expected utility according to Equation (7.14).  
To illustrate the value of hierarchical optimisation of a hierarchical flood protection 
system, additional decision analyses are carried out; in each, the set of available 
decision alternatives is constrained to flood protection system configurations with one 
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or two protection levels. A total of four decision analyses are carried out, with the 
following constraints: 
‐ Decision optimisation SSO – Single-structure optimisation, only the dike is 
considered. The set of available decision alternatives is 
      1,0,0 2,0,0 3,0,0, , ,s SSO s s sA a a a .  
‐ Decision optimisation HO1 – Two-level hierarchical optimisation which 
considers the dike and dry-proofing of buildings. The set of available decision 
alternatives is   1 3,0,, 1 1 3 3, 1, 2,3, 1,...,k ks HO sA a k k N   .  
‐ Decision optimisation HO2 – Two-level hierarchical optimisation which 
considers the dike and local flood barriers. The set of available decision 
alternatives is   1 2, ,0, 2 1 2 2, 1, 2,3, 1,...,k ks HO sA a k k N   . 
‐ Full hierarchical optimisation FHO – Three-level hierarchical optimisation 
which considers the dike, local flood barriers as well as dry-proofing of 
buildings. The set of available decision alternatives is 
  1 2 3, ,, 1 2 2 3 3, 1, 2,3; 1,..., , 1,...,k k ks FHO sA a k k N k N    . 
In each analysis, optimal configuration of the hierarchical flood protection system is 
identified using the available decision alternatives.  
Results of the optimisation are presented as follows; in Figure 7.16, the optimal 
system configurations for each decision analysis are mapped out; in Figure 7.17, 
exceedance probability curves are compared; Figure 7.18 compares the optimal system 
configurations for each decision analysis in terms of annual expected loss, construction 
cost and expected utility. Finally, Table 7.5 summarises key characteristics of each 
optimal system configuration.  
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Figure 7.16 - Optimal configurations of the hierarchical flood protection system for different decision 
constraints 
As illustrated in Figure 7.16, the decision alternative is part of the optimal system 
configuration and seems to depend on whether local flood barriers are available in the 
decision optimisation: when they are not available, dike decision alternative (1)1a  is part 
of the optimal system configuration. Conversely, when local flood barriers are 
available, the dike alternative (0)1a  seems to suffice. Dike alternative 
(2)
sa  is never part of 
an optimal system configuration.  
The decision optimisations that included local flood barriers and/or dry-proofing 
seem to indicate that these protection measures are particularly efficient in proximity of 
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the river, where the probability of flooding is largest. However, the buildings in the 
South-Western corner of Kriessern are close to the river and yet do not seem to require 
protection from local flood barriers and dry-proofing. The reason might be found in the 
terrain, which is slightly more elevated in that area. 
The full hierarchical optimisation (FHO) yields a system configuration where no 
one building is protected by all three protection levels. This observation is further 
indication that the marginal increase in expected utility from the addition of a protection 
level decreases with increasing number of protection levels.  
 
Figure 7.17 - Annual exceedance probability of loss totL  for the current state of the protection system 
 0,0,0
sa  and the optimal system configuration sa
  for each decision analysis 
The EP-curves comparison indicates that, compared to the present protection 
system, the optimal system configuration from each decision analysis reduces losses at 
all exceedance probabilities. However, each optimal system configuration reduces risk 
differently. For instance, ,SSOsa
  ( sa
  for SSO) is more effective than ,HO1sa
  for small 
events with return periods below ca. 100 years, but less effective for larger events. 
Similar observations are made comparing ,HO 2sa
 and ,FHOsa
 . As such, the comparison of 
EP-curves does not allow an easy identification of the system that entails least risk. 
Here, Figure 7.18 is of help, it summarises total risk reduction, total construction costs 
and expected utility of each optimal system configuration. Table 7.5 gives further 
details on the characteristics of each optimal system and of risk reduction and costs they 
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entail. As expected, the expected utility of the optimal system configuration increases 
with the number of considered protection levels. Full hierarchical optimisation leads to 
the largest expected utility; single-structure optimisation to the smallest.  
 
 
Figure 7.18 - Net present value (NPV) of risk reduction and construction costs  as well as the expected 
utility for the optimal system configuration from each decision analysis 
Table 7.5 - Characterisation of the current protection system configuration and the optimal system 
configuration for each decision optimisation 
System configuration Current SSO HO1 HO2 FHO 
Dike decision alternative (0)1a  
(1)
1a  
(1)
1a  
(0)
1a  
(0)
1a  
Number of local flood barrier 0 0 0 12 9 
Number of dry proofed 
building (percentage of total 
buildings) 
0 0 50 (10.4%) 0 28(5.8%) 
Risk           
NPV totr  [CHF / year ] 10’214’000 3’196’800 1’814’540 2’113’500 1’475’680 
NPV r  [CHF / year  ] 0 7’017’200 8’399’460 8’100’500 8’738’320 
Construction costs           
NPV dry-proofing costs 
[CHF] 0 0 954’660 0 528’308 
NPV local flood barrier costs 
[CHF] 0 0 0 1’245’658 996’526 
NPV dike costs [CHF] 0 1’302’000 1’302’000 0 0 
NPV total construction costs 
[CHF] 0 1’302’000 2’256’660 1’245’658 1’524’834 
            
Expected utility [CHF] 0 5’715’200 6’142’800 6’854’842 7’213’486 
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7.6 Discussion 
The considered set of decision alternative As offers decision makers a range of system 
configurations with markedly different risk reduction potential. Based on Figure 7.15, 
comparison of EP-curves of the decision alternative entailing the largest risk (  0,0,0sa ) 
and the decision alternative entailing the smallest risk ( 2 3(2, , )N Nsa ) suggest that flood risk 
for the latter is approximately 100 times smaller than for the former. However, this 
comparison does not consider construction costs; in all probability, system 
configurations entailing smaller risk would entail very large construction costs, making 
them economically unattractive.  
In Figure 7.15, EP-curves for system configurations with local flood barriers show 
significant discontinuities ("jumps") in the loss level. The reason for these is explained 
in the following at the example of individual local flood barrier behaviour. Flood events 
where water level does not reach the top of the barrier cause no damage in the area 
protected by a local flood barrier. Conversely, when a flood event overtops a particular 
barrier, the protected area is assumed fill up instantaneously to the water level it would 
have had, without a local flood barrier in place, see Equation (7.5). A discontinuity in 
the EP-curve appears between two events, when the water level of the first event does 
not overtop the local flood barrier and the water level of the second event overtops the 
local flood barrier.  
Results illustrate the potential of hierarchical flood protection systems in flood risk 
management, as such systems allow for flexibly tailoring flood protection in function of 
hazard and receptors.  
Optimisation of hierarchical flood protection system allows identifying protection 
system configurations with a larger expected utility than single-structure optimisation. 
Results also indicate that the effectiveness of a flood protection system in reducing risk 
increases with a greater number of protection levels. That is, the expected utility of 
,SSOsa
  is smaller than the expected utilities of ,HO1sa
  and ,HO 2sa
 , which are in turn 
smaller than the expected utility of ,FHOsa
 . The reason for the increase in expected utility 
with increasing number of protection levels is that every additional protection levels 
allows for better tailored flood protection. 
Local flood barriers and a strengthened dike (1)1a  seem to reduce risk in similar 
manner. In decision analyses which did not consider local flood barriers (SSO and 
HO1), optimal system configurations include the strengthened dike (1)1a , which allowed 
for reduction of the probability of flooding. Conversely, in decision analyses including 
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local flood barriers (HO2 and FHO), the current dike (0)1a  seems to be sufficient, as 
local flood barriers can be installed to reduce probability of flooding where necessary.  
The example application also allowed for testing of the vulnerability model 
presented in Chapter 6 in a decision analysis context. The vulnerability model proved 
valuable, as it allowed for detailed modelling of individual buildings as well as 
capturing the impact of dry-proofing measure on vulnerability.  
7.6.1 Limitations 
This analysis aimed at testing and illustrating the functioning of the proposed 
methodology for flood risk analysis and decision optimisation in the presence of 
hierarchical flood protection system. The analysis is limited in several regards, as data 
on the study area is scarce and several methodological simplifications were made to 
reduce the computational burden of the risk analysis.  
Detailed data on river morphology and cross-sections, current protection system and 
receptors is not available. In addition, no, detailed hydrological data is available, 
necessitating the postulation of a synthetic hydrograph. In consequence, the present 
study can give only an approximate characterisation of flood risk in the study area and 
practical relevance of the results is limited. 
Methodological limitations are identified in the hazard assessment, fragility models 
and of consequence assessment. The stationarity of the hazard source process is not 
assessed and the probability of having more than one event per year is disregarded. 
Statistical uncertainty in  Qf q  is not considered. The inflow hydrograph of each event 
is freely postulated with the same hydrograph shape for all events. In an improved 
analysis, the shape of the hydrograph should be derived from past event hydrographs 
(see e.g. Apel et al. 2006).  
Flow routing models should be calibrated through comparison with data from past 
events along the Alpine Rhine. The impact of local flood barriers on flood development 
is not considered in the flow routing model. Considering different local flood barriers 
configurations in the flow routing number would have been unfeasible as the number of 
model runs would have increased significantly. However, local flood barriers of this 
size are likely to impact flood development in nearby areas, and should thus be 
considered in the flow routing model. Furthermore, the overtopping process of local 
flood barriers should be considered in more detail, allowing for a more gradual flooding 
of areas protected by local flood barriers. 
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Modelling of breaching scenarios can be improved by considering dike breach 
geometry probabilistically. Furthermore, scenarios entailing two or more breaches 
should be considered (see e.g. Dawson et al. 2005). Dike fragility models incorporating 
dike characteristics should be implemented to allow for detailed consideration of failure 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the assertion that local flood barriers do not fail, should be 
further investigated and, if necessary, a fragility model should be developed to 
characterise breaches in local flood barriers.  
As stated in Chapter 2, for consistent decision making, it is important to consider all 
types of consequences. Here, consequence assessment is limited to direct tangible 
consequences of one asset category, residential buildings. By disregarding other 
consequences, results may be misleading and favour protection system configurations 
relying on focused protection of valuable assets, rather than large protection structures 
providing extensive protection for the whole flood plain. If the same analysis is repeated 
with consideration for further consequences, e.g. the damage to infrastructure and to the 
agricultural sector, large protection structures would probably be favoured over small 
and focused protection structures. 
In the decision analysis, three alternative dike configurations are considered. In 
practice, relevant resistance parameters and protection height are continuous variables, 
which can be optimised with much more precision. Similarly, decision alternatives 
considered on the second hierarchy level are artificially constrained, as only one type of 
local flood barrier is considered and placement of barriers on grid cell borders is 
postulated.  
Decision optimisation is based only on economic optimality of decision alternatives. 
In an improved analysis, further aspects should be considered, for instance, robustness 
of the flood protection system configuration in regard to dike breaches, minimisation of 
the failure probability and flexibility for adaption for changing future flood risk.  
Several methodological simplifications (in particular, hazard is modelled 
deterministically and protection structure breaching is considered only on one hierarchy 
level) allowed circumventing challenges inherent to flood risk analysis in the presence 
of hierarchical flood protection systems. In particular, they enabled reduction of the 
flow routing model runs. For the application of the proposed methodologies in practice, 
such simplifications are not permissible. As such, further research is necessary to allow 
for the implementation the methodology proposed in Chapter 4 without these 
simplifications.
  
 
 
8 Conclusions and outlook 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing and discussing 
its key contributions, as well as giving recommendations for future 
research.  
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8.1 Originality, limitations and recommendations for future research 
The original contributions of this thesis are found in Chapters 4 through 7. As the 
chapters primarily discuss distinct topics, original contribution and limitations - as well 
as suggestions for future research - are summarised for each chapter separately in the 
following, and a more general conclusion and research outlook is provided thereafter. 
Chapter 4 outlines a modelling approach for flood risk assessment in the presence of 
a hierarchical flood protection system. The original contributions of Chapter 4 are: 
‐ A definition and characterisation of hierarchical flood protection system is 
provided. 
‐ The advantages of hierarchical flood protection system are described. They 
include: residual risk management, robustness, tailoring and the planning of 
future risk reduction capacity. At the same time potential disadvantages are 
highlighted, in particular flawless planning and execution are paramount for 
hierarchical flood protection system to deliver the promised advantages.  
‐ A methodology is proposed for flood risk assessment in the presence of a 
hierarchical flood protection system, as well as for its optimisation. 
‐ Several challenges encountered when modelling hierarchical flood protection 
systems are described.  
The main limitations of the work presented in Chapter 4 are:  
‐ The proposed methodology for flood risk analysis in the presence of hierarchical 
flood protection system hinges on the assumption of conditional independence 
between several variables. In certain situations, this assumption might not hold. 
‐ The modelling of hazards in accordance with the proposed methodology might 
be challenging, particularly when a distributed flow routing model is utilised.  
‐ Two advantages of hierarchical flood protection system are robustness and 
flexibility. However, the proposed utility function does not capture either, 
focusing only on optimal risk reduction. 
Further research recommended in regard to the work presented in Chapter 4 includes: 
‐ Find a solution to the outlined implementation challenges.  
‐ Establish and test utility functions, which consider not only economic cost-
benefit, but also robustness and flexibility of the flood protection system.  
‐ Analyse how hierarchical flood protection systems preform in regard to 
uncertainty of future flood risk and whether the consideration of hierarchical 
flood protection systems allows developing flood risk management strategies 
which can be flexibly adapted to the requirements of a changing flood risk.  
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‐ Identify practical situations (geography, river course, catchment characteristics, 
etc.) where a hierarchical flood protection system might be particularly useful. 
Chapter 5 introduces a model for the disaggregation of spatially aggregated 
amounts, which can be utilised to probabilistically disaggregate an aggregated portfolio 
of receptors. The original contributions in Chapter 5 are: 
‐ The probabilistic disaggregation model is a contribution towards consistent 
natural hazard risk modelling at different spatial scales and resolutions.  
‐ The model allows disaggregating an aggregated amount in accordance with an 
indicator available at a spatially higher resolution under consideration of 
uncertainty.  
‐ The spatial correlation between disaggregated variables is considered through a 
Gaussian copula. As such, the model allows for separately defining marginal 
probability distribution of disaggregated variables and their correlation structure.  
‐ The impact of disaggregation uncertainty on natural hazard risk assessment is 
illustrated through the example of a flood risk assessment. When disaggregation 
uncertainty is duly considered, the tails of the risk distribution increase as 
expected. 
The limitations of the presented probabilistic disaggregation model include: 
‐ The size of a disaggregation problem is limited by computation of the 
correlation matrix of the multivariate normal distribution. 
‐ The disaggregation model is only tested for disaggregation to raster grid cells. 
Whereas this is often sufficient for natural hazard risk analysis, the 
disaggregation to cells with different geometry should be tested. 
‐ Correlation between grid cells with different indicator values is not reproduced 
correctly. 
‐ Whereas the behaviour of the model is characterised with a numerical study, an 
analytical closed form of the joint probability function of disaggregated 
variables is not available nor is the analytical formulation of the variance of 
disaggregated variable.  
Recommended further research includes: 
‐ The probabilistic disaggregation model should be tested for applications with 
non-rasterised disaggregation areas.  
‐ Further investigation of the joint probabilistic characterisation of disaggregated 
variables, including research towards the identification of an analytical closed 
form of the joint probability density function is recommended. 
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‐ The impact of probabilistic disaggregation model on natural hazard risk 
assessment should be analysed, e.g. by applying the disaggregation model to 
realistic risk assessments. 
Chapter 6 introduces a modelling approach for the flood vulnerability assessment of 
residential buildings by explicit damage process modelling. The main contributions of 
the modelling approach are the following: 
‐ The modelling approach identifies relevant damage process (i.e. water 
infiltration into the building, mechanical failure of components in the building 
envelope and damage from water contact) and represents them in probabilistic 
manner to obtain a vulnerability curve.  
‐ The modelling approach is abstracted and modularised, which makes it in 
principle applicable to a large variety of building types and hazard situations. 
‐ Building characteristics are considered in extensive detail to capture the change 
in vulnerability introduced by flood proofing measures; the vulnerability model 
can be used as a basis for decision analysis. 
‐ The modularity of the model allows for improving the vulnerability assessment 
when new knowledge or new modelling approaches become available, e.g. in 
regard to individual damage processes.  
‐ The probabilistic approach and consistent treatment of uncertainty allows for 
modelling vulnerability consistently with the available information on the 
building configuration. As such, the modelling approach allows for coherently 
modelling vulnerability curves for single buildings, as well as for portfolios of 
buildings.  
‐ The proposed modelling approach is implemented for 1- and 2-storey masonry 
buildings; it seems to perform according to expectations. 
Limitations of the vulnerability modelling approach and its implementation are: 
‐ The modelling approach neglects several failure modes, such as buoyancy and 
foundation score and does not consider all hazard characteristics, like flood 
duration, debris flow and water contamination. However, the modular structure 
of the model allows these to be added in the future.  
‐ The modelling approach generally assumes that buildings are characterised in 
great detail, which necessitates the estimation of a large number of parameters 
and requires significant effort for establishing, implementing and validating the 
model. 
‐ Although it is claimed that the modelling approach is applicable to a variety 
building types, it is not implemented for reinforced concrete and timber 
buildings; its validity for these building types cannot be confirmed.  
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‐ In the implementation of the modelling approach, damage processes are 
modelled with simplified modelling approaches.  
‐ Full validation of the modelling approach and its implementation, beyond the 
anecdotal attempt made in Chapter 6, is challenging, since it would require an 
analysis of results for a multitude of possible parameter combinations. 
The following points are recommended for future research: 
‐ The applicability of the modelling approach for other building types, e.g. 
concrete or timber buildings should be demonstrated.  
‐ A sensitivity analysis on the number and type of considered components should 
be undertaken.  
‐ Damage mechanisms not considered here should be included in the modelling 
approach.  
‐ Further validation of the modelling approach, as well as its implementations, is 
required before the approach can be applied in practice. 
‐ The models of individual damage processes should be refined and independently 
validated. 
‐ A rationale for the estimation of the large numbers of parameters should be 
established.  
‐ The consideration of the hazard indices should be improved, i.e. the modelling 
approach should be improved to consider real hazard event time series as a 
hazard input. 
In Chapter 7, the hierarchical flood protection system is implemented for the village 
of Kriessern, Switzerland; main contributions of the chapter are: 
‐ The concepts of hierarchical flood protection system, the methodology for flood 
risk assessment in the presence of a hierarchical flood protection system and the 
vulnerability model for residential buildings in floods are tested. 
‐ As anticipated, results indicate that hierarchical flood protection systems have 
larger expected utility than single-structure flood protection systems. The results 
further suggest that the efficiency of a flood protection system in reducing risk 
increases with increasing number of hierarchy levels.  
‐ The vulnerability model specified in Chapter 6 seems to perform as expected as 
part of a decision analysis, allowing evaluation of flood proofing measures 
efficiency for individual building and hazard situation 
The limitations of the example application are: 
‐ The practical relevance of the described risk assessment is questionable, since 
the quality of available data is poor and several assumptions had to be made. 
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Data on receptors, river and current protection system are not available in 
sufficient detail for an accurate risk assessment.  
‐ Several methodological aspects were simplified to reduce computational times, 
e.g. the geometry of dike breaches; the shapes of synthetic hydrographs are 
considered deterministically. Furthermore, breaching scenarios with more than 
one breach are neglected. 
‐ Consequence assessment considers only direct tangible consequences for 
residential buildings. Indirect and intangible consequences are neglected, as are 
consequences to other asset categories. In all likelihood, a more complete 
consequence assessment would shift the preference towards a higher and 
stronger dike rather than local flood barriers and dry-proofed buildings.  
Further research in regard to the example application may include: 
‐ Given the identified limitations, the flood risk assessment and decision analysis 
should be carried out based on better data to confirm the findings, and 
ultimately, the value proposition of hierarchical flood protection systems. 
8.2 Outlook 
Here, a more general outlook is given on further research necessary to utilise the 
concept of hierarchical flood protection systems in practice.  
The disaggregation model presented in Chapter 5 and the vulnerability model in 
Chapter 6 both contribute to the consistent modelling of flood risk at different spatial 
resolutions, however, challenges remain to achieve this goal. In particular, for large 
study areas, risk assessment for optimisation of a hierarchical flood protection system 
might require hazard to be assessed at different resolutions, with different flood routing 
models. Research may be required to assure that hazard modelling at different 
resolutions is consistent.  
When breaching scenarios are considered on more than one hierarchy level, the 
number of unique breaching scenarios grows exponentially with the number of 
hierarchy levels, posing a computational challenge, which is not encountered in the 
example application, since breaches are only considered on one hierarchy level. Further 
research is necessary to identify computational methods to model a large number of 
hazard scenarios under due consideration of breaches in protection structures on more 
than one hierarchy level. 
The concept of hierarchical flood protection system promises flexibility in adapting 
a flood protection system to changing flood risk. In this context, research work should 
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be undertaken to analyse potential advantages of hierarchical flood protection systems 
in regard to climatic uncertainty.  
In this thesis, one application of hierarchical flood protection system optimisation is 
carried out, with the example in Chapter 7. The utilisation of hierarchical flood 
protection systems in other hazard contexts, e.g. mountain river and sea flooding, 
different protection structures, including a dam, and for larger study areas, should be 
tested. In Chapter 7 the optimisation of hierarchical flood protection system is 
approached with the objective of optimising expected utility, i.e. the economic benefit 
of the risk management measure. In future research, optimisation of hierarchical flood 
protection systems with different utility functions should be analysed, i.e. optimising for 
adaptability for future changes in flood risk or robustness.  
8.3 Concluding remarks 
Flood risk management is a continuous process of risk assessment, risk treatment and 
risk monitoring, with periodical re-evaluation and adaption to account for changing 
flood risk and improved assessment of methodologies. This thesis aims at improving 
flood risk management by proposing and formalising the concept of hierarchical flood 
protection system and by making two methodological contributions to improve flood 
risk assessment.  
Taking integrated flood risk management as a starting point, hierarchical flood 
protection systems are characterised and formalised, and a methodology for flood risk 
assessment in presence of hierarchical flood protection system is proposed. Whereas 
such flood protection systems are common in practice, their advantages are seldom 
formally considered in flood risk management. By characterising hierarchical flood 
protection systems and detailing their advantages, the potential of hierarchical flood 
protection systems is highlighted for both researchers and practitioners. Their 
mathematical formalisation and the flood risk assessment methodology provide tools for 
further research and for considering such protection systems in practice.  
Furthermore, this thesis proposes two new methodological approaches to particular 
aspects of flood risk assessment: consideration of uncertainty in disaggregation of 
spatially aggregated portfolio of receptors and modelling of residential building 
vulnerability. The probabilistic disaggregation model allows for disaggregating spatially 
aggregated portfolios of exposure with due consideration of disaggregation uncertainty. 
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The consideration of this type of uncertainty in natural hazard risk assessment is 
relevant, allowing for modelling risk distributions tails more accurately.  
The proposed modelling approach for vulnerability of residential buildings is 
general in its application and can represent the impact of flood proofing measures on 
building vulnerability. It can thus be utilised in a formal engineering decision analysis. 
The modelling approach provides a basis for researchers to develop consistent damage 
process-based vulnerability models for different building types. In practice, 
vulnerability models based on the proposed modelling approach can be utilised to 
determine the effectiveness of flood proofing measures on residential buildings, thus 
allowing for a formal decision analysis.  
Hierarchical flood protection systems can make an important contribution to 
improved flood risk management and allow a sensible use of societal resources. This 
thesis provides several building stones to facilitate the modelling of hierarchical flood 
protection systems in research and practice. 
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In this thesis hierarchical ﬂood protection systems (multiple lines of defence) are 
investigated. Hierarchical ﬂood protection systems offer several advantages com-
pared to single-structure ﬂood protection systems, since they can be precision-
tailored to ﬁt risk reduction requirements and allow for ﬂexible adaption of the 
protection system to changing ﬂood risk. As part of the thesis, a new methodo-
logy to model ﬂood vulnerability of residential buildings by explicit damage pro-
cess is presented and a methodology to disaggregated a spatially aggregated 
portfolio of buildings.  
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